[24] Plato, Gorgias, p. 470 C.

Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of Macedonia — Polus affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one thinks so — Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless denies it.

Polus. — A child can refute such doctrine. You have heard of Archelaus King of Macedonia. Is he, in your opinion, happy or miserable? Sokr. — I do not know: I have never been in his society. Polus. — Cannot you tell without that, whether he is happy or not? Sokr. — No, certainly not. Polus. — Then you will not call even the Great King happy? Sokr. — No: I do not know how he stands in respect to education and justice. Polus. — What! does all happiness consist in that? Sokr. — I say that it does. I maintain that the good and honourable man or woman is happy: the unjust and wicked, miserable.[25] Polus. — Then Archelaus is miserable, according to your doctrine? Sokr. — Assuredly, if he is wicked. Polus. — Wicked, of course; since he has committed enormous crimes: but he has obtained complete kingly power in Macedonia. Is there any Athenian, yourself included, who would not rather be Archelaus than any other man in Macedonia?[26] Sokr. — All the public, with Nikias, Perikles, and the most eminent men among them, will agree with you in declaring Archelaus to be happy. I alone do not agree with you. You, like a Rhetor, intend to overwhelm me and gain your cause, by calling a multitude of witnesses: I shall prove my case without calling any other witness than yourself.[27] Do you think that Archelaus would have been a happy man, if he had been defeated in his conspiracy and punished? Polus. — Certainly not: he would then have been very miserable. Sokr. — Here again I differ from you: I think that Archelaus, or any other wicked man, is under all circumstances miserable; but he is less miserable, if afterwards punished, than he would be if unpunished and successful.[28] Polus. — How say you? If a man, unjustly conspiring to become despot, be captured, subjected to torture, mutilated, with his eyes burnt out and with many other outrages inflicted, not only upon himself but upon his wife and children — do you say that he will be more happy than if he succeeded in his enterprise, and passed his life in possession of undisputed authority over his city — envied and extolled as happy, by citizens and strangers alike?[29] Sokr. — More happy, I shall not say: for in both cases he will be miserable; but he will be less miserable on the former supposition.

[25] Plato, Gorgias, p. 470 E.

[26] Plato, Gorgias, p. 471 B-C.

[27] Plato, Gorgias, p. 472 B. Ἀλλ’ ἐγώ σοι εἶς ὢν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ.… ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγώ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἷς ὢν μόνος, τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν ἐᾷς.

[28] Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 C.

[29] Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 D.

Sokrates maintains — 1. That it is a greater evil to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. 2. That if a man has done wrong, it is better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished.

Sokr. — Which of the two is worst: to do wrong, or to suffer wrong? Polus. — To suffer wrong. Sokr. — Which of the two is the most disgraceful? Polus. — To do wrong. Sokr. — If more ugly and disgraceful, is it not then worse? Polus. — By no means. Sokr. — You do not think then that the good — and the fine or honourable — are one and the same; nor the bad — and the ugly or disgraceful? Polus. — No: certainly not. Sokr. — How is this? Are not all fine or honourable things, such as bodies, colours, figures, voices, pursuits, &c., so denominated from some common property? Are not fine bodies said to be fine, either from rendering some useful service, or from affording some pleasure to the spectator who contemplates them?[30] And are not figures, colours, voices, laws, sciences, &c., called fine or honourable for the same reason, either for their agreeableness or their usefulness, or both? Polus. — Certainly: your definition of the fine or honourable, by reference to pleasure, or to good, is satisfactory. Sokr. — Of course therefore the ugly or disgraceful must be defined by the contrary, by reference to pain or to evil? Polus. — Doubtless.[31] Sokr. — If therefore one thing be finer or more honourable than another, this is because it surpasses the other either in pleasure, or in profit: if one thing be more ugly or disgraceful than another, it must surpass that other either in pain, or in evil? Polus. — Yes.