The mistake of Plato in affirming Names to be true or false, is analogous to that which we read in the Philêbus, where Pleasures are distinguished as true and false.
[6] Plato, Kratyl. p. 386 D. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι αὐτὰ αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντά τινα βέβαιόν ἐστι τὰ πράγματα, οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ ὑφ’ ἡμῶν, ἐλκόμενα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τῷ ἡμετέρῳ φαντάσματι, ἀλλὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ πρὸς τὴν αὑτων οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ᾗπερ πέφυκεν.
[7] Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 A.
[8] Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 C. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὀνομάζειν πρᾶξις τίς ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ λέγειν πρᾶξις τις ἦν περὶ τὰ πράγματα; … Αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἐφάνησαν ἡμῖν οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὖσαι, ἀλλ’ αὑτῶν τινα ἰδίαν φύσιν ἔχουσαι; … Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὀνομαστέον ᾗ πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα ὀνομάζειν τε καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι, καὶ ᾧ, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ᾗ ἂν ἡμεῖς βουληθῶμεν, εἴπερ τι τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν μέλλει ὁμολογούμενον εἶναι; καὶ οὕτω μὲν ἂν πλέον τι ποιοῖμεν καὶ ὀνομάζοιμεν, ἄλλως δὲ οὔ;
Speaking and naming are regarded by Plato as acts whereby the thing (spoken of or) named is acted upon or suffers. So in the Sophistês (p. 248) he considers Knowing as an act performed, whereby the thing known suffers. Deuschle (Die Platonische Sprach-philosophie, p. 59, Marpurg. 1859) treats this comparison made by Plato between naming and material agencies, as if it were mere banter — and even indifferent banter. Schleiermacher in his note thinks it seriously meant and Platonic; and I fully agree with him (Schl. p. 456).
[9] Plato, Kratyl. p. 388 C. Ὄνομα ἄρα διδασκαλικόν τί ἐστιν ὄργανον, καὶ διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας, ὥσπερ κερκὶς ὑφάσματος. See Boethius ap. Schol. ad Aristot. Interp. p. 108, a. 40. Aristotle (De Interpr. iv. 3) says: ἔστι δὲ λόγος ἅπας μὲν σημαντικός, οὐχ ὡς ὄργανον δέ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συνθήκην. Several even of the Platonic critics consider Plato’s choice of the metaphor ὄργανον as inappropriate: but modern writers on logic and psychology often speak of names as “instruments of thought”.
[10] Plato, Kratyl. p. 389 A. ὁ νομοθέτης, ὃς δὴ τῶν δημιουργῶν σπανιώτατος ἐν ἀνθρῶποις γίγνεται.
The name is a didactic instrument; fabricated by the law-giver upon the type of the Name-Form, and employed as well as appreciated, by the philosopher.
To what does the lawgiver look when he frames a name? Compare the analogy of other instruments. The artisan who constructs a bodkin or shuttle for weaving, has present to his mind as a model, the Idea or Form of the bodkin — the self-existent bodkin of Nature herself. If a broken shuttle is to be replaced, it is this Idea or type, not the actual broken instrument, which he seeks to copy. Whatever may be the variety of web for which the shuttle is destined, he modifies the new instrument accordingly: but all of them must embody the Form or Idea of the shuttle. He cannot choose another type according to his own pleasure: he must embody the type, prescribed by nature, in the iron, wood, or other material of which the instrument is made.[11]
[11] Plato, Kratyl. p. 389 B-C. αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστι κερκίς … πάσας μὲν δεῖ τὸ τῆς κερκίδος ἔχειν εἶδος … οὐχ οἷον ἂν αὐτὸς βουλήθη, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἐπεφύκει.