[18] Plato, Politik. p. 274 C.
Plato embodies these last-mentioned comparisons in an elaborate and remarkable mythe — theological, cosmical, zoological, social — which occupies six pages of the Politikus (268 D — 274 E). Meiners and Socher (Ueber Platon’s Schriften, pp. 273-275) point out that the theology of Plato in this fable differs much from what we read in the Phædon, Republic, &c.: and Socher insists upon such discrepancy as one of his arguments against the genuineness of the Politikus. I have already observed that I do not concur in his inference. I do not expect uniformity of doctrine in the various Platonic dialogues: more especially on a subject so much beyond experience, and so completely open to the conjectures of a rich imagination, as theology and cosmogony. In the Sophistês, pp. 242-243, Plato had talked in a sort of contemptuous tone about those who dealt with philosophical doctrine in the way of mythe, as a proceeding fit only for boys: (not unlike the manner of Aristotle, when he speaks of οἱ μυθικῶς σοφιζόμενοι — τὰ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, Metaphys. B. 1000, a. 15-18, Λ. 1071, b. 27): while here, in the Politikus, he dilates upon what he admits to be a boyish mythe, partly because a certain portion of it may be made available in illustration of his philosophical purpose, partly because he wishes to enliven the monotony of a long-continued classification. Again, in the Phædrus (p. 229 C), the Platonic Sokrates is made to censure as futile any attempt to find rational explanations for the popular legends (σοφίζεσθαι): but here, in the Politikus, the Eleate expressly adapts his theory about the backward and forward rotation of the Kosmos to the explanation of the popular legends — about earthborn men, and about Helios turning back his chariot, in order to escape the shocking spectacle of the Thyestean banquet: which legends, when so explained, Plato declares that people would be wrong to disbelieve (οἱ νῦν ὑπὸ πολλῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπιστοῦνται, pp. 271 B, 268 A, B, C).
The differences of doctrine and handling, between the various Platonic dialogues, are facts not less worthy to be noted than the similarities. Here, in the mythe of the Politikus, we find a peculiar theological view, and a very remarkable cosmical doctrine — the rotation and counter-rotation of the Kosmos. The Kosmos is here declared (as in the Timæus) to be a living and intelligent Subject; having received these mental gifts from its Demiurgus. But the Kosmos is also Body as well as Mind; so that it is incapable of that constant sameness or uniformity which belongs to the Divine: Body having in itself an incurable principle of disorder (p. 269 D). The Kosmos is perpetually in movement; but its movement is only rotatory or circular in the same place: which is the nearest approximation to uniformity of movement. It does not always revolve by itself; nor is it always made to revolve by the Divine Steersman (κυβερνήτης, p. 272 E), but alternately the one and the other. This Divine Steersman presides over its rotation for a certain time, and along with him many subordinate Deities or Dæmons; until an epoch fixed by some unassigned destiny has been reached (p. 272 E). Then the Steersman withdraws from the process to his own watch-tower (εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ περιωπὴν), and the other Deities along with him. The Kosmos, being left to itself, ceases to revolve in the same direction, and begins its counter rotation; revolving by itself backwards, or in the contrary direction. By such violent revulsion many of the living inhabitants of the Kosmos are destroyed. The past phenomena are successively reproduced, but in an inverse direction — the old men go back to maturity, boyhood, infancy, death: the dead are born again, and pass through their lives backwards from age to infancy. Yet the counter-rotation brings about not simply an inverted reproduction of past phenomena, but new phenomena also: for we are told that the Kosmos, when left to itself, did tolerably well as long as it remembered the Steersman’s direction, but after a certain interval became forgetful and went wrong, generating mischief and evil: so that the Steersman was at last forced to put his hand again to the work, and to impart to it a fresh rotation in his own direction (p. 273 B-D). The Kosmos never goes satisfactorily, except when the hand of the Steersman is upon it. But we are informed that there are varieties of this divine administration: one named the period of Kronus or Saturn; another that of Zeus, &c. The present is the period of Zeus (p. 272 B). The period of Kronus was one of spontaneous and universal abundance, under the immediate superintendence of the Deity. This Divine Ruler was infinitely superior to the subjects whom he ruled, and left nothing to be desired. But now, in the present period of Zeus, men are under human rule, and not divine: there is no such marked superiority of the Ruler to his subjects. The human race has been on the point of becoming extinct; and has only been saved by beneficent presents from various Gods — fire from Prometheus, handicraft from Hephæstus and Athênê (pp. 272 C, 274 C).
All this prodigious bulk of mythical invention (θαυμαστὸς ὄγκος, p. 277 B) seems to be introduced here for the purpose of illustrating the comparative ratio between the Ruler and his subjects; and the material difference in this respect between King and Shepherd — between the government of mankind by kings, and that of flocks and herds by the herdsman. In attempting to define the True and Genuine Ruler (he lays it down), we can expect nothing better than a man among other men; but distinguished above his fellows, so far as wisdom, dialectic, and artistic accomplishment, can confer superiority.
There is much in this copious mythe which I cannot clearly understand or put together: nor do I derive much profit from the long exposition of it given by Stallbaum (Proleg. ad Polit. pp. 100-128). We cannot fairly demand either harmonious consistency or profound meaning in the different features of an ingenious fiction. The hypothesis of a counter-rotation of the Kosmos (spinning like a top, ἐπὶ σμικροτάτου βαῖνον ποδὸς ἰέναι, p. 270 A), with an inverted reproduction of past phenomena, appears to me one of the most singular fancies in the Greek mythology. I cannot tell how far it may have been suggested by any such statement as that of the Egyptian priests (Herodot. ii. 142). I can only repeat the observation made by Phædrus to the Platonic Sokrates, in the dialogue Phædrus (p. 275 A): “You, Sokrates, construct easily enough Egyptian tales, or any other tales that you please”.
Distinction of causes Principal and Causes Auxiliary. The King is the only Principal Cause, but his auxiliaries pretend to be principal also.
The human King, whom we shall now attempt to define, tends the human flock; but there are other persons also who assist in doing so, and without whose concurrent agency he could not attain his purpose. We may illustrate this by comparing with him the weaver of woollen garments: who requires many subsidiary and preparatory processes, performed by agents different from himself (such as the carder of wool, the spinner, and the manufacturer of the instruments for working the loom) to enable him to finish his work. In all matters, important as well as vulgar, two separate processes or arts, or contributory persons, are to be distinguished: Causes and Co-Causes, i.e., Principal Causes, and Concurrent, Auxiliary, Co-efficient, Subordinate, Causes.[19] The King, like the Weaver, is distinguishable, from other agents helping towards the same end, as a Principal Cause from Auxiliary Causes.[20] The Causes auxiliary to the King, in so far as they are inanimate, may be distributed roughly under seven heads (bipartition being here impracticable) — Implements, Vessels, Vehicles, Protections surrounding the Body, Recreative Objects, Raw Material of every variety, Nutritive Substances, &c.[21] Other auxiliary Causes are, the domestic cattle, bought slaves, and all descriptions of serving persons; being often freemen who undertake, for hire, servile occupations and low trades. There are moreover ministerial officers of a higher grade: heralds, scribes, interpreters, prophets, priests, Sophists, rhetors; and a great diversity of other functionaries, military, judicial, forensic, dramatic, &c., who manage different departments of public affairs, often changing from one post to another.[22] But these higher ministerial functionaries differ from the lower in this — That they pretend to be themselves the directors and managers of the government, not recognising the genuine King: whereas the truth is, that they are only ministerial and subordinate to him:— they are Concurrent Causes, while he is the only real or principal Cause.[23]
[19] Plato, Politik. p. 281 D-E.
[20] Plato, Politik. p. 287 D.
[21] Plato, Politik. pp. 288-289.