We have, p. 116 B, the equivocation between καλῶς πράττειν and εὖ πράττειν, also with κακῶς πράττειν, p. 134 A, 135 A; compare Heindorf ad Platon. Charmid. p. 172 A, p. 174 B; also Platon. Gorgias, p. 507 C, where similar equivocal meanings occur.
Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen are equally ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades is to measure himself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia. Eulogistic description of those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must make himself as good as possible.
Alkibiades is thus reduced to a state of humiliating embarrassment, and stands convicted, by his own contradictions and confession, of ignorance in its worst form: that is, of being ignorant, and yet believing himself to know.[13] But other Athenian statesmen are no wiser. Even Perikles is proved to be equally deficient — by the fact that he has never been able to teach or improve any one else, not even his own sons and those whom he loved best.[14] “At any rate” (contends Alkibiades) “I am as good as my competitors, and can hold my ground against them.” But Sokrates reminds him that the real competitors with whom he ought to compare himself, are foreigners, liable to become the enemies of Athens, and against whom he, if he pretends to lead Athens, must be able to contend. In an harangue of unusual length, Sokrates shows that the kings of Sparta and Persia are of nobler breed, as well as more highly and carefully trained, than the Athenian statesmen.[15] Alkibiades must be rescued from his present ignorance, and exalted, so as to be capable of competing with these kings: which object cannot be attained except through the auxiliary interposition of Sokrates. Not that Sokrates professes to be himself already on this elevation, and to stand in need of no farther improvement. But he can, nevertheless, help others to attain it for themselves, through the discipline and stimulus of his interrogatories.[16]
[13] Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118.
[14] Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118-119.
[15] Plato, Alkib. i. p. 120-124.
[16] Plato, Alkib. i. p. 124.
But good — for what end, and under what circumstances? Abundant illustrative examples.
The dialogue then continues. Sokr. — We wish to become as good as possible. But in what sort of virtue? Alk. — In that virtue which belongs to good men. Sokr. — Yes, but good, in what matters? Alk. — Evidently, to men who are good in transacting business. Sokr. — Ay, but what kind of business? business relating to horses, or to navigation? If that be meant, we must go and consult horse-trainers or mariners? Alk. — No, I mean such business as is transacted by the most esteemed leaders in Athens. Sokr. — You mean the intelligent men. Every man is good, in reference to that which he understands: every man is bad, in reference to that which he does not understand. Alk. — Of course. Sokr. — The cobbler understands shoemaking, and is therefore good at that: he does not understand weaving, and is therefore bad at that. The same man thus, in your view, will be both good and bad?[17] Alk. — No: that cannot be. Sokr. — Whom then do you mean, when you talk of the good? Alk. — I mean those who are competent to command in the city. Sokr. — But to command whom or what — horses or men? Alk. — To command men. Sokr. — But what men, and under what circumstances? sick men, or men on shipboard, or labourers engaged in harvesting, or in what occupations? Alk. — I mean, men living in social and commercial relation with each other, as we live here; men who live in common possession of the same laws and government. Sokr. — When men are in communion of a sea voyage and of the same ship, how do we name the art of commanding them, and to what purpose does it tend? Alk. — It is the art of the pilot; and the purpose towards which it tends, is, bringing them safely through the dangers of the sea. Sokr. — When men are in social and political communion, to what purpose does the art of commanding them tend? Alk. — Towards the better preservation and administration of the city.[18] Sokr. — But what do you mean by better? What is that, the presence or absence of which makes better or worse? If in regard to the management of the body, you put to me the same question, I should reply, that it is the presence of health, and the absence of disease. What reply will you make, in the case of the city? Alk. — I should say, when friendship and unanimity among the citizens are present, and when discord and antipathy are absent. Sokr. — This unanimity, of what nature is it? Respecting what subject? What is the art or science for realising it? If I ask you what brings about unanimity respecting numbers and measures, you will say the arithmetical and the metrêtic art. Alk. — I mean that friendship and unanimity which prevails between near relatives, father and son, husband and wife. Sokr. — But how can there be unanimity between any two persons, respecting subjects which one of them knows, and the other does not know? For example, about spinning and weaving, which the husband does not know, or about military duties, which the wife does not know, how can there be unanimity between the two? Alk. — No: there cannot be. Sokr. — Nor friendship, if unanimity and friendship go together? Alk. — Apparently there cannot. Sokr. — Then when men and women each perform their own special duties, there can be no friendship between them. Nor can a city be well administered, when each citizen performs his own special duties? or (which is the same thing) when each citizen acts justly? Alk. — Not so: I think there may be friendship, when each person performs his or her own business. Sokr. — Just now you said the reverse. What is this friendship or unanimity which we must understand and realise, in order to become good men?