[72] See the passage in Republic, vii. 523-524, where the τὸ παρακλητικὸν καὶ ἐγερτικὸν τῆς νοήσεως is declared to arise from the pain of a felt contradiction.
There are two circumstances which lend particular interest to this dialogue — Hippias Minor. 1. That the thesis out of which the confusion arises, is one which we know to have been laid down by the historical Sokrates himself. 2. That Aristotle expressly notices this thesis, as well as the dialogue in which it is contained, and combats it.
The thesis maintained here by Sokrates, is also affirmed by the historical Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia.
Sokrates in his conversation with the youthful Euthydemus (in the Xenophontic Memorabilia) maintains, that of two persons, each of whom deceives his friends in a manner to produce mischief, the one who does so wilfully is not so unjust as the one who does so unwillingly.[73] Euthydemus (like Hippias in this dialogue) maintains the opposite, but is refuted by Sokrates; who argues that justice is a matter to be learnt and known like letters; that the lettered man, who has learnt and knows letters, can write wrongly when he chooses, but never writes wrongly unless he chooses — while it is only the unlettered man who writes wrongly unwillingly and without intending it: that in like manner the just man, he that has learnt and knows justice, never commits injustice unless when he intends it — while the unjust man, who has not learnt and does not know justice, commits injustice whether he will or not. It is the just man therefore, and none but the just man (Sokrates maintains), who commits injustice knowingly and wilfully: it is the unjust man who commits injustice without wishing or intending it.[74]
[73] Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 19. τῶν δὲ δὴ τοὺς φίλους ἐξαπατώντων ἐπὶ βλαβῇ (ἵνα μηδὲ τοῦτο παραλείπωμεν ἄσκεπτον) πότερος ἀδικώτερός ἐστιν, ὁ ἑκὼν ἢ ὁ ἄκων;
The natural meaning of ἐπὶ βλαβῇ would be, “for the purpose of mischief”; and Schneider, in his Index, gives “nocendi causâ”. But in that meaning the question would involve an impossibility, for the words ὁ ἄκων exclude any such purpose.
[74] Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 19-22.
This is the same view which is worked out by the Platonic Sokrates in the Hippias Minor: beginning with the antithesis between the veracious and mendacious man (as Sokrates begins in Xenophon); and concluding with the general result — that it belongs to the good man to do wrong wilfully, to the bad man to do wrong unwillingly.
Aristotle combats the thesis. Arguments against it.
Aristotle,[75] in commenting upon this doctrine of the Hippias Minor, remarks justly, that Plato understands the epithets veracious and mendacious in a sense different from that which they usually bear. Plato understands the words as designating one who can tell the truth if he chooses — one who can speak falsely if he chooses: and in this sense he argues plausibly that the two epithets go together, and that no man can be mendacious unless he be also veracious. Aristotle points out that the epithets in their received meaning are applied, not to the power itself, but to the habitual and intentional use of that power. The power itself is doubtless presupposed or implied as one condition to the applicability of the epithets, and is one common condition to the applicability of both epithets: but the distinction, which they are intended to draw, regards the intentions and dispositions with which the power is employed. So also Aristotle observes that Plato’s conclusion — “He that does wrong wilfully is a better man than he that does wrong unwillingly,” is falsely collected from induction or analogy. The analogy of the special arts and accomplishments, upon which the argument is built, is not applicable. Better has reference, not to the amount of intelligence but to the dispositions and habitual intentions; though it presupposes a certain state and amount of intelligence as indispensable.