| [CHAPTER XII.] |
| ALKIBIADES I. AND II. |
| [Situation supposed in the dialogue. Persons — Sokrates and Alkibiades] | [1] |
| [Exorbitant hopes and political ambition of Alkibiades] | [2] |
| [Questions put by Sokrates, in reference to Alkibiades in his intended function as adviser of the Athenians. What does he intend to advise themupon? What has he learnt, and what does he know?] | ib. |
| [Alkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on questions of war and peace. Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must fight those whom it isbetter to fight — to what standard does better refer? To just and unjust] | [3] |
| [How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or distinguish Just and Unjust? He never learnt it from any one ; he always knew it, evenas a boy] | [4] |
| [Answer amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the multitude, as he learnt to speak Greek. — The multitude cannot teach just and unjust, forthey are at variance among themselves about it. Alkibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not know himself] | [5] |
| [Answer farther amended. The Athenians do not generally debate about just or unjust — which they consider plain to every one — butabout expedient and inexpedient, which are not coincident with just and unjust. But neither does Alkibiades know the expedient. He asks Sokrates to explain. Sokrates declines: he can do nothing butquestion] | [6] |
| [Comment on the preceding — Sokratic method — the respondent makes the discoveries for himself] | ib. |
| [Alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is just, is good, honourable, expedient: and that whoever acts honourably, both does well, andprocures for himself happiness thereby. Equivocal reasoning of Sokrates] | [7] |
| [Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen are equally ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades is to measurehimself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia. Eulogistic description of those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must make himself as good as possible] | [8] |
| [But good — for what end, and under what circumstances? Abundant illustrative examples] | [9] |
| [Alkibiades, puzzled and humiliated, confesses his ignorance. Encouragement given by Sokrates. It is an advantage to make such discovery inyouth] | [10] |
| [Platonic Dialectic — its actual effect — its anticipated effect — applicable to the season of youth] | [11] |
| [Know Thyself — Delphian maxim — its urgent importance — What is myself? My mind is myself] | ib. |
| [I cannot know myself, except by looking into another mind. Self-knowledge is temperance. Temperance and Justice are the conditions both ofhappiness and of freedom] | [11] |
| [Alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free, and declares that he will never quit Sokrates] | [12] |
| [Second Alkibiades — situation supposed] | ib. |
| [Danger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts which may prove mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the generic word: madmen, aparticular variety under it] | ib. |
| [Relation between a generic term, and the specific terms comprehended under it, was not then familiar] | [13] |
| [Frequent cases, in which men pray for supposed benefits, and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every one fancies that he knowswhat is beneficial: mischiefs of ignorance] | [14] |
| [Mistake in predications about ignorance generally. We must discriminate. Ignorance of what? Ignorance of good, is always mischievous:ignorance of other things, not always] | ib. |
| [Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground do we call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special arts or accomplishments,but because they know besides, upon what occasions and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought to be used] | [15] |
| [Special accomplishments, without the knowledge of the good or profitable, are oftener hurtful than beneficial] | [16] |
| [It is unsafe for Alkibiades to proceed with his sacrifice, until he has learnt what is the proper language to address to the Gods. Herenounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the counsel of Sokrates] | ib. |
| [Different critical opinions respecting these two dialogues] | [17] |
| [Grounds for disallowing them — less strong against the Second than against the First] | [18] |
| [The supposed grounds for disallowance are in reality only marks of inferiority] | ib. |
| [The two dialogues may probably be among Plato’s earlier compositions] | [20] |
| [Analogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic Memorabilia — Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men] | [21] |
| [Fitness of the name and character of Alkibiades for idealising this feature in Sokrates] | ib. |
| [Plato’s manner of replying to the accusers of Sokrates. Magical influence ascribed to the conversation of Sokrates] | [22] |
| [The purpose proclaimed by Sokrates in the Apology is followed out in Alkibiades I. Warfare against the false persuasion of knowledge] | [24] |
| [Difficulties multiplied for the purpose of bringing Alkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance] | [25] |
| [Sokrates furnishes no means of solving these difficulties. He exhorts to Justice and Virtue — but these are acknowledgedIncognita] | [26] |
| [Prolixity of Alkibiadês I. — Extreme multiplication of illustrative examples — How explained] | ib. |
| [Alkibiadês II. leaves its problem avowedly undetermined] | [27] |
| [Sokrates commends the practice of praying to the Gods for favours undefined — his views about the semi-regular, semi-irregular agency ofthe Gods — he prays to them for premonitory warnings] | [28] |
| [Comparison of Alkibiadês II. with the Xenophontic Memorabilia, especially the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydemus. Sokrates notalways consistent with himself] | [29] |
| [Remarkable doctrine of Alkibiadês II. — that knowledge is not always Good. The knowledge of Good itself is indispensable: withoutthat, the knowledge of other things is more hurtful than beneficial] | ib. |
| [Knowledge of Good — appears postulated and divined, in many of the Platonic dialogues, under different titles] | [31] |
| [The Good — the Profitable — what is it? — How are we to know it ? Plato leaves this undetermined] | ib. |
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| [CHAPTER XIII.] |
| HIPPIAS MAJOR — HIPPIAS MINOR. |
| [Hippias Major — situation supposed — character of the dialogue. Sarcasm and mockery against Hippias] | [33] |
| [Real debate between the historical Sokrates and Hippias in the Xenophontic Memorabilia — subject of that debate] | [34] |
| [Opening of the Hippias Major — Hippias describes the successful circuit whichhe had made through Greece, and the renown as well as the gain acquired by his lectures] | [35] |
| [Hippias had met with no success at Sparta. Why the Spartans did not admit his instructions — their law forbids] | ib. |
| [Question, What is law? The law-makers always aim at the Profitable, but sometimes fail to attain it. When they fail, they fail to attain law.The lawful is the Profitable: the Unprofitable is also unlawful] | [36] |
| [Comparison of the argument of the Platonic Sokrates with that of the Xenophontic Sokrates] | [37] |
| [The Just or Good is the beneficial or profitable. This is the only explanation which Plato ever gives and to this he does not alwaysadhere] | [38] |
| [Lectures of Hippias at Sparta not upon geometry, or astronomy, &c., but upon the question — What pursuits are beautiful, fine, andhonourable for youth?] | [39] |
| [Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the background, who has just been puzzling him with it — What is theBeautiful?] | ib. |
| [Hippias thinks the question easy to answer] | [40] |
| [Justice, Wisdom, Beauty must each be something. What is Beauty, or the Beautiful?] | ib. |
| [Hippias does not understand the question. He answers by indicating one particularly beautiful object] | ib. |
| [Cross-questioning by Sokrates — Other things also are beautiful ; but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or under someparticular circumstances — it is sometimes beautiful, sometimes not beautiful] | [41] |
| [Second answer of Hippias — Gold, is that by the presence of which all things become beautiful — scrutiny applied to theanswer. Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies] | ib. |
| [Third answer of Hippias — questions upon it — proof given that it fails of universal application] | [42] |
| [Farther answers, suggested by Sokrates himself — 1. The Suitable or Becoming — objections thereunto — it isrejected] | [43] |
| [2. The useful or profitable — objections — it will not hold] | [44] |
| [3. The Beautiful is a variety of the Pleasurable — that which is received through the eye and the ear] | [45] |
| [Objections to this last — What property is there common to both sight and hearing, which confers upon the pleasures of these two sensesthe exclusive privilege of being beautiful?] | ib. |
| [Answer — There is, belonging to each and to both in common, the property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures — upon thisground they are called beautiful] | [46] |
| [This will not hold — the Profitable is the cause of Good, and is therefore different from Good — to say that the beautiful is theProfitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this has been already declared inadmissible] | ib. |
| [Remarks upon the Dialogue — the explanations ascribed to Hippias are special conspicuous examples: those ascribed to Sokrates areattempts to assign some general concept] | [47] |
| [Analogy between the explanations here ascribed to Sokrates, and those given by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia] | [49] |
| [Concluding thrust exchanged between Hippias and Sokrates] | [51] |
| [Rhetoric against Dialectic] | [52] |
| [Men who dealt with real life, contrasted with the speculative and analytical philosophers] | ib. |
| [Concrete Aggregates — abstract or logical Aggregates. Distinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for the Dialectician] | [53] |
| [Antithesis of Absolute and Relative, here brought into debate by Plato, in regard to the Idea of Beauty] | [54] |
| [Hippias Minor — characters and situation supposed] | [55] |
| [Hippias has just delivered a lecture, in which he extols Achilles as better than Odysseus — the veracious and straightforward herobetter than the mendacious and crafty] | [56] |
| [This is contested by Sokrates. The veracious man and the mendacious man are one and the same — the only man who can answer truly if hechooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses, i. e. the knowing man — the ignorant man cannot make sure of doing either the one or the other] | [57] |
| [Analogy of special arts — it is only the arithmetician who can speak falsely on a question of arithmetic when he chooses] | ib. |
| [View of Sokrates respecting Achilles in the Iliad. He thinks that Achilles speaks falsehood cleverly. Hippias maintains that if Achilles everspeaks falsehood, it is with an innocent purpose, whereas Odysseus does the like with fraudulent purpose] | [58] |
| [Issue here taken — Sokrates contends that those who hurt, or cheat, or lie wilfully, are better than those who do the like unwillingly— he entreats Hippias to enlighten him and answer his questions] | ib. |
| [Questions of Sokrates — multiplied analogies of the special arts. The unskilful artist, who runs, wrestles, or sings badly, whether hewill or not, is worse than the skilful, who can sing well when he chooses, but can also sing badly when he chooses] | [59] |
| [It is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his mark only by design, than that of one who misses even when he intends to hit] | [60] |
| [Dissent and repugnance of Hippias] | ib. |
| [Conclusion — That none but the good man can do evil wilfully: the bad man does evil unwillingly. Hippias cannot resist the reasoning,but will not accept the conclusion — Sokrates confesses his perplexity] | [61] |
| [Remarks on the dialogue. If the parts had been inverted, the dialogue would have been cited by critics as a specimen of the sophistry andcorruption of the Sophists] | [62] |
| [Polemical purpose of the dialogue — Hippias humiliated by Sokrates] | [63] |
| [Philosophical purpose of the dialogue — theory of the Dialogues of Search generally, and of Knowledge as understood by Plato] | ib. |
| [The Hippias is an exemplification of this theory — Sokrates sets forth a case of confusion, and avows his inability to clear it up.Confusion shown up in the Lesser Hippias — Error in the Greater] | [64] |
| [The thesis maintained here by Sokrates, is also affirmed by the historical Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia] | [66] |
| [Aristotle combats the thesis. Arguments against it] | [67] |
| [Mistake of Sokrates and Plato in dwelling too exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct] | ib. |
| [They rely too much on the analogy of the special arts — they take no note of the tacit assumptions underlying the epithets of praise andblame] | [68] |
| [Value of a Dialogue of Search, that it shall be suggestive, and that it shall bring before us different aspects of the question underreview] | [69] |
| [Antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic] | [70] |
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| [CHAPTER XIV.] |
| HIPPARCHUS — MINOS. |
| [Hipparchus — Question — What is the definition of Lover of Gain? He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth nothing.Sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation. No man expects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing: in this sense, no man is a lover of gain] | [71] |
| [Gain is good. Every man loves good: therefore all men are lovers of gain] | [72] |
| [Apparent contradiction. Sokrates accuses the companion of trying to deceive him — accusation is retorted upon Sokrates] | [73] |
| [Precept inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the Peisistratid — never deceive a friend. Eulogy of Hipparchus by Sokrates] | ib. |
| [Sokrates allows the companion to retract some of his answers. The companion affirms that some gain is good, other gain is evil] | [74] |
| [Questions by Sokrates — bad gain is gain, as much as good gain. What is the common property, in virtue of which both are calledGain? Every acquisition, made with no outlay, or with a smaller outlay, is gain. Objections — the acquisition may be evil — embarrassment confessed] | ib. |
| [It is essential to gain, that the acquisition made shall be greater not merely in quantity, but also in value, than the outlay. The valuable isthe profitable — the profitable is the good. Conclusion comes back. That Gain is Good] | [75] |
| [Recapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain is good, and that there is no evil gain — all men are lovers of gain — no manought to be reproached for being so the companion is compelled to admit this, though he declares that he is not persuaded] | ib. |
| [Minos. Question put by Sokrates to the companion. What is Law, or The Law? All law is the same, quatenus law: what is the commonconstituent attribute?] | [76] |
| [Answer — Law is, 1. The consecrated and binding customs. 2. The decree of the city. 3. Social or civic opinion] | ib. |
| [Cross-examination by Sokrates — just and lawfully-behaving men are so through law; unjust and lawless men are so through the absence oflaw. Law is highly honourable and useful: lawlessness is ruinous. Accordingly, bad decrees of the city — or bad social opinion — cannot be law] | [77] |
| [Suggestion by Sokrates — Law is the good opinion of the city — but good opinion is true opinion, or the finding out ofreality. Law therefore wishes (tends) to be the finding out of reality, though it does not always succeed in doing so] | [77] |
| [Objection taken by the Companion — That there is great discordance of laws in different places — he specifies several cases ofsuch discordance at some length. Sokrates reproves his prolixity, and requests him to confine himself to question or answer] | [78] |
| [Farther questions by Sokrates — Things heavy and light, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, &c., are so, and are accountedso everywhere. Real things are always accounted real. Whoever fails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the lawful] | ib. |
| [There are laws of health and of cure, composed by the few physicians wise upon those subjects, and unanimously declared by them. So also thereare laws of farming, gardening, cookery, declared by the few wise in those respective pursuits. In like manner, the laws of a city are the judgments declared by the few wise men who know how torule] | [79] |
| [That which is right is the regal law, the only true and real law — that which is not right, is not law, but only seems to be law in theeyes of the ignorant] | [80] |
| [Minos, King of Krete — his laws were divine and excellent, and have remained unchanged from time immemorial] | ib. |
| [Question about the character of Minos — Homer and Hesiod declare him to have been admirable, the Attic tragedians defame him as atyrant, because he was an enemy of Athens] | [81] |
| [That Minos was really admirable — and that he has found out truth and reality respecting the administration of the city — we maybe sure from the fact that his laws have remained so long unaltered] | ib. |
| [The question is made more determinate — What is it that the good lawgiver prescribes and measures out for the health of the mind, as thephysician measures out food and exercise for the body? Sokrates cannot tell. Close] | [81] |
| [The Hipparchus and Minos are analogous to each other, and both of them inferior works of Plato, perhaps unfinished] | [82] |
| [Hipparchus — double meaning of φιλοκερδὴς andκέρδος] | ib. |
| [State or mind of the agent, as to knowledge, frequent inquiry in Plato. No tenable definition found] | [83] |
| [Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain, what is the meaning of the word gain? None is found] | ib. |
| [Purpose of Plato in the dialogue — to lay bare the confusion, and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for clearing itup] | [84] |
| [Historical narrative and comments given in the dialogue respecting Hipparchus — afford no ground for declaring the dialogue to bespurious] | ib. |
| [Minos. Question — What is the characteristic property connoted by the word Νόμος or law?] | [86] |
| [This question was discussed by the historical Sokrates, Memorabilia of Xenophon] | ib. |
| [Definitions of law — suggested and refuted. Law includes, as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, usefulness, &c. Bad decreesare not laws] | [86] |
| [Sokrates affirms that law is everywhere the same — it is the declared judgment and command of the Wise man upon the subject to which itrefers — it is truth and reality, found out and certified by him] | [87] |
| [Reasoning of Sokrates in the Minos is unsound, but Platonic. The Good, True, and Real, coalesce in the mind of Plato — he acknowledgesnothing to be Law, except what he thinks ought to be Law] | [88] |
| [Plato worships the Ideal of his own mind — the work of systematic constructive theory by the Wise Man] | [89] |
| [Different applications of this general Platonic view, in the Minos, Politikus, Kratylus, &c. Natural Rectitude of Law, Government,Names, &c] | ib. |
| [Eulogy on Minos, as having established laws on this divine type or natural rectitude] | [90] |
| [The Minos was arranged by Aristophanes at first in a Trilogy along with the Leges] | [91] |
| [Explanations of the word Law — confusion in its meaning] | ib. |
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| [CHAPTER XV.] |
| THEAGES. |
| [Theagês — has been declared spurious by some modern critics — grounds for such opinion not sufficient] | [98] |
| [Persons of the dialogue — Sokrates, with Demodokus and Theagês, father and son. Theagês (the son), eager to acquireknowledge, desires to be placed under the teaching of a Sophist] | [99] |
| [Sokrates questions Theagês, inviting him to specify what he wants] | ib. |
| [Theagês desires to acquire that wisdom by which he can govern freemen with their own consent] | [100] |
| [Incompetence of the best practical statesmen to teach any one else. Theagês requests that Sokrates will himself teach him] | ib. |
| [Sokrates declares that he is not competent to teach — that he knows nothing except about matters of love. Theagês maintains thatmany of his young friends have profited largely by the conversation of Sokrates] | [101] |
| [Sokrates explains how this has sometimes happened — he recites his experience of the divine sign or Dæmon] | ib. |
| [The Dæmon is favourable to some persons, adverse to others. Upon this circumstance it depends how far any companion profits by thesociety of Sokrates. Aristeides has not learnt anything from Sokrates, yet has improved much by being near to him] | [102] |
| [Theagês expresses his anxiety to be received as the companion of Sokrates] | [103] |
| [Remarks on the Theagês — analogy with the Lachês] | [104] |
| [Chief peculiarity of the Theagês — stress laid upon the divine sign or Dæmon] | ib. |
| [Plato employs this divine sign here to render some explanation of the singularity and eccentricity of Sokrates, and of his unequal influenceupon different companions] | ib. |
| [Sokrates, while continually finding fault with other teachers, refused to teach himself — difficulty of finding an excuse for hisrefusal. The Theagês furnishes an excuse] | [106] |
| [Plato does not always, nor in other dialogues, allude to the divine sign in the same way. Its character and working essentially impenetrable.Sokrates a privileged person] | ib. |
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| [CHAPTER XVI.] |
| ERASTÆ OR ANTERASTÆ — RIVALES. |
| [Erastæ — subject and persons of the dialogue — dramatic introduction — interesting youths in thepalæstra] | [111] |
| [Two rival Erastæ — one of them literary, devoted to philosophy — the other gymnastic, hating philosophy] | ib. |
| [Question put by Sokrates — What is philosophy? It is the perpetual accumulation of knowledge, so as to make the largest sumtotal] | [112] |
| [In the case of the body, it is not the maximum of exercise which does good, but the proper, measured quantity. For the mind also, it is not themaximum of knowledge, but the measured quantity which is good. Who is the judge to determine this measure?] | ib. |
| [No answer given. What is the best conjecture? Answer of the literary Erastes. A man must learn that which will yield to him the greatestreputation as a philosopher — as much as will enable him to talk like an intelligent critic, though not to practise] | [113] |
| [The philosopher is one who is second-best in several different arts — a Pentathlus — who talks well upon each] | ib. |
| [On what occasions can such second-best men be useful? There are always regular practitioners at hand, and no one will call in the second-bestman when he can have the regular practitioner] | [114] |
| [Philosophy cannot consist in multiplication of learned acquirements] | ib. |
| [Sokrates changes his course of examination — questions put to show that there is one special art, regal and political, of administeringand discriminating the bad from the good] | [115] |
| [In this art the philosopher must not only be second-best, competent to talk — but he must be a fully qualified practitioner, competentto act] | ib. |
| [Close of the dialogue — humiliation of the literary Erastes] | [116] |
| [Remarks — animated manner of the dialogue] | ib. |
| [Definition of philosophy — here sought for the first time — Platonic conception of measure — referee not discovered] | [117] |
| [View taken of the second-best critical talking man, as compared with the special proficient and practitioner] | [118] |
| [Plato’s view — that the philosopher has a province special to himself, distinct from other specialties — dimly indicated— regal or political art] | [119] |
| [Philosopher — the supreme artist controlling other artists] | [120] |
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| [CHAPTER XVII.] |
| ION. |
| [Ion. Persons of the dialogue. Difference of opinion among modern critics as to its genuineness] | [124] |
| [Rhapsodes as a class in Greece. They competed for prizes at the festivals. Ion has been triumphant] | [124] |
| [Functions of the Rhapsodes. Recitation — exposition of the poets — arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent] | [125] |
| [The popularity of the Rhapsodes was chiefly derived from their recitation — powerful effect which they produced] | ib. |
| [Ion both reciter and expositor — Homer was considered more as an instructor than as a poet] | [126] |
| [Plato disregards and disapproves the poetic or emotional working] | ib. |
| [Ion devoted himself to Homer exclusively. Questions of Sokrates to him — How happens it that you cannot talk equally upon other poets?The poetic art is one] | [127] |
| [Explanation given by Sokrates — both the Rhapsode and the Poet work, not by art and system, but by divine inspiration — fine poetsare bereft of their reason, and possessed by inspiration from some God] | ib. |
| [Analogy of the Magnet, which holds up by attraction successive stages of iron rings. The Gods first inspire Homer, then act through him andthrough Ion upon the auditors] | [128] |
| [This comparison forms the central point of the dialogue. It is an expansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates in the Apology] | [129] |
| [Platonic Antithesis: systematic procedure distinguished from unsystematic: which latter was either blind routine, or madness inspired by theGods. Varieties of madness, good and bad] | [129] |
| [Special inspiration from the Gods was a familiar fact in Grecian life — privileged communications from the Gods to Sokrates — hisfirm belief in them] | [130] |
| [Condition of the inspired person — his reason is for the time withdrawn] | [131] |
| [Ion does not admit himself to be inspired and out of his mind] | [132] |
| [Homer talks upon all subjects — Is Ion competent to explain what Homer says upon all of them? Rhapsodic art. What is itsprovince?] | ib. |
| [The Rhapsode does not know special matters, such as the craft of the pilot, physician, farmer, &c., but he knows the business of thegeneral, and is competent to command soldiers, having learnt it from Homer] | [133] |
| [Conclusion. Ion expounds Homer, not with any knowledge of what he says, but by divine inspiration] | [134] |
| [The generals in Greece usually possessed no professional experience — Homer and the poets were talked of as the great teachers —Plato’s view of the poet, as pretending to know everything, but really knowing nothing] | ib. |
| [Knowledge, opposed to divine inspiration without knowledge] | [136] |
| [Illustration of Plato’s opinion respecting the uselessness of written geometrical treatises] | ib. |
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| [CHAPTER XVIII.] |
| LACHES. |
| [Lachês. Subject and persons of the dialogue — whether it is useful that two young men should receive lessons from a master of arms.Nikias and Lachês differ in opinion] | [138] |
| [Sokrates is invited to declare his opinion — he replies that the point cannot be decided without a competent professional judge] | [139] |
| [Those who deliver an opinion must begin by proving their competence to judge — Sokrates avows his own incompetence] | [140] |
| [Nikias and Lachês submit to be cross-examined by Sokrates] | [141] |
| [Both of them give opinions offhand, according to their feelings on the special case — Sokrates requires that the question shall begeneralised, and examined as a branch of education] | [141] |
| [Appeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise Man — this man is never seen or identified] | [142] |
| [We must know what virtue is, before we give an opinion on education — virtue, as a whole, is too large a question — we will enquireabout one branch of virtue — courage] | ib. |
| [Question — what is courage? Laches answers by citing one particularly manifest case of courage — mistake of not giving a generalexplanation] | [143] |
| [Second answer. Courage is a sort of endurance of the mind — Sokrates points out that the answer is vague and incorrect — enduranceis not always courage: even intelligent endurance is not always courage] | ib. |
| [Confusion. New answer given by Nikias. Courage is a sort of Intelligence — the intelligence of things terrible and not terrible.Objections of Lachês] | [144] |
| [Questions of Sokrates to Nikias. It is only future events, not past or present, which are terrible; but intelligence of future events cannotbe had without intelligence of past or present] | [145] |
| [Courage therefore must be intelligence of good and evil generally. But this definition would include the whole of virtue, and we declared thatcourage was only a part thereof — it will not hold therefore as a definition of courage] | [146] |
| [Remarks. Warfare of Sokrates against the false persuasion of knowledge. Brave generals deliver opinions confidently about courage withoutknowing what it is] | ib. |
| [No solution given by Plato — apparent tendency of his mind, in looking for a solution. Intelligence — cannot be understood withoutreference to some object or end] | [147] |
| [Object — is supplied in the answer of Nikias. Intelligence — of things terrible and not terrible. Such intelligence is notpossessed by professional artists] | [148] |
| [Postulate of a Science of Ends, or Teleology, dimly indicated by Plato. The Unknown Wise Man — correlates with the undiscovered Scienceof Ends] | ib. |
| [Perfect condition of the intelligence — is the one sufficient condition of virtue] | [149] |
| [Dramatic contrast between Lachês and Sokrates, as cross-examiners] | [150] |
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| [CHAPTER XIX.] |
| CHARMIDES. |
| [Scene and personages of the dialogue. Crowded palæstra. Emotions of Sokrates] | [153] |
| [Question, What is Temperance? addressed by Sokrates to the temperate Charmides. Answer, It is a kind of sedateness or slowness] | [154] |
| [But Temperance is a fine or honourable thing, and slowness is, in many or most cases, not fine or honourable, but the contrary. Temperancecannot be slowness] | ib. |
| [Second answer. Temperance is a variety of the feeling of shame. Refuted by Sokrates] | ib. |
| [Third answer. Temperance consists in doing one’s own business. Defended by Kritias. Sokrates pronounces it a riddle, and refutes it.Distinction between making and doing] | [155] |
| [Fourth answer, by Kritias. Temperance consists in self-knowledge] | ib. |
| [Questions of Sokrates thereupon. What good does self-knowledge procure for us? What is the object known, in this case ? Answer: There is noobject of knowledge, distinct from the knowledge itself] | [156] |
| [Sokrates doubts the possibility of any knowledge, without a given cognitum as its object. Analogies to prove that knowledge of knowledgeis impossible] | [156] |
| [All knowledge must be relative to some object] | [157] |
| [All properties are relative — every thing in nature has its characteristic property with reference to something else] | ib. |
| [Even if cognition of cognition were possible, cognition of non-cognition would be impossible. A man may know what he knows, but he cannot knowwhat he is ignorant of. He knows the fact that he knows: but he does not know how much he knows, and how much he does not know] | [158] |
| [Temperance, therefore, as thus defined, would be of little or no value] | [159] |
| [But even granting the possibility of that which has just been denied, still Temperance would be of little value. Suppose that all separatework were well performed, by special practitioners, we should not attain our end — Happiness] | ib. |
| [Which of the varieties of knowledge contributes most to well-doing or happiness? That by which we know good and evil] | [160] |
| [Without the science of good and evil, the other special science will be of little or of no service. Temperance is not the science of good andevil, and is of little service] | [161] |
| [Sokrates confesses to entire failure in his research. He cannot find out what temperance is: although several concessions have been made whichcannot be justified] | ib. |
| [Temperance is and must be a good thing: but Charmides cannot tell whether he is temperate or not ; since what temperance is remainsunknown] | [162] |
| [Expressions both from Charmides and Kritias of praise and devotion to Sokrates, at the close of the dialogue. Dramatic ornamentthroughout] | ib. |
| [The Charmides is an excellent specimen of Dialogues of Search. Abundance of guesses and tentatives, all ultimately disallowed] | [163] |
| [Trial and Error, the natural process of the human mind. Plato stands alone in bringing to view and dramatising this part of the mentalprocess. Sokrates accepts for himself the condition of conscious ignorance] | [164] |
| [Familiar words — constantly used, with much earnest feeling, but never understood nor defined — ordinary phenomenon in humansociety] | [165] |
| [Different ethical points of view in different Platonic dialogues] | [167] |
| [Self-knowledge is here declared to be impossible] | ib. |
| [In other dialogues, Sokrates declares self-knowledge to be essential and inestimable. Necessity for the student to have presented to himdissentient points of view] | ib. |
| [Courage and Temperance are shown to have no distinct meaning, except as founded on the general cognizance of good and evil] | [168] |
| [Distinction made between the special sciences and the science of Good and Evil. Without this last, the special sciences are of no use] | ib. |
| [Knowledge, always relative to some object known. Postulate or divination of a Science of Teleology] | [169] |
| [Courage and Temperance, handled both by Plato and by Aristotle. Comparison between the two] | [170] |
| |
| |
| |
| [CHAPTER XX.] |
| LYSIS. |
| [Analogy between Lysis and Charmides. Richness of dramatic incident in both. Youthful beauty] | [172] |
| [Scenery and personages of the Lysis] | ib. |
| [Origin of the conversation. Sokrates promises to give an example of the proper way of talking to a youth, for his benefit] | [173] |
| [Conversation of Sokrates with Lysis] | ib. |
| [Lysis is humiliated. Distress of Hippothalês] | [177] |
| [Lysis entreats Sokrates to talk in the like strain to Menexenus] | ib. |
| [Value of the first conversation between Sokrates and Lysis, as an illustration of the Platonico-Sokratic manner] | [177] |
| [Sokrates begins to examine Menexenus respecting friendship. Who is to be called a friend? Halt in the dialogue] | [178] |
| [Questions addressed to Lysis. Appeal to the maxims of the poets. Like is the friend of like. Canvassed and rejected] | ib. |
| [Other poets declare that likeness is a cause of aversion; unlikeness, of friendship. Reasons pro and con. Rejected] | [179] |
| [Confusion of Sokrates. He suggests, That the Indifferent (neither good nor evil) is friend to the Good] | [180] |
| [Suggestion canvassed. If the Indifferent is friend to the Good, it is determined to become so by the contact of felt evil, from which it isanxious to escape] | [180] |
| [Principle illustrated by the philosopher. His intermediate condition — not wise, yet painfully feeling his own ignorance] | [181] |
| [Sokrates dissatisfied. He originates a new suggestion. The Primum Amabile, or object originally dear to us, per se: by relation orresemblance to which other objects become dear] | ib. |
| [The cause of love is desire. We desire that which is akin to us or our own] | [182] |
| [Good is of a nature akin to every one, evil is alien to every one. Inconsistency with what has been previously laid down] | [183] |
| [Failure of the enquiry. Close of the dialogue] | [184] |
| [Remarks. No positive result. Sokratic purpose in analysing the familiar words — to expose the false persuasion of knowledge] | ib. |
| [Subject of Lysis. Suited for a Dialogue of Search. Manner of Sokrates, multiplying defective explanations, and showing reasons why each isdefective] | [185] |
| [The process of trial and error is better illustrated by a search without result than with result. Usefulness of the dialogue for self-workingminds] | [186] |
| [Subject of friendship, handled both by the Xenophontic Sokrates, and by Aristotle] | ib. |
| [Debate in the Lysis partly verbal, partly real. Assumptions made by the Platonic Sokrates, questionable, such as the real Sokrates would havefound reason for challenging] | [188] |
| [Peculiar theory about friendship broached by Sokrates. Persons neither good nor evil by nature, yet having a superficial tinge of evil, anddesiring good to escape from it] | [189] |
| [This general theory illustrated by the case of the philosopher or lover of wisdom. Painful consciousness of ignorance the attribute of thephilosopher. Value set by Sokrates and Plato upon this attribute] | [190] |
| [Another theory of Sokrates. The Primum Amabile, or original and primary object of Love. Particular objects are loved through association withthis. The object is Good] | [191] |
| [Statement by Plato of the general law of mental association] | ib. |
| [Theory of the Primum Amabile, here introduced by Sokrates, with numerous derivative objects of love. Platonic Idea. Generic communion ofAristotle, distinguished by him from the feebler analogical communion] | [192] |
| [Primum Amabile of Plato, compared with the Prima Amicitia of Aristotle. Each of them is head of an analogical aggregate, not member of ageneric family] | [194] |
| [The Good and Beautiful, considered as objects of attachment] | ib. |
| |
| |
| |
| [CHAPTER XXI.] |
| EUTHYDEMUS. |
| [Dramatic and comic exuberance of the Euthydêmus. Judgments of various critics] | [195] |
| [Scenery and personages] | ib. |
| [The two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus: manner in which they are here presented] | [196] |
| [Conversation carried on with Kleinias, first by Sokrates, next by the two Sophists] | ib. |
| [Contrast between the two different modes of interrogation] | [197] |
| [Wherein this contrast does not consist] | [198] |
| [Wherein it does consist] | [199] |
| [Abuse of fallacies by the Sophists — their bidding for the applause of the by-standers] | ib. |
| [Comparison of the Euthydêmus with the Parmenidês] | [200] |
| [Necessity of settling accounts with the negative, before we venture upon the affirmative, is common to both: in the one the process issolitary and serious; in the other, it is vulgarised and ludicrous] | [201] |
| [Opinion of Stallbaum and other critics about the Euthydêmus, that Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus represent the way in whichProtagoras and Gorgias talked to their auditors] | [202] |
| [That opinion is unfounded. Sokrates was much more Eristic than Protagoras, who generally manifested himself by continuous speech orlecture] | ib. |
| [Sokrates in the Euthydêmus is drawn suitably to the purpose of that dialogue] | [203] |
| [The two Sophists in the Euthydêmus are not to be taken as real persons, or representatives of real persons] | [204] |
| [Colloquy of Sokrates with Kleinias — possession of good things is useless, unless we also have intelligence how to use them] | ib. |
| [But intelligence — of what? It must be such intelligence, or such an art, as will include both the making of what we want, and the rightuse of it when made] | [205] |
| [Where is such an art to be found? The regal or political art looks like it; but what does this art do for us? No answer can be found. Ends inpuzzle] | [206] |
| [Review of the cross-examination just pursued by Sokrates. It is very suggestive — puts the mind upon what to look for] | [207] |
| [Comparison with other dialogues — Republic, Philêbus, Protagoras. The only distinct answer is found in the Protagoras] | [208] |
| [The talk of the two Sophists, though ironically admired while it is going on, is shown at the end to produce no real admiration, but thecontrary] | ib. |
| [Mistaken representations about the Sophists — Aristotle’s definition — no distinguishable line can be drawn between theSophist and the Dialectician] | [210] |
| [Philosophical purpose of the Euthydêmus — exposure of fallacies, in Plato’s dramatic manner, by multiplication of particularexamples] | [211] |
| [Aristotle (Soph. Elench.) attempts a classification of fallacies: Plato enumerates them without classification] | [212] |
| [Fallacies of equivocation propounded by the two Sophists in the Euthydêmus] | ib. |
| [Fallacies — à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter — in the Euthydêmus] | [213] |
| [Obstinacy shown by the two Sophists in their replies — determination not to contradict themselves] | [214] |
| [Farther verbal equivocations] | ib. |
| [Fallacies involving deeper logical principles — contradiction is impossible. — To speak falsely is impossible] | [215] |
| [Plato’s Euthydêmus is the earliest known attempt to set out and expose fallacies — the only way of exposing fallacies is toexemplify the fallacy by particular cases, in which the conclusion proved is known aliunde to be false and absurd] | [216] |
| [Mistake of supposing fallacies to have been invented and propagated by Athenian Sophists — they are inherent inadvertencies andliabilities to error, in the ordinary process of thinking. Formal debate affords the best means of correcting them] | [217] |
| [Wide-spread prevalence of erroneous belief, misguided by one or other of these fallacies, attested by Sokrates, Plato, Bacon, &c., —complete enumeration of heads of fallacies by Mill] | [218] |
| [Value of formal debate as a means for testing and confuting fallacies] | [221] |
| [Without the habit of formal debate, Plato could not have composed his Euthydêmus, nor Aristotle the treatise De SophisticisElenchis] | ib. |
| [Probable popularity of the Euthydêmus at Athens — welcomed by all the enemies of Dialectic] | [222] |
| [Epilogue of Plato to the Dialogue, trying to obviate this inference by opponents — Conversation between Sokrates and Kriton] | [223] |
| [Altered tone in speaking of Euthydêmus — Disparagement of persons half-philosophers, half-politicians] | [224] |
| [Kriton asks Sokrates for advice about the education of his sons — Sokrates cannot recommend a teacher — tells him to search forhimself] | [225] |
| [Euthydêmus is here cited as representative of Dialectic and philosophy] | [226] |
| [Who is the person here intended by Plato, half-philosopher, half-politician? Is it Isokrates?] | [227] |
| [Variable feeling at different times, between Plato and Isokrates] | [228] |
| |
| |
| |
| [CHAPTER XXII.] |
| MENON. |
| [Persons of the Dialogue] | [232] |
| [Question put by Menon — Is virtue teachable? Sokrates confesses that he does not know what virtue is. Surprise of Menon] | ib. |
| [Sokrates stands alone in this confession. Unpopularity entailed by it] | [233] |
| [Answer of Menon — plurality of virtues, one belonging to each different class and condition. Sokrates enquires for the property common toall of them] | ib. |
| [Analogous cases cited — definitions of figure and colour] | [235] |
| [Importance at that time of bringing into conscious view, logical subordination and distinctions — Neither logic nor grammar had then beencast into system] | ib. |
| [Definition of virtue given by Menon: Sokrates pulls it to pieces] | [236] |
| [Menon complains that the conversation of Sokrates confounds him like an electric shock — Sokrates replies that he is himself in the samestate of confusion and ignorance. He urges continuance of search by both] | [237] |
| [But how is the process of search available to any purpose? No man searches for what he already knows: and for what he does not know, it isuseless to search, for he cannot tell when he has found it] | ib. |
| [Theory of reminiscence propounded by Sokrates — anterior immortality of the soul — what is called teaching is the revival andrecognition of knowledge acquired in a former life, but forgotten] | ib. |
| [Illustration of this theory — knowledge may be revived by skilful questions in the mind of a man thoroughly untaught. Sokrates questionsthe slave of Menon] | [238] |
| [Enquiry taken up — Whether virtue is teachable? without determining what virtue is] | [239] |
| [Virtue is knowledge — no possessions, no attributes, either of mind or body, are good or profitable, except under the guidance ofknowledge] | ib. |
| [Virtue, as being knowledge, must be teachable. Yet there are opposing reasons, showing that it cannot be teachable. No teachers of it can befound] | [239] |
| [Conversation of Sokrates with Anytus, who detests the Sophists, and affirms that any one of the leading politicians can teach virtue] | [240] |
| [Confused state of the discussion. No way of acquiring virtue is shown] | ib. |
| [Sokrates modifies his premisses — knowledge is not the only thing which guides to good results — right opinion will do thesame] | ib. |
| [Right opinion cannot be relied on for staying in the mind, and can never give rational explanations, nor teach others — good practicalstatesmen receive right opinion by inspiration from the Gods] | [241] |
| [All the real virtue that there is, is communicated by special inspiration from the Gods] | [242] |
| [But what virtue itself is, remains unknown] | ib. |
| [Remarks on the dialogue. Proper order for examining the different topics, is pointed out by Sokrates] | ib. |
| [Mischief of debating ulterior and secondary questions when the fundamental notions and word are unsettled] | ib. |
| [Doctrine of Sokrates in the Menon — desire of good alleged to be universally felt — in what sense this is true] | [243] |
| [Sokrates requires knowledge as the principal condition of virtue, but does not determine knowledge, of what ?] | [244] |
| [Subject of Menon; same as that of the Protagoras — diversity of handling — Plato is not anxious to settle a question and get ridof it] | [245] |
| [Anxiety of Plato to keep up and enforce the spirit of research] | [246] |
| [Great question discussed among the Grecian philosophers — criterion of truth — Wherein consists the process ofverification?] | ib. |
| [None of the philosophers were satisfied with the answer here made by Plato — that verification consists in appeal to pre-natalexperience] | [247] |
| [Plato’s view of the immortality of the soul — difference between the Menon, Phædrus, and Phædon] | [249] |
| [Doctrine of Plato, that new truth may be elicited by skilful examination out of the unlettered mind — how far correct ?] | ib. |
| [Plato’s doctrine about à priori reasonings — different from the modern doctrine] | [251] |
| [Plato’s theory about pre-natal experience. He took no pains to ascertain and measure the extent of post-natal experience] | [252] |
| [Little or nothing is said in the Menon about the Platonic Ideas or Forms] | [253] |
| [What Plato meant by Causal Reasoning — his distinction between knowledge and right opinion] | ib. |
| [This distinction compared with modern philosophical views] | [254] |
| [Manifestation of Anytus — intense antipathy to the Sophists and to philosophy generally] | [255] |
| [The enemy of Sokrates is also the enemy of the sophists — practical statesmen] | [256] |
| [The Menon brings forward the point of analogy between Sokrates and the Sophists, in which both were disliked by the practicalstatesmen] | [257] |
| |
| |
| |
| [CHAPTER XXIII.] |
| PROTAGORAS. |
| [Scenic arrangement and personages of the dialogue] | [259] |
| [Introduction. Eagerness of the youthful Hippokrates to become acquainted with Protagoras] | [260] |
| [Sokrates questions Hippokrates as to his purpose and expectations from Protagoras] | ib. |
| [Danger of going to imbibe the instruction of a Sophist without knowing beforehand what he is about to teach] | [262] |
| [Remarks on the Introduction. False persuasion of knowledge brought to light] | [263] |
| [Sokrates and Hippokrates go to the house of Kallias. Company therein. Respect shown to Protagoras] | [264] |
| [Questions of Sokrates to Protagoras. Answer of the latter, declaring the antiquity of the sophistical profession, and his own openness inavowing himself a sophist] | ib. |
| [Protagoras prefers to converse in presence of the assembled company] | [266] |
| [Answers of Protagoras. He intends to train young men as virtuous citizens] | ib. |
| [Sokrates doubts whether virtue is teachable. Reasons for such doubt. Protagoras is asked to explain whether it is or not.] | ib. |
| [Explanation of Protagoras. He begins with a mythe] | [267] |
| [Mythe. First fabrication of men by the Gods. Prometheus and Epimetheus. Bad distribution of endowments to man by the latter. It is partlyamended by Prometheus] | [267] |
| [Prometheus gave to mankind skill for the supply of individual wants, but could not give them the social art — Mankind are on the pointof perishing, when Zeus sends to them the dispositions essential for society] | [268] |
| [Protagoras follows up his mythe by a discourse. Justice and the sense of shame are not professional attributes, but are possessed by allcitizens and taught by all to all] | [269] |
| [Constant teaching of virtue. Theory of punishment] | [270] |
| [Why eminent men cannot make their sons eminent] | [271] |
| [Teaching by parents, schoolmaster, harpist, laws, dikastery, &c.] | ib. |
| [All learn virtue from the same teaching by all. Whether a learner shall acquire more or less of it, depends upon his own individualaptitude] | [272] |
| [Analogy of learning vernacular Greek. No special teacher thereof. Protagoras teaches virtue somewhat better than others] | [273] |
| [The sons of great artists do not themselves become great artists] | [274] |
| [Remarks upon the mythe and discourse. They explain the manner in which the established sentiment of a community propagates and perpetuatesitself] | [274] |
| [Antithesis of Protagoras and Sokrates. Whether virtue is to be assimilated to a special art] | [275] |
| [Procedure of Sokrates in regard to the discourse of Protagoras — he compliments it as an exposition, and analyses some of thefundamental assumptions] | [276] |
| [One purpose of the dialogue. To contrast continuous discourse with short cross-examining question and answer] | [277] |
| [Questions by Sokrates — Whether virtue is one and indivisible, or composed of different parts? Whether the parts are homogeneous orheterogeneous ?] | ib. |
| [Whether justice is just, and holiness holy? How far justice is like to holiness? Sokrates protests against an answer, “If youplease”] | [278] |
| [Intelligence and moderation are identical, because they have the same contrary] | [279] |
| [Insufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom cares to distinguish different meanings of the same term] | ib. |
| [Protagoras is puzzled, and becomes irritated] | [280] |
| [Sokrates presses Protagoras farther. His purpose is, to test opinions and not persons. Protagoras answers with angry prolixity] | ib. |
| [Remonstrance of Sokrates against long answers as inconsistent with the laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates rises todepart] | [281] |
| [Interference of Kallias to get the debate continued. Promiscuous conversation. Alkibiades declares that Protagoras ought to acknowledgesuperiority of Sokrates in dialogue] | [282] |
| [Claim of a special locus standi and professorship for Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric] | ib. |
| [Sokrates is prevailed upon to continue, and invites Protagoras to question him] | ib. |
| [Protagoras extols the importance of knowing the works of the poets, and questions about parts of a song of Simonides. Dissenting opinionsabout the interpretation of the song] | [283] |
| [Long speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of the song, and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous concealed sophists at Kreteand Sparta, masters of short speech] | [283] |
| [Character of this speech — its connection with the dialogue, and its general purpose. Sokrates inferior to Protagoras in continuousspeech] | [284] |
| [Sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the poets. Their meaning is always disputed, and you can never ask from themselves what it is.Protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the task of answering] | [285] |
| [Purpose of Sokrates to sift difficulties which he really feels in his own mind. Importance of a colloquial companion for this purpose] | [287] |
| [The interrupted debate is resumed. Protagoras says that courage differs materially from the other branches of virtue] | [288] |
| [Sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in knowledge or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates changes hisattack] | ib. |
| [Identity of the pleasurable with the good — of the painful with the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies. Debate] | [289] |
| [Enquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency in the mind? Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or pain ? Both agreethat knowledge is dominant] | [290] |
| [Mistake of supposing that men act contrary to knowledge. We never call pleasures evils, except when they entail a preponderance of pain, or adisappointment of greater pleasures] | [291] |
| [Pleasure is the only good — pain the only evil. No man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between pleasurespresent and future — resolves itself into pleasure and pain] | [292] |
| [Necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing pleasures rightly — all the security of our lives depend upon it] | [293] |
| [To do wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad phrase for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance] | [294] |
| [Reasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions which conduct to pleasures or freedom from pain, are honourable] | [295] |
| [Explanation of courage. It consists in a wise estimate of things terrible and not terrible] | ib. |
| [Reluctance of Protagoras to continue answering. Close of the discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still in confusion, and that hewishes to debate it again with Protagoras. Amicable reply of Protagoras] | [297] |
| [Remarks on the dialogue. It closes without the least allusion to Hippokrates] | [298] |
| [Two distinct aspects of ethics and politics exhibited: one under the name of Protagoras; the other, under that of Sokrates] | [299] |
| [Order of ethical problems, as conceived by Sokrates] | ib. |
| [Difference of method between him and Protagoras flows from this difference of order. Protagoras assumes what virtue is, withoutenquiry] | [300] |
| [Method of Protagoras. Continuous lectures addressed to established public sentiments with which he is in harmony] | [301] |
| [Method of Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of the problem which Protagoras had left out] | ib. |
| [Antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and the analytical cross-examiner] | [303] |
| [Protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong, though he is described as brought to a contradiction] | ib. |
| [Affirmation of Protagoras about courage is affirmed by Plato himself elsewhere] | ib. |
| [The harsh epithets applied by critics to Protagoras are not borne out by the dialogue. He stands on the same ground as the commonconsciousness] | [304] |
| [Aversion of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude about the song of Simonides] | [305] |
| [Ethical view given by Sokrates worked out at length clearly. Good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation of pleasures and pains of theagent] | ib. |
| [Protagoras is at first opposed to this theory] | [306] |
| [Reasoning of Sokrates] | [307] |
| [Application of that reasoning to the case of courage] | ib. |
| [The theory which Plato here lays down is more distinct and specific than any theory laid down in other dialogues] | [308] |
| [Remarks on the theory here laid down by Sokrates. It is too narrow, and exclusively prudential] | [309] |
| [Comparison with the Republic] | [310] |
| [The discourse of Protagoras brings out an important part of the whole case, which is omitted in the analysis by Sokrates] | [311] |
| [The Ethical End, as implied in the discourse of Protagoras, involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of other persons besides theagent himself] | [312] |
| [Plato’s reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or satisfactory, especially about courage] | [313] |
| [Doctrine of Stallbaum and other critics is not correct. That the analysis here ascribed to Sokrates is not intended by Plato as serious, butas a mockery of the sophists] | [314] |
| [Grounds of that doctrine. Their insufficiency] | [315] |
| [Subject is professedly still left unsettled at the close of the dialogue] | [316] |
| |
| |
| |
| [CHAPTER XXIV.] |
| GORGIAS. |
| [Persons who debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the historical Gorgias] | [317] |
| [Introductory circumstances of the dialogue. Polus and Kalliklês] | [318] |
| [Purpose of Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a good definition] | ib. |
| [Questions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is the artisan of persuasion] | [319] |
| [The Rhetor produces belief without knowledge. Upon what matters is he competent to advise?] | [319] |
| [The Rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter, even against the opinion of the special expert. He appears to know, among theignorant] | [320] |
| [Gorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus takes up the debate with Sokrates] | [321] |
| [Polemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of Polus he gives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an empirical knack of cateringfor the immediate pleasure of hearers, analogous to cookery. It is a branch under the general head flattery] | ib. |
| [Distinction between the true arts which aim at the good of the body and mind — and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to the same, butin reality aim at immediate pleasure] | [322] |
| [Questions of Polus. Sokrates denies that the Rhetors have any real power, because they do nothing which they really wish] | [323] |
| [All men wish for what is good for them. Despots and Rhetors, when they kill any one, do so because they think it good for them. If it bereally not good, they do not do what they will, and therefore have no real power] | [324] |
| [Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of Macedonia — Polus affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one thinks so —Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless denies it] | [325] |
| [Sokrates maintains — 1. That it is a greater evil to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. 2. That if a man has done wrong, it is better forhim to be punished than to remain unpunished] | [326] |
| [Sokrates offers proof — Definition of Pulchrum and Turpe — Proof of the first point] | [327] |
| [Proof of the second point] | ib. |
| [The criminal labours under a mental distemper, which though not painful, is a capital evil. Punishment is the only cure for him. To bepunished is best for him] | [328] |
| [Misery of the Despot who is never punished. If our friend has done wrong, we ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we ought to keep himunpunished] | [329] |
| [Argument of Sokrates paradoxical — Doubt expressed by Kalliklês whether he means it seriously] | [330] |
| [Principle laid down by Sokrates — That every one acts with a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery] | ib. |
| [Peculiar view taken by Plato of Good — Evil — Happiness] | [331] |
| [Contrast of the usual meaning of these words, with the Platonic meaning] | ib. |
| [Examination of the proof given by Sokrates — Inconsistency between the general answer of Polus and his previous declarations — Lawand Nature] | [332] |
| [The definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by Sokrates, will not hold] | [334] |
| [Worse or better — for whom? The argument of Sokrates does not specify. If understood in the sense necessary for his inference, thedefinition would be inadmissible] | ib. |
| [Plato applies to every one a standard of happiness and misery peculiar to himself. His view about the conduct of Archelaus is just, but hedoes not give the true reasons for it] | [335] |
| [If the reasoning of Plato were true, the point of view in which punishment is considered would be reversed] | [336] |
| [Plato pushes too far the analogy between mental distemper and bodily distemper — Material difference between the two — Distempermust be felt by the distempered persons] | [337] |
| [Kalliklês begins to argue against Sokrates — he takes a distinction between Just by Law and Just by nature — Reply ofSokrates, that there is no variance between the two, properly understood] | [338] |
| [What Kalliklês says is not to be taken as a sample of the teachings of Athenian sophists. Kalliklês — rhetor andpolitician] | [339] |
| [Uncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority. It may be pleaded in favour of opposite theories. The theory of Kalliklês is made toappear repulsive by the language in which he expresses it] | [340] |
| [Sokrates maintains that self-command and moderation is requisite for the strong man as well as for others. Kalliklês defends thenegative] | [343] |
| [Whether the largest measure of desires is good for a man, provided he has the means of satisfying them? Whether all varieties of desire aregood? Whether the pleasurable and the good are identical?] | [344] |
| [Kalliklês maintains that pleasurable and good are identical. Sokrates refutes him. Some pleasures are good, others bad. A scientificadviser is required to discriminate them] | [345] |
| [Contradiction between Sokrates in the Gorgias, and Sokrates in the Protagoras] | ib. |
| [Views of critics about this contradiction] | [346] |
| [Comparison and appreciation of the reasoning of Sokrates in both dialogues] | ib. |
| [Distinct statement in the Protagoras. What are good and evil, and upon what principles the scientific adviser is to proceed in discriminatingthem. No such distinct statement in the Gorgias] | [347] |
| [Modern ethical theories. Intuition. Moral sense — not recognised by Plato in either of the dialogues] | [348] |
| [In both dialogues the doctrine of Sokrates is self-regarding as respects the agent: not considering the pleasures and pains of other persons,so far as affected by the agent] | [349] |
| [Points wherein the doctrine of the two dialogues is in substance the same, but differing in classification] | ib. |
| [Kalliklês, whom Sokrates refutes in the Gorgias, maintains a different argument from that which Sokrates combats in theProtagoras] | [350] |
| [The refutation of Kalliklês by Sokrates in the Gorgias, is unsuccessful — it is only so far successful as he adoptsunintentionally the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras] | [351] |
| [Permanent elements — and transient elements — of human agency — how each of them is appreciated in the twodialogues] | [353] |
| [In the Protagoras] | ib. |
| [In the Gorgias] | [354] |
| [Character of the Gorgias generally — discrediting all the actualities of life] | [355] |
| [Argument of Sokrates resumed — multifarious arts of flattery, aiming at immediate pleasure] | [357] |
| [The Rhetors aim at only flattering the public — even the best past Rhetors have done nothing else — citation of the four greatRhetors by Kallikles] | [357] |
| [Necessity for temperance, regulation, order. This is the condition of virtue and happiness] | [358] |
| [Impossible to succeed in public life, unless a man be thoroughly akin to and in harmony with the ruling force] | [359] |
| [Danger of one who dissents from the public, either for better or for worse] | ib. |
| [Sokrates resolves upon a scheme of life for himself — to study permanent good, and not immediate satisfaction] | [360] |
| [Sokrates announces himself as almost the only man at Athens, who follows out the true political art. Danger of doing this] | [361] |
| [Mythe respecting Hades, and the treatment of deceased persons therein, according to their merits during life — the philosopher who stoodaloof from public affairs, will then be rewarded] | ib. |
| [Peculiar ethical views of Sokrates — Rhetorical or dogmatical character of the Gorgias] | [362] |
| [He merges politics in Ethics — he conceives the rulers as spiritual teachers and trainers of the community] | ib. |
| [Idéal of Plato — a despotic lawgiver or man-trainer, on scientific principles, fashioning all characters pursuant tocertain types of his own] | [363] |
| [Platonic analogy between mental goodness and bodily health — incomplete analogy — circumstances of difference] | ib. |
| [Sokrates in the Gorgias speaks like a dissenter among a community of fixed opinions and habits. Impossible that a dissenter, on importantpoints, should acquire any public influence] | [364] |
| [Sokrates feels his own isolation from his countrymen. He is thrown upon individual speculation and dialectic] | [365] |
| [Antithesis between philosophy and rhetoric] | ib. |
| [Position of one who dissents, upon material points, from the fixed opinions and creed of his countrymen] | [366] |
| [Probable feelings of Plato on this subject — Claim put forward in the Gorgias of an independent locus standi for philosophy, butwithout the indiscriminate cross-examination pursued by Sokrates] | [367] |
| [Importance of maintaining the utmost liberty of discussion. Tendency of all ruling orthodoxy towards intolerance] | [368] |
| [Issue between philosophy and rhetoric — not satisfactorily handled by Plato. Injustice done to rhetoric. Ignoble manner in which it ispresented by Polus and Kalliklês] | [369] |
| [Perikles would have accepted the defence of rhetoric, as Plato has put it into the mouth of Gorgias] | [370] |
| [The Athenian people recognise a distinction between the pleasurable and the good: but not the same as that which Plato conceived] | [371] |
| [Rhetoric was employed at Athens in appealing to all the various established sentiments and opinions. Erroneous inferences raised by theKalliklês of Plato] | [373] |
| [The Platonic Idéal exacts, as good, some order, system, discipline. But order may be directed to bad ends as well as to good. Divergentideas about virtue] | [374] |
| [How to discriminate the right order from the wrong. Plato does not advise us] | [375] |
| [The Gorgias upholds the independence and dignity of the dissenting philosopher] | ib. |
| |
| |
| |
| [CHAPTER XXV.] |
| PHÆDON. |
| [The Phædon is affirmative and expository] | [377] |
| [Situation and circumstances assumed in the Phædon. Pathetic interest which they inspire] | ib. |
| [Simmias and Kebês, the two collocutors with Sokrates. Their feelings and those of Sokrates] | [378] |
| [Emphasis of Sokrates in insisting on freedom of debate, active exercise of reason, and independent judgment for each reasoner] | [379] |
| [Anxiety of Sokrates that his friends shall be on their guard against being influenced by his authority — that they shall follow only theconvictions of their own reason] | [380] |
| [Remarkable manifestation of earnest interest for reasoned truth and the liberty of individual dissent] | [381] |
| [Phædon and Symposion — points of analogy and contrast] | [382] |
| [Phædon — compared with Republic and Timæus. No recognition of the triple or lower souls. Antithesis between soul andbody] | [383] |
| [Different doctrines of Plato about the soul. Whether all the three souls are immortal, or the rational soul alone] | [385] |
| [The life and character of a philosopher is a constant struggle to emancipate his soul from his body. Death alone enables him to do thiscompletely] | [386] |
| [Souls of the ordinary or unphilosophical men pass after death into the bodies of different animals. The philosopher alone is relieved from allcommunion with body] | [387] |
| [Special privilege claimed for philosophers in the Phædon apart from the virtuous men who are not philosophers] | [388] |
| [Simmias and Kebês do not admit readily the immortality of the soul, but are unwilling to trouble Sokrates by asking for proof. Unabatedinterest of Sokrates in rational debate] | [390] |
| [Simmias and Kebês believe fully in the pre-existence of the soul, but not in its post-existence. Doctrine — That the soul is asort of harmony — refuted by Sokrates] | ib. |
| [Sokrates unfolds the intellectual changes or wanderings through which his mind had passed] | [391] |
| [First doctrine of Sokrates as to cause. Reasons why he rejected it] | ib. |
| [Second doctrine. Hopes raised by the treatise of Anaxagoras] | [393] |
| [Disappointment because Anaxagoras did not follow out the optimistic principle into detail. Distinction between causes efficient and causesco-efficient] | [394] |
| [Sokrates could neither trace out the optimistic principle for himself, nor find any teacher thereof. He renounced it, and embraced a thirddoctrine about cause] | [395] |
| [He now assumes the separate existence of ideas. These ideas are the causes why particular objects manifest certain attributes] | [396] |
| [Procedure of Sokrates if his hypothesis were impugned. He insists upon keeping apart the discussion of the hypothesis and the discussion ofits consequences] | [397] |
| [Exposition of Sokrates welcomed by the hearers. Remarks upon it] | [398] |
| [The philosophical changes in Sokrates all turned upon different views as to a true cause] | ib. |
| [Problems and difficulties of which Sokrates first sought solution] | [399] |
| [Expectations entertained by Sokrates from the treatise of Anaxagoras. His disappointment. His distinction between causes andco-efficients] | [400] |
| [Sokrates imputes to Anaxagoras the mistake of substituting physical agencies in place of mental. This is the same which Aristophanes andothers imputed to Sokrates] | [401] |
| [The supposed theory of Anaxagoras cannot be carried out, either by Sokrates himself or any one else. Sokrates turns to general words, andadopts the theory of ideas] | [403] |
| [Vague and dissentient meanings attached to the word Cause. That is a cause, to each man, which gives satisfaction to his inquisitivefeelings] | [404] |
| [Dissension and perplexity on the question. — What is a cause? revealed by the picture of Sokrates — no intuition to guidehim] | [407] |
| [Different notions of Plato and Aristotle about causation, causes regular and irregular. Inductive theory of causation, elaborated in moderntimes] | ib. |
| [Last transition of the mind of Sokrates from things to words — to the adoption of the theory of ideas. Great multitude of ideas assumed, eachfitting a certain number of particulars] | [410] |
| [Ultimate appeal to hypothesis of extreme generality] | [411] |
| [Plato’s demonstration of the immortality of the soul rests upon the assumption of the Platonic ideas. Reasoning to prove this] | [412] |
| [The soul always brings life, and is essentially living. It cannot receive death: in other words, it is immortal] | [413] |
| [The proof of immortality includes pre-existence as well as post-existence — animals as well as man — also the metempsychosis ortranslation of the soul from one body to another] | [414] |
| [After finishing his proof that the soul is immortal, Sokrates enters into a description, what will become of it after the death of the body.He describes a Νεκυία] | [415] |
| [Sokrates expects that his soul is going to the islands of the blest. Reply to Kriton about burying his body] | [416] |
| [Preparations for administering the hemlock. Sympathy of the gaoler. Equanimity of Sokrates] | ib. |
| [Sokrates swallows the poison. Conversation with the gaoler] | [417] |
| [Ungovernable sorrow of the friends present. Self-command of Sokrates. Last words to Kriton, and death] | ib. |
| [Extreme pathos, and probable trustworthiness of these personal details] | [419] |
| [Contrast between the Platonic Apology and the Phædon] | ib. |
| [Abundant dogmatic and poetical invention of the Phædon compared with the profession of ignorance which we read in the Apology] | [421] |
| [Total renunciation and discredit of the body in the Phædon. Different feeling about the body in other Platonic dialogues] | [422] |
| [Plato’s argument does not prove the immortality of the soul. Even if it did prove that, yet the mode of pre-existence and the mode ofpost-existence, of the soul, would be quite undetermined] | [423] |
| [The philosopher will enjoy an existence of pure soul unattached to any body] | [425] |
| [Plato’s demonstration of the immortality of the soul did not appear satisfactory to subsequent philosophers. The question remaineddebated and problematical] | [426] |