Now note the consequence (continues the Eleate). When we speak of Non-Ens, we do not mean any thing contrary to Ens, but only something different from Ens. When we call any thing not great, we do not affirm it to be the contrary of great, or to be little: for it may perhaps be simply equal: we only mean that it is different from great.[70] A negative proposition, generally, does not signify anything contrary to the predicate, but merely something else distinct or different from the predicate.[71] The Form of Different, though of one and the same general nature throughout, is distributed into many separate parts or specialties, according as it is attached to different things. Thus not beautiful is a special mode of the general Form or Genus Different, placed in antithesis with another Form or Genus, the beautiful. The antithesis is that of one Ens or Real thing against another Ens or Real thing: not beautiful, not great, not just, exist just as much and are quite as real, as beautiful, great, just. If the Different be a real Form or Genus, all its varieties must be real also. Accordingly Different from Ens is just as much a real Form as Ens itself:[72] and this is what we mean by Non-Ens:— not any thing contrary to Ens.
[70] Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B. Ὁπόταν τὸ μὴ ὂν λέγωμεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον μόνον . . . Οἷον ὅταν εἰπωμέν τι μὴ μέγα, τότε μᾶλλόν τί σοι φαινόμεθα τὸ σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ἴσον δηλοῦν τῷ ῥήματι.
Plato here means to imply that τὸ σμικρὸν is the real contrary of τὸ μέγα. When we say μὴ μέγα, we do not necessarily mean σμικρόν — we may mean ἴσον. Therefore τὸ μὴ μέγα does not (in his view) imply the contrary of μέγα.
[71] Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B. Οὐκ ἄρ’ ἐναντίον, ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγηται, σημαίνειν συγχωρησόμεθα, τοσοῦτον δὲ μόνον, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τι μηνύει τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὐ προτιθέμενα τῶν ἐπιόντων ὀνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ ἄττ’ ἂν κέηται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὕστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὀνόματα.
[72] Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B. ἡ τῆς θατέρου μορίου φύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων ἀντιθεσις οὐδὲν ἦττον, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος οὐσία ἐστίν· οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ σημαίνουσα, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ἕτερον ἐκείνου.
The Eleate claims to have refuted Parmenides, and to have shown both that Non-Ens is a real Form, and also what it is.
Here then the Eleate professes to have found what Non-Ens is: that it is a real substantive Form, numerable among the other Forms, and having a separate constant nature of its own, like not beautiful, not great:[73] that it is real and existent, just as much as Ens, beautiful, great, &c. Disregarding the prohibition of Parmenides, we have shown (says he) not only that Non-Ens exists, but also what it is. Many Forms or Genera enter into partnership or communion with each other; and Non-Ens is the partnership between Ens and Diversum. Diversum, in partnership with Ens, is (exists), in consequence of such partnership:— yet it is not that with which it is in partnership, but different therefrom — and being thus different from Ens, it is clearly and necessarily Non-Ens: while Ens also, by virtue of its partnership with Diversum, is different from all the other Forms, or is not any one of them, and to this extent therefore Ens is Non-Ens. We drop altogether the idea of contrariety, without enquiring whether it be reasonably justifiable or not: we attach ourselves entirely to the Form — Different.[74]
[73] Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B-C. τὸ μὴ ὂν βεβαίως ἐστὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον … ἐνάριθμον τῶν πολλῶν ὄντῶν εἶδος ἕν.
[74] Plato, Sophist. pp. 258 E — 259 A. ἡμεῖς γὰρ περὶ μὲν ἐναντίου τινὸς αὐτῷ χαίρειν πάλαι λέγομεν, εἴτ’ ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ λόγον ἔχον ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἄλογον, &c.
τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μετασχὸν τοῦ ὄντος ἔστι μὲν διὰ ταύτην τὴν μέθεξιν, οὐ μὴν ἐκεῖνο γε οὖ μέτεσχεν, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον, ἕτερον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ὄν ἐστι σαφέστατα ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὄν, &c.