[60] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 394 B, 399 B, 414 C, 418 A.
[61] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 397 B, 409 B.
Sokrates qualifies and attenuates his original thesis.
To this point Sokrates brings the question during his conversation with Hermogenes: against whom he maintains — That there is a natural intrinsic rectitude in Names, or a true Name-Form — that naming is a process which must be performed in the natural way, and by an Artist who knows that way. But when, after laying down this general theory, he has gone a certain length in applying it to actual names, he proceeds to introduce qualifications which attenuate and explain it away. Existing names were bestowed by artistic law-givers, but under a belief in the Herakleitean theory — which theory is at best doubtful: moreover the original names have, in course of time, undergone such multiplied changes, that the original point of significant resemblance can hardly be now recognised except by very penetrating intellects.
Conversation of Sokrates with Kratylus: who upholds that original thesis without any qualification.
It is here that Sokrates comes into conversation with Kratylus: who appears as the unreserved advocate of the same general theory which Sokrates had enforced upon Hermogenes. He admits all the consequences of the theory, taking no account of qualifications. Moreover he announces himself as having already bestowed reflection on the subject, and as espousing the doctrine of Herakleitus.[62]
[62] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 428 B, 440 E.
It appears that on this point the opinion of Herakleitus coincided with that of the Pythagoreans, who held that names were φύσει καὶ οὐ θέσει and maintained as a corollary that there could be only one name for each thing and only one thing signified by each name (Simplikius ad Aristot. Categ. p. 43, b. 32, Schol. Bekk.).
In general Herakleitus differed from Pythagoras, and is described as speaking of him with bitter antipathy.