Sokr. — You say that some men live well, others badly. Do you think that a man lives well if he lives in pain and distress? Prot. — No. Sokr. — But if he passes his life pleasurably until its close, does he not then appear to you to have lived well? Prot. — I think so. Sokr. — To live pleasurably therefore is good: to live disagreeably is evil. Prot. — Yes: at least provided he lives taking pleasure in fine or honourable things.[99] Sokr. — What! do you concur with the generality of people in calling some pleasurable things evil, and some painful things good? Prot. — That is my opinion. Sokr. — But are not all pleasurable things, so far forth as pleasurable, to that extent good, unless some consequences of a different sort result from them? And again, subject to the like limitation, are not all painful things evil, so far forth as they are painful? Prot. — To that question, absolutely as you put it, I do not know whether I can reply affirmatively — that all pleasurable things are good, and all painful things evil. I think it safer — with reference not merely to the present answer, but to my manner of life generally — to say, that there are some pleasurable things which are good, others which are not good — some painful things which are evil, others which are not evil: again, some which are neither, neither good nor evil.[100] Sokr. — You call those things pleasurable, which either partake of the nature of pleasure, or cause pleasure? Prot. — Unquestionably. Sokr. — When I ask whether pleasurable things are not good, in so far forth as pleasurable — I ask in other words, whether pleasure itself be not good? Prot. — As you observed before, Sokrates,[101] let us examine the question on each side, to see whether the pleasurable and the good be really the same.
[99] Plat. Prot. p. 351 C. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἡδέως ζῆν, ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ’ ἀηδῶς, κακόν; Εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γ’, ἔφη, ζῴη ἡδόμενος.
[100] Plato, Protag. p. 351 D. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθται, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμόν, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἂ τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθά, ἔστι δ’ αὖ καὶ ἃ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ ἐστι κακά, ἔστι δ’ ἃ ἔστι, καὶ τρίτον ἃ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτ’ ἀγαθά.
These words strengthen farther what I remarked in a recent [note], about the character which Plato wished to depict in Protagoras, so different from what is imputed to that Sophist by the Platonic commentators.
[101] Plato, Protag. p. 351 E. ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἑκάστοτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκοπώμεθα αὐτό.
This is an allusion to the words used by Sokrates not long before, — ἃ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ ἑκάστοτε ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι, p. 348 C.
Enquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency in the mind? Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or pain? Both agree that knowledge is dominant.
Sokr. — Let us penetrate from the surface to the interior of the question.[102] What is your opinion about knowledge? Do you share the opinion of mankind generally about it, as you do about pleasure and pain? Mankind regard knowledge as something neither strong nor directive nor dominant. Often (they say), when knowledge is in a man, it is not knowledge which governs him, but something else — passion, pleasure, pain, love, fear — all or any of which overpower knowledge, and drag it round about in their train like a slave. Are you of the common opinion on this point also?[103] Or do you believe that knowledge is an honourable thing, and made to govern man: and that when once a man knows what good and evil things are, he will not be over-ruled by any other motive whatever, so as to do other things than what are enjoined by such knowledge — his own intelligence being a sufficient defence to him?[104] Prot. — The last opinion is what I hold. To me, above all others, it would be disgraceful not to proclaim that knowledge or intelligence was the governing element of human affairs.
[102] Plato, Protag. p. 352 A.
[103] Plato, Protag. p. 352 B-C. πότερον καὶ τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ ὥσπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλως; … διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδον, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων. Aristotle in the Nikomachean Ethics cites and criticises the opinion of Sokrates, wherein the latter affirmed the irresistible supremacy of knowledge, when really possessed, over all passions and desires. Aristotle cites it with the express phraseology and illustration contained in this passage of the Protagoras. Ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὔ φασί τινες οἷόν τε εἶναι [ἀκρατεύεσθαι]. δεινὸν γάρ, ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν, καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα, πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἄγνοιαν (Ethic. N. vii. 2, vii. 3, p. 1145, b. 24). The same metaphor περιέλκεται ἐπιστήμη is again ascribed to Sokrates by Aristotle, a little farther on in the same treatise, p. 1147, b. 15.