Before replying to Simmias and Kebês, Sokrates is described as hesitating and reflecting for a long time. He then enters into a sketch of[42] his own intellectual history. How far the sketch as it stands depicts the real Sokrates, or Plato himself, or a supposed mind not exactly coincident with either — we cannot be certain: the final stage however must belong to Plato himself.
[42] Plato, Phædon, pp. 96-102.
The following abstract is intended only to exhibit the train of thought and argument pursued by Sokrates; not adhering to the exact words, nor even preserving the interlocutory form. I could not have provided room for a literal translation.
First doctrine of Sokrates as to cause. Reasons why he rejected it.
“You compel me (says Sokrates) to discuss thoroughly the cause of generation and destruction.[43] I will tell you, if you like, my own successive impressions on these subjects. When young, I was amazingly eager for that kind of knowledge which people call the investigation of Nature. I thought it matter of pride to know the causes of every thing — through what every thing is either generated, or destroyed, or continues to exist. I puzzled myself much to discover first of all such matters as these — Is it a certain putrefaction of the Hot and the Cold in the system (as some say), which brings about the nourishment of animals? Is it the blood through which we think — or air, or fire? Or is it neither one nor the other, but the brain, which affords to us sensations of sight, hearing, and smell, out of which memory and opinion are generated: then, by a like process, knowledge is generated out of opinion and memory when permanently fixed?[44] I tried to understand destructions as well as generations, celestial as well as terrestrial phenomena. But I accomplished nothing, and ended by fancying myself utterly unfit for the enquiry. Nay — I even lost all the knowledge of that which I had before believed myself to understand. For example — From what cause does a man grow? At first, I had looked upon this as evident — that it was through eating and drinking: flesh being thereby added to his flesh, bone to his bone, &c. So too, when a tall and a short man were standing together, it appeared to me that the former was taller than the latter by the head — that ten were more than eight because two were added to them[45] — that a rod of two cubits was greater than a rod of one cubit, because it projected beyond it by a half. Now — I am satisfied that I do not know the cause of any of these matters. I cannot explain why, when one is added to one, such addition makes them two; since in their separated state each was one. In this case, it is approximation or conjunction which is said to make the two: in another case, the opposite cause, disjunction, is said also to make two — when one body is bisected.[46] How two opposite causes can produce the same effect — and how either conjunction or disjunction can produce two, where there were not two before — I do not understand. In fact, I could not explain to myself, by this method of research, the generation, or destruction, or existence, of any thing; and I looked out for some other method.
[43] Plato, Phædon, pp. 95 E — 96. Οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα ζητεῖς· ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοὶ δίειμι, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γ’ ἐμὰ πάθη, &c.
[44] Phædon, p. 96 B. ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης, λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην.
This is the same distinction between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη, as that which Sokrates gives in the Menon, though not with full confidence (Menon, pp. 97-98). See suprà, [chap. xxii. p. 241].
[45] Plato, Phædon, p. 96 E. καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτὼ πλείονα εἶναι, διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου μεῖζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν.
[46] Plato, Phædon, p. 97 B.