[65] Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 B. ὅτι τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐταρκὴς ὤν, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής.
[66] Plato, Protag. p. 322 B.
Sokrates maintains that self-command and moderation is requisite for the strong man as well as for others. Kalliklês defends the negative.
Kalliklês now explains, that by stronger men, he means better, wiser, braver men. It is they (he says) who ought, according to right by nature, to rule over others and to have larger shares than others. Sokr. — Ought they not to rule themselves as well as others:[67] to control their own pleasures and desires: to be sober and temperate? Kall. — No, they would be foolish if they did. The weak multitude must do so; and there grows up accordingly among them a sentiment which requires such self-restraint from all. But it is the privilege of the superior few to be exempt from this necessity. The right of nature authorises them to have the largest desires, since their courage and ability furnish means to satisfy the desires. It would be silly if a king’s son or a despot were to limit himself to the same measure of enjoyment with which a poor citizen must be content; and worse than silly if he did not enrich his friends in preference to his enemies. He need not care for that public law and censure which must reign paramount over each man among the many. A full swing of enjoyment, if a man has power to procure and maintain it, is virtue as well as happiness.[68]
[67] Plato, Gorgias, p. 491 D.
[68] Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 A-C.
Whether the largest measure of desires is good for a man, provided he has the means of satisfying them? Whether all varieties of desire are good? Whether the pleasurable and the good are identical?
Sokr. — I think on the contrary that a sober and moderate life, regulated according to present means and circumstances, is better than a life of immoderate indulgence.[69] Kall. — The man who has no desires will have no pleasure, and will live like a stone. The more the desires, provided they can all be satisfied, the happier a man will be. Sokr. — You mean that a man shall be continually hungry, and continually satisfying his hunger: continually thirsty, and satisfying his thirst; and so forth. Kall. — By having and by satisfying those and all other desires, a man will enjoy happiness. Sokr. — Do you mean to include all varieties of desire and satisfaction of desire: such for example as itching and scratching yourself:[70] and other bodily appetites which might be named? Kall. — Such things are not fit for discussion. Sokr. — It is you who drive me to mention them, by laying down the principle, that men who enjoy, be the enjoyment of what sort it may, are happy; and by not distinguishing what pleasures are good and what are evil. Tell me again, do you think that the pleasurable and the good are identical? Or are there any pleasurable things which are not good?[71] Kall. — I think that the pleasurable and the good are the same.
[69] Plato, Gorgias, p. 493 C. ἐάν πως οἷός τ’ ὦ πεῖσαι μεταθέσθαι καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος βίου τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρκούντως ἔχοντα βίον ἑλέσθαι.