This is put forward as the worst scheme of all: as the greatest depravation of society, and the greatest forfeiture of public as well as private happiness. We have here the proposition which Pôlus and Kalliklês are introduced as defending in the Gorgias, and Thrasymachus in the Republic. In both dialogues, Sokrates undertakes to expose it. The great benefit conferred by King Nomos, is, that he protects society against the maximum of evil.
Comparison of the Politikus with the Republic. Points of analogy and difference.
Another interesting comparison may be made: that between the Politikus and the Republic. We must remember that the Politikus is announced by Plato as having two purposes. 1. To give a lesson in the method of definition and division. 2. To define the characteristic of the person bearing the name of Politikus, distinguishing him from all others, analogous or disparate. — The method is here more prominent than the doctrine.
But in the Republic, no lesson of method is attempted; the doctrine stands alone and independent of it. We shall find however that the doctrine is essentially the same. That which the Politikus lays down in brief outline, is in the Republic amplified and enlarged; presented with many variations and under different points of view, yet, still at the bottom, the same doctrine, both as to affirmation and negation. The Republic affirms (as the Politikus does) the exclusive legitimacy of science, art, intelligence, &c., as the initiatory and omnipotent authority over all the constituent members of society: and farther, that such intelligence can have no place except in one or a few privileged persons. The Republic (like the Politikus) presents to us the march of society with its Principal Cause — its concurrent or Auxiliary Causes — and its inferior governable mass or matter, the human flock, indispensable and co-essential as a part of the whole scheme. In the Republic, the Cause is represented by the small council of philosophical Elders: the concurrent causes, by the Guardians or trained soldiers: the inferior matter, by the remaining society, which is distributed among various trades, providing for the subsistence and wants of all. The explanation of Justice (which is the ostensible purpose of the Republic) is made to consist in the fact — That each one of these several parts does its own special work — nothing more — nothing less. Throughout all the Republic, a constant parallelism is carried on (often indeed overstrained) between the community and the individual man. In the one as well as in the other, Plato recognises the three constituent elements, all essential as co-operators, but each with its own special function: in the individual, he recognises three souls (encephalic, thoracic, and abdominal) as corresponding to Elders, Guardians, and Producers, in the community. Here are the same features as those given in outline in the Politikus: but the two higher features of the three appear greatly expanded in the Republic: the training and conditions proper for the philosophic Artist or Governor, and for his auxiliaries the Guardians, being described and vindicated at great length. Moreover, in the Republic, Plato not only repeats the doctrine[60] that the right of command belongs to every art in its own province and over its own subject-matter (which is the cardinal point in the Politikus) — but he farther proclaims that each individual neither can exercise, nor ought to exercise, more than one art. He allows no double men or triple men[61] — “Quam quisque novit artem, in eâ se exerceat”. He would not have respected the Xenophontic Cyrus or Ischomachus. He carries the principle of specialization to its extreme point. His Republic is an aggregate of special artists and professional aptitudes: among whom the Governor is only one, though the first and rarest. He sets aside the common basis of social endowments essential to every man: upon which each man’s specialty is superinduced in the theory of the Platonic Protagoras. The only common quality which Plato admits is, — That each man, and each of the three souls composing each man, shall do his own business and his own business only: this is his definition of Justice, in the Republic.[62]
[60] Plato, Republ. i. p. 342 C. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄρχουσι γε αἱ τέχναι καὶ κρατοῦσιν ἐκείνου οὖ περ εἰσὶ τέχναι.
[61] Plato, Republ. ii. pp. 370 B, 374 B — 395-397 E. οὐκ ἔστι διπλοῦς ἀνηρ παρ’ ἡμῖν οὐδὲ πολλαπλοῦς, ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστος ἓν πράττει (p. 397 E).
[62] Plato, Republ. iv. p. 433.
Comparison of the Politikus with the Kratylus. Dictatorial, constructive, science or art, common to both: applied in the former to social administration — in the latter to the formation and modification of names.
Lastly, I will illustrate the Politikus by comparison with the Kratylus, which will be treated in the [next chapter]. The conception of dictatorial science or art, which I have stated as the principal point in the Politikus, appears again in the Kratylus applied to a different subject — naming, or the imposition of names. Right and legitimate name-giving is declared to be an affair of science or art, like right and legitimate polity: it can only be performed by the competent scientific or artistic name-giver, or by the lawgiver considered in that special capacity. The second title of the dialogue Kratylus is Περὶ Ὀνομάτων Ὀρθότητος — On the Rectitude or legitimacy of names. What constitutes right and legitimate Name-giving? In like manner, we might provide a second title for the Politikus — Περὶ Πολιτείας Ὀρθότητος — On the rectitude or legitimacy of polity or sociality. What constitutes right or legitimate sociality?[63] Plato answers — It is the constant dictation and supervision of art or science — or of the scientific, artistic, dictator, who alone knows both the End and the means. This alone is right and true sociality — or sociality as it ought to be. So, if we read the Kratylus, we find Plato defining in the same way right Name-giving — or name-giving as it ought to be. It is when each name is given by an artistic name-constructor, who discerns the Form of the name naturally suitable in each particular case, and can embody it in appropriate letters and syllables.[64] A true or right name signifies by likeness to the thing signified.[65] The good lawgiver discerns this likeness: but all lawgivers are not good: the bad lawgiver fancies that he discerns it, but is often mistaken.[66] It would be the ideal perfection of language, if every name could be made to signify by likeness to the thing named. But this cannot be realised: sufficient likenesses cannot be found to furnish an adequate stock of names. In the absence of such best standard, we are driven to eke out language by appealing to a second-best, an inferior and vulgar principle approximating more or less, to rectitude — that is, custom and convention.[67]
[63] The exact expression occurs in Politikus, pp. 293 E, 294 A. νῦν δὲ ἤδη φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦτο βουλησόμεθα, τὸ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἄνευ νόμων ἀρχόντων ὀρθότητος διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς.