I have put together the two dialogues Hipparchus and Minos, partly because of the analogy which really exists between them, partly because that analogy is much insisted on by Boeckh, Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and other recent critics; who not only strike them both out of the list of Platonic works, but speak of them with contempt as compositions. On the first point, I dissent from them altogether: on the second, I agree with them thus far — that I consider the two dialogues inferior works of Plato:— much inferior to his greatest and best compositions, — certainly displaying both less genius and less careful elaboration — probably among his early performances — perhaps even unfinished projects, destined for a farther elaboration, which they never received, and not published until after his decease. Yet in Hipparchus as well as in Minos, the subjects debated are important as regards ethical theory. Several questions are raised and partially canvassed: no conclusion is finally attained. These characteristics they have in common with several of the best Platonic dialogues.
Hipparchus — Double meaning of φιλοκερδὴς and κέρδος.
In Hipparchus, the question put by Sokrates is, about the definition of ὁ φιλοκερδὴς (the lover of gain), and of κέρδος itself — gain. The first of these two words (like many in Greek as well as in English) is used in two senses. In its plain, etymological sense, it means an attribute belonging to all men: all men love gain, hate loss. But since this is predicable of all, there is seldom any necessity for predicating it of any one man or knot of men in particular. Accordingly, when you employ the epithet as a predicate of A or B, what you generally mean is, to assert something more than its strict etymological meaning: to declare that he has the attribute in unusual measure; or that he has shown himself, on various occasions, wanting in other attributes, which on those occasions ought, in your judgment, to have countervailed it. The epithet thus comes to connote a sentiment of blame or reproach, in the mind of the speaker.[30]
[30] Aristotle adverts to this class of ethical epithets, connoting both an attribute in the person designated and an unfavourable sentiment in the speaker (Ethic. Nikom. ii. 6, p. 1107, a. 9). Οὐ πᾶσα δ’ ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις, οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος, τὴν μεσότητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος, οἶον, &c.
State or mind of the agent, as to knowledge, frequent inquiry in Plato. No tenable definition found.
The Companion or Collocutor, being called upon by Sokrates to explain τὸ φιλοκερδὲς, defines it in this last sense, as conveying or connoting a reproach. He gives three different explanations of it (always in this sense), each of which Sokrates shows to be untenable. A variety of parallel cases are compared, and the question is put (so constantly recurring in Plato’s writings), what is the state of the agent’s mind as to knowledge? The cross-examination makes out, that if the agent be supposed to know, — then there is no man corresponding to the definition of a φιλοκερδής: if the agent be supposed not to know — then, on the contrary, every man will come under the definition. The Companion is persuaded that there is such a thing as “love of gain” in the blamable sense. Yet he cannot find any tenable definition, to discriminate it from “love of gain” in the ordinary or innocent sense.
Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain, what is the meaning of the word gain? None is found.
The same question comes back in another form, after Sokrates has given the liberty of retractation. The Collocutor maintains that there is bad gain, as well as good gain. But what is that common, generic, quality, designated well as good by the word gain, apart from these two distinctive epithets? He cannot find it out or describe it. He gives two definitions, each of which is torn up by Sokrates. To deserve the name of gain, that which a man acquires must be good; and it must surpass, in value as well as in quantity, the loss or outlay which he incurs in order to acquire it. But when thus understood, all gains are good. There is no meaning in the distinction between good and bad gains: all men are lovers of gain.
Purpose of Plato in the dialogue — to lay bare the confusion, and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for clearing it up.
With this confusion, the dialogue closes. The Sokratic notion of good, as what every one loves — evil as what every one hates — also of evil-doing, as performed by every evil-doer only through ignorance or mistake is brought out and applied to test the ethical phraseology of a common-place respondent. But it only serves to lay bare a state of confusion and perplexity, without clearing up any thing. Herein, so far as I can see, lies Plato’s purpose in the dialogue. The respondent is made aware of the confusion, which he did not know before; and this, in Plato’s view, is a progress. The respondent cannot avoid giving contradictory answers, under an acute cross-examination: but he does not adopt any new belief. He says to Sokrates at the close — “The debate has constrained rather than persuaded me”.[31] This is a simple but instructive declaration of the force put by Sokrates upon his collocutors; and of the reactionary effort likely to be provoked in their minds, with a view to extricate themselves from a painful sense of contradiction. If such effort be provoked, Plato’s purpose is attained.