Dittrich, in his Dissertation De Cratylo Platonis, Leipsic, 1841, adopts the opinion of Schleiermacher and the other critics, that the etymological examples given in this dialogue, though Sokrates announces them as proving and illustrating his own theory seriously laid down, are really bitter jests and mockery, intended to destroy it — “hanc sententiam facetissimis et irrisione plenis exemplis, dum comprobare videtur, reverâ infringit” (p. 12). Dittrich admits that Kratylus, who holds the theory derided, understands nothing of this acerbissima irrisio (p. 18). He thinks that Protagoras, not Prodikus nor Antisthenes, is the person principally caricatured (pp. 32-34-38).
[33] Schleiermacher, Introd. to Kratyl. pp. 8-16; Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Krat. p. 17. Winckelmann suspects that Hermogenes in the Kratylus is intended to represent Antisthenes (Antisth. Fragment. p. 49).
Lobeck (Aglaophamus, p. 866) says that the Pythagoreans were among the earliest etymologising philosophers, proposing such etymologies as now appear very absurd.
Dissent from this theory — No proof that the Sophists ever proposed etymologies.
To me this modern discovery or hypothesis appears inadmissible. It rests upon assumptions at best gratuitous, and in part incorrect: it introduces difficulties greater than those which it removes. We find no proof that the Sophists ever proposed such etymologies as those which are here supposed to be ridiculed — or that they devoted themselves to etymology at all. If they etymologised, they would doubtless do so in the manner (to our judgment loose and fantastic) of their own time and of times long after them. But what ground have we for presuming that Plato’s views on the subject were more correct? and that etymologies which to them appeared admissible, would be regarded by him as absurd and ridiculous?
Now if the persons concerned were other than the Sophists, scarcely any critic would have thought himself entitled to fasten upon them a discreditable imputation without some evidence. Of Prodikus we know (and that too chiefly from some sarcasms of Plato) that he took pains to distinguish words apparently, but not really, equivalent: and that such accurate distinction was what he meant by “rectitude of names” (Plato, Euthydêm. 277 E.) Of Protagoras we know that he taught, by precept or example, correct speaking or writing: but we have no information that either of them pursued etymological researches, successfully or unsuccessfully.[34] Moreover this very dialogue (Kratylus) contains strong presumptive evidence that the Platonic etymologies could never have been intended to ridicule Protagoras. For these etymologies are announced by Sokrates as exemplifying and illustrating a theory of his own respecting names: which theory (Sokrates himself expressly tells us) is founded upon the direct negation of the cardinal doctrine of Protagoras.[35] That Sophist, therefore, could not have been ridiculed by any applications, however extravagant, of a theory directly opposed to him.[36]
[34] See a good passage of Winckelmann, Prolegg. ad Platon. Euthydemum, p. xlvii., respecting Protagoras and Prodikus, as writers and critics on language.
Stallbaum says, Proleg. ad Krat. p. 11:— “Quibus verbis haud dubié notantur Sophistæ; qui, neglectis linguæ elementis, derivatorum et compositorum verborum originationem temeré ad suum arbitrium tractabant”. Ibid. p. 4:— “In Cratylo ineptæ etymologiæ specimina exhibentur, ita quidem ut haudquaquam dubitari liceat, quin ista omnia ad mentem sophistarum maximeque Protagoreorum joculari imitatione explicata sint”.
In spite of these confident assertions, — first, that the Sophists are the persons intended to be ridiculed, next, that they deserved to be so ridiculed — Stallbaum has another passage, p. 15, wherein he says, “Jam vero quinam fuerint philosophi isti atque etymologi, qui in Cratylo ridentur et exploduntur, vulgo parum exploratum habetur”. He goes on to say that neither Prodikus nor Antisthenes is meant, but Protagoras and the Protagoreans. To prove this he infers, from a passage in this dialogue (c. 11, p. 391 C), that Protagoras had written a book περὶ ὀρθότητος τῶν ὀνομάτων (Heindorf and Schleiermacher, with better reason, infer from the passage nothing more than the circumstance that Protagoras taught ὀρθοεπείαν or correct speaking and writing). The passage does not prove this; but if it did, what did Protagoras teach in the book? Stallbaum tells us (p. 16):— “Jam si quæras, quid tandem Protagoras ipse de nominum ortu censuerit, fateor unâ conjecturâ nitendum esse, ut de hâc re aliquid eruatur”. He then proceeds to conjecture, from the little which we know respecting Protagoras, what that Sophist must have laid down upon the origin of names; and he finishes by assuming the very point which he ought to have proved (p. 17):— “ex ipso Cratylo intelligimus et cognoscimus, mox inter Protagoræ amicos exstitisse qui inepté hæc studia persequentes, non e verbis et nominibus mentis humanæ notiones elicere et illustrare, sed in verba et nomina sua ipsi decreta transferre et sic ea probare et confirmare niterentur. Quid quidem homines à Platone hoc libro facetissimâ irrisione exagitantur,” &c. I repeat, that in spite of Stallbaum’s confident assertions, he fails in giving the smallest proof that Protagoras or the Sophists proposed etymologies such as to make them a suitable butt for Plato on this occasion. Ast also talks with equal confidence and equal absence of proof about the silly and arbitrary etymological proceedings of the Sophists, which (he says) this dialogue is intended throughout to ridicule (Ast, Platon’s Leben und Schriften, pp. 253-254-264, &c.).
[35] Plato, Kratylus, c. 4-5, pp. 386-387.