[16] Plato, Parmenid. p. 133 E.
[17] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 393 D, 432.
[18] Plato, Kratyl. p. 422 D. τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ ὀρθότης τοιαύτη τις ἐβούλετο εἶναι, οἷα δηλοῦν οἷον ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων. — 423 D: οὐ καὶ οὐσία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ χρῶμα καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; πρῶτον αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ὅσα ἠξίωται ταύτης τῆς προσρήσεως τοῦ εἶναι; … Τί οὖν; εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο μιμεῖσθαι δύναιτο, ἑκάστου τὴν οὐσίαν, γράμμασί τε καὶ συλλαβαῖς, ἆρ’ οὐκ ἂν δηλοῖ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν; Compare p. 433.
The story given by Herodotus (ii. 2) about the experiment made by the Egyptian king Psammetichus, is curious. He wished to find out whether the Egyptians or the Phrygians were the oldest or first of mankind: he accordingly caused two children to be brought up without having a word spoken to them, with a view to ascertain what language they would come to by nature. At the age of two years they uttered the Phrygian word signifying bread. Psammetichus was then satisfied that the Phrygians were the first of mankind.
This story undoubtedly proceeds upon the assumption that there is one name which naturally suggests itself for each object. But when M. Renan says that the assumption is the same “as Plato has developed with so much subtlety in the Kratylus,” I do not agree with him. The Absolute Name-Form or Essence, discernible only by the technical Lawgiver, is something very different. See M. Renan, De l’Origine du Langage, ch. vi. p. 146, 2nd ed.
Another point here is peculiar to Plato. The Name-Giver must provide names such as can be used with effect by the dialectician or philosopher: who is the sole competent judge whether the names have genuine rectitude or not.[19] We see from hence that the aspirations of Plato went towards a philosophical language fit for those who conversed with forms or essences: something like (to use modern illustrations) a technical nomenclature systematically constructed for the expositions of men of science: such as that of Chemistry, Botany, Mineralogy, &c. Assuredly no language actually spoken among men, has ever been found suitable for this purpose without much artificial help.[20]
[19] Plato, Kratyl. p. 390 D. Respecting the person called ὁ διαλεκτικός, whom Plato describes as grasping Ideas, or Forms, Essences, and employing nothing else in his reasoning — λόγον διδοὺς καὶ λαμβάνων τῆς οὐσίας — see Republic, vi. p. 511 B, vii. pp. 533-534-537 C.
[20] Plato, Kratyl. p. 426 A. ὁ περὶ ὀνομάτων τεχνικός, &c.
Exclusive competence of a privileged lawgiver, to discern these essences, and to apportion names rightly.
As this theory of naming is a deduction from Plato’s main doctrine of absolute or self-existing Ideas, so it also illustrates (to repeat what was said in the last [chapter]) his recognition of professional skill and of competence vested exclusively in a gifted One or Few: which he ranks as the sole producing cause of Good or the Best, setting it in contrast with those two causes which he considers as productive of Evil, or at any rate of the Inferior or Second-Best: 1. The One or Few, who are ungifted and unphilosophical: perhaps ambitious pretenders. 2. The spontaneous, unbespoken inspirations, conventions, customs, or habits, which grow up without formal mandate among the community. To find the right name of each thing, is no light matter, nor within the competence of any one or many ordinary men. It can only be done by one of the few privileged lawgivers. Plato even glances at the necessity of a superhuman name-giver: though he deprecates the supposition generally, as a mere evasion or subterfuge, introduced to escape the confession of real ignorance.[21]