| [CHAPTER XXVI. ] |
| PHÆDRUS — SYMPOSION. |
| [These two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. Phædrus is the originator of both ] | [1] |
| [Eros as conceived by Plato. Different sentiment prevalent in Hellenic antiquity and in modern times. Position of women in Greece ] | ib. |
| [Eros, considered as the great stimulus to improving philosophical communion. Personal Beauty, the great point of approximation between the world of sense and the world of Ideas. Gradual generalisation of the sentiment ] | [4] |
| [All men love Good, as the means of Happiness, but they pursue it by various means. The name Eros is confined to one special case of this large variety ] | [5] |
| [Desire of mental copulation and procreation, as the only attainable likeness of immortality, requires the sight of personal beauty as an originating stimulus ] | [6] |
| [Highestexaltation of the erotic impulse in a few privileged minds, when it ascends gradually to the love of Beauty in general. This is the most absorbing sentiment of all ] | [7] |
| [Purposeof the Symposion, to contrast this Platonic view of Eros with several different views of it previously enunciated by the other speakers; closing with a panegyric on Sokrates, by the drunken Alkibiades ] | [8] |
| [Views of Eros presented by Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon ] | [9] |
| [Discourseof Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He describes Eros as not a God, but an intermediate Dæmon between Gods and men, constantly aspiring to divinity, but not attaining it ] | [9] |
| [Analogy of the erotic aspiration with that of the philosopher, who knows his own ignorance and thirsts for knowledge ] | [10] |
| [Eros as presented in the Phædrus — Discourse of Lysias, and counter-discourse of Sokrates, adverse to Eros — Sokrates is seized with remorse, and recants in a high-flown panegyric on Eros ] | [11] |
| [Panegyric — Sokrates admits that the influence of Eros is a variety of madness, but distinguishes good and bad varieties of madness, both coming from the Gods. Good madness is far better than sobriety ] | ib. |
| [Poeticalmythe delivered by Sokrates, describing the immortality and pre-existence of the soul, and its pre-natal condition of partial companionship with Gods and eternal Ideas ] | [12] |
| [Operationof such pre-natal experience upon the Intellectual faculties of man — Comparison and combination of particular sensations indispensable — Reminiscence ] | [13] |
| [Reminiscenceis kindled up in the soul of the philosopher by the aspect of visible Beauty, which is the great link between the world of sense and the world of Ideas ] | [14] |
| [Elevatinginfluence ascribed, both in Phædrus and Symposion, to Eros Philosophus. Mixture in the mind of Plato, of poetical fancy and religious mysticism, with dialectic theory ] | [15] |
| [Differences between Symposion and Phædrus. In-dwelling conceptions assumed by the former, pre-natal experiences by the latter ] | [17] |
| [Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in Symposion ] | ib. |
| [Form or Idea of Beauty presented singly and exclusively in Symposion ] | [18] |
| [Eros recognised, both in Phædrus and Symposion, as affording the initiatory stimulus to philosophy — Not so recognised in Phædon, Theætêtus, and elsewhere ] | ib. |
| [Concluding scene and speech of Alkibiades in the Symposion — Behaviour of Sokrates to Alkibiades and other handsome youths ] | [19] |
| [Perfect self-command of Sokrates — proof against every sort of trial ] | [20] |
| [Drunkenness of others at the close of the Symposion — Sokrates is not affected by it, but continues his dialectic process ] | [21] |
| [Symposion and Phædon — each is the antithesis and complement of the other ] | [22] |
| [Symposion of Plato compared with that of Xenophon ] | ib. |
| [Small proportion of the serious, in the Xenophontic Symposion ] | [24] |
| [Platonic Symposion more ideal and transcendental than the Xenophontic ] | [25] |
| [Second half of the Phædrus — passes into a debate on Rhetoric. Eros is considered as a subject for rhetorical exercise ] | [26] |
| [Lysiasis called a logographer by active politicians. Contempt conveyed by the word. Sokrates declares that the only question is, Whether a man writes well or ill ] | [27] |
| [Questionabout teaching the art of writing well or speaking well. Can it be taught upon system or principle? Or does the successful Rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack? ] | [28] |
| [Theoryof Sokrates — that all art of persuasion must be founded upon a knowledge of the truth, and of gradations of resemblance to the truth ] | ib. |
| [Comparisonmade by Sokrates between the discourse of Lysias and his own. Eros is differently understood: Sokrates defined what he meant by it: Lysias did not define ] | [29] |
| [Logical processes — Definition and Division — both of them exemplified in the two discourses of Sokrates ] | ib. |
| [View of Sokrates — that there is no real Art of Rhetoric, except what is already comprised in Dialectic — The rhetorical teaching is empty and useless ] | [30] |
| [What the Art of Rhetoric ought to be — Analogy of Hippokrates and the medical Art ] | [31] |
| [Art of Rhetoric ought to include a systematic classification of minds with all their varieties, and of discourses with all their varieties. The Rhetor must know how to apply the one to the other, suitably to each particular case ] | [32] |
| [The Rhetorical Artist must farther become possessed of real truth, as well as that which his auditors believe to be truth. He is not sufficiently rewarded for this labour ] | [33] |
| [Questionabout Writing — As an Art, for the purpose of instruction, it can do little — Reasons why. Writing may remind the reader of what he already knows ] | ib. |
| [Neitherwritten words, nor continuous speech, will produce any serious effect in teaching. Dialectic and cross-examination are necessary ] | [34] |
| [The Dialectician and Cross-Examiner is the only man who can really teach. If the writer can do this, he is more than a writer ] | [37] |
| [Lysias is only a logographer: Isokrates promises to become a philosopher ] | [38] |
| [Date of the Phædrus — not an early dialogue ] | ib. |
| [Criticism given by Plato on the three discourses — His theory of Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic ] | ib. |
| [His theory postulates, in the Rhetor, knowledge already assured — it assumes that all the doubts have been already removed ] | [39] |
| [The Expositor, with knowledge and logical process, teaches minds unoccupied and willing to learn ] | ib. |
| [The Rhetor does not teach, but persuades persons with minds pre-occupied — guiding them methodically from error to truth ] | [40] |
| [He must then classify the minds to be persuaded, and the means of persuasion or varieties of discourse. He must know how to fit on the one to the other in each particular case ] | [41] |
| [Plato’s Idéal of the Rhetorical Art — involves in part incompatible conditions — the Wise man or philosopher will never be listened to by the public ] | ib. |
| [The other part of the Platonic Idéal is grand but unattainable — breadth of psychological data and classified modes of discourse ] | [42] |
| [Plato’sideal grandeur compared with the rhetorical teachers — Usefulness of these teachers for the wants of an accomplished man ] | [44] |
| [The Rhetorical teachers conceived the Art too narrowly: Plato conceived it too widely. The principles of an Art are not required to be explained to all learners ] | [45] |
| [Plato includes in his conception of Art, the application thereof to new particular cases. This can never be taught by rule ] | [46] |
| [Plato’s charge against the Rhetorical teachers is not made out ] | [47] |
| [Plato has not treated Lysias fairly, in neglecting his greater works, and selecting for criticism an erotic exercise for a private circle ] | [47] |
| [No fair comparison can be taken between this exercise of Lysias and the discourses delivered by Sokrates in the Phædrus ] | [48] |
| [Continuous discourse, either written or spoken, inefficacious as a means of instruction to the ignorant ] | [49] |
| [Written matter is useful as a memorandum for persons who know — or as an elegant pastime ] | [50] |
| [Plato’s didactic theories are pitched too high to be realised ] | [51] |
| [No one has ever been found competent to solve the difficulties raised by Sokrates, Arkesilaus, Karneades, and the negative vein of philosophy ] | ib. |
| [Plato’s idéal philosopher can only be realised under the hypothesis of a pre-existent and omniscient soul, stimulated into full reminiscence here ] | [52] |
| [Different proceeding of Plato in the Timæus ] | [53] |
| [Oppositetendencies co-existent in Plato’s mind — Extreme of the Transcendental or Absolute — Extreme of specialising adaptation to individuals and occasions ] | [54] |
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| [CHAPTER XXVII. ] |
| PARMENIDES. |
| [Character of dialogues immediately preceding — much transcendental assertion. Opposite character of the Parmenides ] | [56] |
| [Sokratesis the juvenile defendant — Parmenides the veteran censor and cross-examiner. Parmenides gives a specimen of exercises to be performed by the philosophical aspirant ] | ib. |
| [Circumstances and persons of the Parmenides ] | [57] |
| [Manner in which the doctrine of Parmenides was impugned. Manner in which his partisan Zeno defended him ] | [58] |
| [Sokrateshere impugns the doctrine of Zeno. He affirms the Platonic theory of ideas separate from sensible objects, yet participable by them ] | [60] |
| [Parmenidesand Zeno admire the philosophical ardour of Sokrates. Parmenides advances objections against the Platonic theory of Ideas ] | [60] |
| [What Ideas does Sokrates recognise? Of the Just and Good? Yes. Of Man, Horse, &c.? Doubtful. Of Hair, Mud, &c.? No ] | ib. |
| [Parmenides declares that no object in nature is mean to the philosopher ] | [61] |
| [Remarks upon this — Contrast between emotional and scientific classification ] | ib. |
| [Objections of Parmenides — How can objects participate in the Ideas. Each cannot have the whole Idea, nor a part thereof ] | [62] |
| [Comparingthe Idea with the sensible objects partaking in the Idea, there is a likeness between them which must be represented by a higher Idea — and so on ad infinitum ] | [63] |
| [Are the Ideas conceptions of the mind, and nothing more? Impossible ] | [64] |
| [The Ideas are types or exemplars, and objects partake of them by being likened to them. Impossible ] | [65] |
| [If Ideas exist, they cannot be knowable by us. We can know only what is relative to ourselves. Individuals are relative to individuals: Ideas relative to Ideas ] | ib. |
| [Forms can be known only through the Form of Cognition, which we do not possess ] | [66] |
| [Form of cognition, superior to our Cognition, belongs to the Gods. We cannot know them, nor can they know us ] | ib. |
| [Sum total of objections against the Ideas is grave. But if we do not admit that Ideas exist, and that they are knowable, there can be no dialectic discussion ] | [67] |
| [Dilemma put by Parmenides — Acuteness of his objections ] | [68] |
| [The doctrine which Parmenides attacks is the genuine Platonic theory of Ideas. His objections are never answered in any part of the Platonic dialogues ] | ib. |
| [Views of Stallbaum and Socher. The latter maintains that Plato would never make such objections against his own theory, and denies the authenticity of the Parmenidês ] | [69] |
| [Philosophers are usually advocates, each of a positive system of his own ] | [70] |
| [Different spirit of Plato in his Dialogues of Search ] | ib. |
| [The Parmenidês is the extreme manifestation of the negative element. That Plato should employ one dialogue in setting forth the negative case against the Theory of Ideas is not unnatural ] | [71] |
| [Force of the negative case in the Parmenidês. Difficulties about participation of sensible objects in the world of Ideas] | ib. |
| [Difficultiesabout the Cognizability of Ideas. If Ideas are absolute, they cannot be cognizable: if they are cognizable, they must be relative. Doctrine of Homo Mensura ] | [72] |
| [Answer of Sokrates — That Ideas are mere conceptions of the mind. Objection of Parmenides correct, though undeveloped ] | [73] |
| [Meaningof Abstract and General Terms, debated from ancient times to the present day — Different views of Plato and Aristotle upon it ] | [76] |
| [Plato never expected to make his Ideas fit on to the facts of sense: Aristotle tried to do it and partly succeeded ] | [78] |
| [Continuationof the Dialogue — Parmenides admonishes Sokrates that he has been premature in delivering a doctrine, without sufficient preliminary exercise ] | [79] |
| [What sort of exercise? Parmenides describes: To assume provisionally both the affirmative and the negative of many hypotheses about the most general terms, and to trace the consequences of each ] | ib. |
| [Impossibleto do this before a numerous audience — Parmenides is entreated to give a specimen — After much solicitation he agrees ] | [80] |
| [Parmenides elects his own theory of the Unum, as the topic for exhibition — Aristoteles becomes respondent ] | ib. |
| [Exhibition of Parmenides — Nine distinct deductions or Demonstrations, first from Unum Est — next from Unum non Est ] | [81] |
| [The Demonstrations in antagonising pairs, or Antinomies. Perplexing entanglement of conclusions given without any explanation ] | ib. |
| [Different judgments of Platonic critics respecting the Antinomies and the dialogue generally ] | [82] |
| [No dogmatical solution or purpose is wrapped up in the dialogue. The purpose is negative, to make a theorist keenly feel all the difficulties of theorising ] | [85] |
| [This negative purpose is expressly announced by Plato himself. All dogmatical purpose, extending farther, is purely hypothetical, and even inconsistent with what is declared ] | [87] |
| [The Demonstrations or Antinomies considered. They include much unwarranted assumption and subtlety. Collection of unexplained perplexities or ἀπορίαι ] | [88] |
| [Even if Plato himself saw through these subtleties, he might still choose to impose and to heap up difficulties in the way of a forward affirmative aspirant ] | [89] |
| [The exercises exhibited by Parmenides are exhibited only as illustrative specimens of a method enjoined to be applied to many other Antinomies ] | [91] |
| [These Platonic Antinomies are more formidable than any of the sophisms or subtleties broached by the Megaric philosophers ] | ib. |
| [In order to understand fully the Platonic Antinomies, we ought to have before us the problems of the Megarics and others. Uselessness of searching for a positive result ] | [93] |
| [Assumptionsof Parmenides in his Demonstrations convey the minimum of determinate meaning. Views of Aristotle upon these indeterminate predicates, Ens, Unum, &c. ] | [94] |
| [In the Platonic Demonstrations the same proposition in words is made to bear very different meanings ] | [95] |
| [First demonstration ends in an assemblage of negative conclusions. Reductio ad Absurdum, of the assumption — Unum non Multa ] | [96] |
| [Second Demonstration ] | [97] |
| [It ends in demonstrating Both, of that which the first Demonstration had demonstrated Neither ] | [98] |
| [Startling paradox — Open offence against logical canon — No logical canon had then been laid down ] | [99] |
| [Demonstration third — Attempt to reconcile the contradiction of Demonstrations I. and II. ] | [100] |
| [Plato’s imagination of the Sudden or Instantaneous — Breaches or momentary stoppages in the course of time ] | ib. |
| [Reviewof the successive pairs of Demonstrations or Antinomies in each, the first proves the Neither, the second proves the Both ] | [101] |
| [The third Demonstration is mediatorial but not satisfactory — The hypothesis of the Sudden or Instantaneous found no favour ] | [102] |
| [Review of the two last Antinomies. Demonstrations VI. and VII. ] | [103] |
| [Demonstration VII. is founded upon the genuine doctrine of Parmenides ] | [104] |
| [DemonstrationsVI. and VII. considered — Unwarrantable steps in the reasoning — The fundamental premiss differently interpreted, though the same in words ] | [105] |
| [Demonstrations VIII. and IX. — Analysis of Demonstration VIII. ] | [106] |
| [Demonstration VIII. is very subtle and Zenonian ] | [107] |
| [Demonstration IX. Neither following Both ] | ib. |
| [Concludingwords of the Parmenides — Declaration that he has demonstrated the Both and the Neither of many different propositions ] | [108] |
| [Comparisonof the conclusion of the Parmenides to an enigma of the Republic. Difference. The constructor of the enigma adapted its conditions to a foreknown solution. Plato did not ] | ib. |
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| [CHAPTER XXVIII. ] |
| THEÆTETUS. |
| [Subjects and personages in the Theætêtus ] | [110] |
| [Questionraised by Sokrates — What is knowledge or Cognition? First answer of Theætêtus, enumerating many different cognitions. Corrected by Sokrates ] | [111] |
| [Preliminaryconversation before the second answer is given. Sokrates describes his own peculiar efficacy — mental obstetric — He cannot teach, but he can evolve knowledge out of pregnant minds ] | [112] |
| [Ethical basis of the cross-examination of Sokrates — He is forbidden to pass by falsehood without challenge ] | [113] |
| [Answer of Theætêtus — Cognition is sensible perception: Sokrates says that this is the same doctrine as the Homo Mensura laid down by Protagoras, and that both are in close affinity with the doctrines of Homer, Herakleitus, Empedoklês, &c., all except Parmenides ] | ib. |
| [Plato here blends together three distinct theories for the purpose of confuting them; yet he also professes to urge what can be said in favour of them. Difficulty of following his exposition ] | [114] |
| [The doctrine of Protagoras is completely distinct from the other doctrines. The identification of them as one and the same is only constructive — the interpretation of Plato himself ] | [115] |
| [Explanation of the doctrine of Protagoras — Homo Mensura ] | [116] |
| [Perpetual implication of Subject with Object — Relate and Correlate ] | [118] |
| [Such relativity is no less true in regard to the ratiocinative combinations of each individual, than in regard to his percipient capacities ] | ib. |
| [Evidence from Plato proving implication of Subject and Object, in regard to the intelligible world ] | [121] |
| [The Protagorean measure is even more easily shown in reference to the intelligible world than in reference to sense ] | [122] |
| [Object always relative to Subject — Either without the other, impossible. Plato admits this in Sophistes ] | [126] |
| [Plato’s representation of the Protagorean doctrine in intimate conjunction with the Herakleitean ] | [126] |
| [Relativity of sensible facts, as described by him ] | ib. |
| [Relations are nothing in the object purely and simply without a comparing subject ] | [127] |
| [Relativity twofold — to the comparing Subject — to another object, besides the one directly described ] | ib. |
| [Statement of the doctrine of Herakleitus — yet so as to implicate it with that of Protagoras ] | [128] |
| [Agent and Patient — No absolute Ens ] | [129] |
| [Arguments derived from dreams, fevers, &c., may be answered ] | [130] |
| [Expositionof the Protagorean doctrine, as given here by Sokrates is to a great degree just. You cannot explain the facts of consciousness by independent Subject and Object ] | [131] |
| [Plato’s attempt to get behind the phenomena. Reference to a double potentiality — Subjective and Objective ] | [133] |
| [Argumentsadvanced by the Platonic Sokrates against the Protagorean doctrine. He says that it puts the wise and foolish on a par — that it contradicts the common consciousness. Not every one, but the wise man only, is a measure ] | [135] |
| [In matters of present sentiment every man can judge for himself. Where future consequences are involved special knowledge is required ] | [136] |
| [Plato,when he impugns the doctrine of Protagoras, states that doctrine without the qualification properly belonging to it. All belief relative to the condition of the believing mind ] | [137] |
| [All exposition and discussion is an assemblage of individual judgments and affirmations. This fact is disguised by elliptical forms of language ] | [139] |
| [Argument — That the Protagorean doctrine equalises all men and animals. How far true. Not true in the sense requisite to sustain Plato’s objection ] | [141] |
| [Belief on authority is true to the believer himself — The efficacy of authority resides in the believer’s own mind ] | [142] |
| [Protagorean formula — is false, to those who dissent from it ] | [143] |
| [Plato’s argument that the wise man alone is a measure — Reply to it ] | ib. |
| [Plato’s argument as to the distinction between present sensation and anticipation of the future ] | [145] |
| [The formula of Relativity does not imply that every man believes himself to be infallible ] | ib. |
| [Plato’sargument is untenable — That if the Protagorean formula be admitted, dialectic discussion would be annulled — The reverse is true — Dialectic recognises the autonomy of the Individual mind ] | [146] |
| [Contrast with the Treatise De Legibus — Plato assumes infallible authority — sets aside Dialectic ] | [148] |
| [Plato in denying the Protagorean formula, constitutes himself the measure for all. Counter-proposition to the formula ] | ib. |
| [Import of the Protagorean formula is best seen when we state explicitly the counter-proposition ] | [150] |
| [Unpopularityof the Protagorean formula — Most believers insist upon making themselves a measure for others, as well as for themselves. Appeal to Abstractions ] | [150] |
| [Aristotlefailed in his attempts to refute the Protagorean formula — Every reader of Aristotle will claim the right of examining for himself Aristotle’s canons of truth ] | [152] |
| [Plato’sexamination of the other doctrine — That knowledge is Sensible Perception. He adverts to sensible facts which are different with different Percipients ] | [153] |
| [Such is not the case with all the facts of sense. The conditions of unanimity are best found among select facts of sense — weighing, measuring, &c. ] | [154] |
| [Argumentsof Sokrates in examining this question. Divergence between one man and another arises, not merely from different sensual impressibility, but from mental and associative difference ] | [155] |
| [Argument — That sensible Perception does not include memory — Probability that those who held the doctrine meant to include memory ] | [157] |
| [Argument from the analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same time ] | ib. |
| [Sokrates maintains that we do not see with our eyes, but that the mind sees through the eyes: that the mind often conceives and judges by itself without the aid of any bodily organ ] | [159] |
| [Indication of several judgments which the mind makes by itself — It perceives Existence, Difference, &c. ] | [160] |
| [Sokratesmaintains that knowledge is to be found, not in the Sensible Perceptions themselves, but in the comparisons add computations of the mind respecting them ] | [161] |
| [Examination of this view — Distinction from the views of modern philosophers ] | [162] |
| [Different views given by Plato in other dialogues ] | [163] |
| [Plato’sdiscussion of this question here exhibits a remarkable advance in analytical psychology. The mind rises from Sensation, first to Opinion, then to Cognition ] | [164] |
| [Plato did not recognise Verification from experience, or from facts of sense, as either necessary or possible ] | [168] |
| [Second definition given by Theætêtus — That Cognition consists in right or true opinion ] | ib. |
| [Objectionby Sokrates — This definition assumes that there are false opinions. But how can false opinions be possible? How can we conceive Non-Ens: or confound together two distinct realities? ] | ib. |
| [Waxen memorial tablet in the mind, on which past impressions are engraved. False opinion consists in wrongly identifying present sensations with past impressions ] | [169] |
| [Sokrates refutes this assumption. Dilemma. Either false opinion is impossible, or else a man may know what he does not know ] | [170] |
| [He draws distinction between possessing knowledge, and having it actually in hand. Simile of the pigeon-cage with caught pigeons turned into it and flying about ] | ib. |
| [Sokratesrefutes this. Suggestion of Theætêtus — That there may be non-cognitions in the mind as well as cognitions, and that false opinion may consist in confounding one with the other. Sokrates rejects this ] | [171] |
| [He brings another argument to prove that Cognition is not the same as true opinion. Rhetors persuade or communicate true opinion; but they do not teach or communicate knowledge ] | [172] |
| [New answer of Theætêtus — Cognition is true opinion, coupled with rational explanation ] | [173] |
| [Criticismon the answer by Sokrates. Analogy of letters and words, primordial elements and compounds. Elements cannot be explained: compounds alone can be explained ] | ib. |
| [Sokrates refutes this criticism. If the elements are unknowable, the compound must be unknowable also ] | [174] |
| [Rationalexplanation may have one of three different meanings. 1. Description in appropriate language. 2. Enumeration of all the component elements in the compound. In neither of these meanings will the definition of Cognition hold ] | ib. |
| [Third meaning. To assign some mark, whereby the thing to be explained differs from everything else. The definition will not hold. For rational explanation, in this sense, is already included in true opinion ] | [175] |
| [Conclusion of the dialogue — Summing up by Sokrates — Value of the result, although purely negative ] | [176] |
| [Remarks on the dialogue. View of Plato. False persuasion of knowledge removed. Importance of such removal ] | ib. |
| [Formationof the testing or verifying power in men’s minds, value of the Theætêtus, as it exhibits Sokrates demolishing his own suggestions ] | [177] |
| [Comparison of the Philosopher with the Rhetor. The Rhetor is enslaved to the opinions of auditors ] | [178] |
| [The Philosopher is master of his own debates ] | [179] |
| [Purpose of dialogue to qualify for a life of philosophical Search ] | ib. |
| [Difficulties of the Theætêtus are not solved in any other Dialogue ] | [180] |
| [Plato considered that the search for Truth was the noblest occupation of life ] | [182] |
| [Contrast between the philosopher and the practical statesman — between Knowledge and Opinion ] | [183] |
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| [CHAPTER XXIX. ] |
| SOPHISTES — POLITIKUS. |
| [Persons and circumstances of the two dialogues ] | [185] |
| [Relation of the two dialogues to the Theætêtus ] | [187] |
| [Plato declares that his first purpose is to administer a lesson in logical method: the special question chosen, being subordinate to that purpose ] | [188] |
| [Method of logical Definition and Division ] | ib. |
| [Sokratestries the application of this method, first, upon a vulgar subject. To find the logical place and deduction of the Angler. Superior classes above him. Bisecting division ] | [189] |
| [Such a lesson in logical classification was at that time both novel and instructive. No logical manuals then existed ] | [190] |
| [Plato describes the Sophist as analogous to an angler. He traces the Sophist by descending subdivision from the acquisitive genus of art ] | [191] |
| [The Sophist traced down from the same, by a second and different descending subdivision ] | [192] |
| [Also, by a third ] | [193] |
| [The Sophist is traced down, from the genus of separating or discriminating art ] | [194] |
| [In a logical classification, low and vulgar items deserve as much attention as grand ones. Conflict between emotional and scientific classification ] | [195] |
| [The purifier — a species under the genus discriminator — separates good from evil. Evil is of two sorts; the worst sort is, Ignorance, mistaking itself for knowledge ] | [197] |
| [Exhortationis useless against this worst mode of evil. Cross-examination, the shock of the Elenchus, must be brought to bear upon it. This is the sovereign purifier ] | ib. |
| [The application of this Elenchus is the work of the Sophist, looked at on its best side. But looked at as he really is, he is a juggler who teaches pupils to dispute about every thing — who palms off falsehood for truth ] | [198] |
| [Doubt started by the Eleate. How can it be possible either to think or to speak falsely? ] | [199] |
| [He pursues the investigation of this problem by a series of questions ] | ib. |
| [The Sophist will reject our definition and escape, by affirming that to speak falsely is impossible. He will require us to make out a rational theory, explaining Non-Ens ] | [200] |
| [The Eleate turns from Non-Ens to Ens. Theories of various philosophers about Ens ] | ib. |
| [Difficulties about Ens are as great as those about Non-Ens ] | [201] |
| [WhetherEns is Many or One? If Many, how Many? Difficulties about One and the Whole. Theorists about Ens cannot solve them ] | [201] |
| [Theories of those who do not recognise a definite number of Entia or elements. Two classes thereof ] | [202] |
| [1. The Materialist Philosophers. 2. The Friends of Forms or Idealists, who recognise such Forms as the only real Entia] | ib. |
| [Argumentagainst the Materialists — Justice must be something, since it may be either present or absent, making sensible difference — But Justice is not a body ] | [203] |
| [At least many of them will concede this point, though not all Ens is common to the corporeal and the incorporeal. Ens is equivalent to potentiality ] | [204] |
| [Argumentagainst the Idealists — who distinguish Ens from the generated, and say that we hold communion with the former through our minds, with the latter through our bodies and senses ] | ib. |
| [Holdingcommunion — What? Implies Relativity. Ens is known by the mind. It therefore suffers or undergoes change. Ens includes both the unchangeable and the changeable ] | [205] |
| [Motion and rest are both of them Entia or realities. Both agree in Ens. Ens is a tertium quid — distinct from both. But how can anything be distinct from both? ] | [206] |
| [Here the Eleate breaks off without solution. He declares his purpose to show, That Ens is as full of puzzle as Non-Ens ] | ib. |
| [Argumentagainst those who admit no predication to be legitimate, except identical. How far Forms admit of intercommunion with each other ] | ib. |
| [No intercommunion between any distinct forms. Refuted. Common speech is inconsistent with this hypothesis ] | [207] |
| [Reciprocal intercommunion of all Forms — inadmissible ] | ib. |
| [Some Forms admit of intercommunion, others not. This is the only admissible doctrine. Analogy of letters and syllables ] | ib. |
| [Art and skill are required to distinguish what Forms admit of intercommunion, and what Forms do not. This is the special intelligence of the Philosopher, who lives in the bright region of Ens: the Sophist lives in the darkness of Non-Ens ] | [208] |
| [He comes to enquire what Non-Ens is. He takes for examination five principal Forms — Motion — Rest — Ens — Same — Different ] | ib. |
| [Form of Diversum pervades all the others ] | [209] |
| [Motionis different from Diversum, or is not Diversum. Motion is different from Ens — in other words, it is Non-Ens. Each of these Forms is both Ens and Non-Ens ] | [210] |
| [By Non-Ens, we do not mean anything contrary to Ens — we mean only something different from Ens. Non-Ens is a real Form, as well as Ens ] | ib. |
| [The Eleate claims to have refuted Parmenides, and to have shown both that Non-Ens is a real Form, and also what it is ] | [211] |
| [The theory now stated is the only one, yet given, which justifies predication as a legitimate process, with a predicate different from the subject ] | [212] |
| [Enquiry, whether the Form of Non-Ens can come into intercommunion with the Forms of Proposition, Opinion, Judgment ] | [213] |
| [Analysis of a Proposition. Every Proposition must have a noun and a verb — it must be proposition of Something. False propositions, involve the Form of Non-Ens, in relation to the particular subject ] | ib. |
| [Opinion,Judgment, Fancy, &c., are akin to Proposition, and may be also false, by coming into partnership with the Form Non-Ens ] | [214] |
| [It thus appears that Falsehood, imitating Truth, is theoretically possible, and that there may be a profession, like that of the Sophist, engaged in producing it ] | ib. |
| [Logicaldistribution of Imitators — those who imitate what they know, or what they do not know — of these last, some sincerely believe themselves to know, others are conscious that they do not know, and designedly impose upon others ] | [215] |
| [Last class divided — Those who impose on numerous auditors by long discourse, the Rhetor — Those who impose on select auditors, by short question and answer, making the respondent contradict himself — the Sophist ] | [215] |
| [Dialogue closed. Remarks upon it. Characteristics ascribed to a Sophist ] | [216] |
| [These characteristics may have belonged to other persons, but they belonged in an especial manner to Sokrates himself ] | ib. |
| [The conditions enumerated in the dialogue (except the taking of a fee) fit Sokrates better than any other known person ] | [217] |
| [The art which Plato calls “the thoroughbred and noble Sophistical Art” belongs to Sokrates and to no one else. The Elenchus was peculiar to him. Protagoras and Prodikus were not Sophists in this sense ] | [218] |
| [Universal knowledge — was professed at that time by all Philosophers — Plato, Aristotle, &c. ] | [219] |
| [Inconsistencyof Plato’s argument in the Sophistês. He says that the Sophist is a disputatious man who challenges every one for speaking falsehood. He says also that the Sophist is one who maintains false propositions to be impossible ] | [220] |
| [Reasoning of Plato about Non-Ens — No predications except identical ] | [221] |
| [Misconception of the function of the copula in predication ] | ib. |
| [No formal Grammar or Logic existed at that time. No analysis or classification of propositions before the works of Aristotle ] | [222] |
| [Plato’sdeclared purpose in the Sophistês — To confute the various schools of thinkers — Antisthenes, Parmenides, the Materialists, &c. ] | [223] |
| [Plato’s refutation throws light upon the doctrine of Antisthenes ] | ib. |
| [Plato’s argument against the Materialists ] | [224] |
| [Reply open to the Materialists ] | ib. |
| [Plato’s argument against the Idealists or Friends of Forms. Their point of view against him ] | [225] |
| [Plato argues — That to know, and be known, is action and passion, a mode of relativity ] | [226] |
| [Plato’s reasoning — compared with the points of view of both ] | ib. |
| [The argument of Plato goes to an entire denial of the Absolute, and a full establishment of the Relative ] | [227] |
| [Coincidence of his argument with the doctrine of Protagoras in the Theætêtus ] | ib. |
| [The Idealists maintained that Ideas or Forms were entirely unchangeable and eternal. Plato here denies this, and maintains that ideas were partly changeable, partly unchangeable ] | [228] |
| [Plato’s reasoning against the Materialists ] | ib. |
| [Differencebetween Concrete and Abstract, not then made conspicuous. Large meaning here given by Plato to Ens — comprehending not only objects of Perception, but objects of Conception besides ] | [229] |
| [Narrower meaning given by Materialists to Ens — they included only Objects of Perception. Their reasoning as opposed to Plato ] | ib. |
| [Different definitions of Ens — by Plato — the Materialists, the Idealists ] | [231] |
| [Plato’s views about Non-Ens examined ] | ib. |
| [His review of the select Five Forms ] | [233] |
| [Plato’s doctrine — That Non-Ens is nothing more than different from Ens ] | ib. |
| [Communion of Non-Ens with proposition — possible and explicable ] | [235] |
| [Imperfect analysis of a proposition — Plato does not recognise the predicate ] | ib. |
| [Plato’s explanation of Non-Ens is not satisfactory — Objections to it ] | [236] |
| [Plato’s view of the negative is erroneous. Logical maxim of contradiction ] | [239] |
| [Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato — How do we know that one is true, the other false? ] | ib. |
| [Necessity of accepting the evidence of sense ] | [240] |
| [Errors of Antisthenes — depended partly on the imperfect formal logic of that day ] | [241] |
| [Doctrine of the Sophistês — contradicts that of other Platonic dialogues ] | [242] |
| [The persons whom Plato here attacks as Friends of Forms are those who held the same doctrine as Plato himself espouses in Phædon, Republic, &c. ] | [246] |
| [The Sophistês recedes from the Platonic point of view, and approaches the Aristotelian ] | [247] |
| [Aristotle assumes without proof, that there are some propositions true, others false ] | [249] |
| [Plato in the Sophistês has undertaken an impossible task — He could not have proved, against his supposed adversary, that there are false propositions ] | ib. |
| [What must be assumed in all dialectic discussion] | [251] |
| [Discussionand theorising presuppose belief and disbelief, expressed in set forms of words. They imply predication, which Antisthenes discarded ] | [252] |
| [Precepts and examples of logical partition, illustrated in the Sophistês ] | [253] |
| [Recommendation of logical bipartition ] | [254] |
| [Precepts illustrated by the Philêbus ] | ib. |
| [Importance of founding logical Partition on resemblances perceived by sense ] | [255] |
| [Province of sensible perception — is not so much narrowed by Plato here as it is in the Theætêtus ] | [256] |
| [Comparison of the Sophistês with the Phædrus ] | [257] |
| [Comparison of the Politikus with the Parmenidês ] | [258] |
| [Variety of method in dialectic research — Diversity of Plato ] | [259] |
| |
| |
| |
| [CHAPTER XXX. ] |
| POLITIKUS. |
| [The Politikus by itself, apart from the Sophistês ] | [260] |
| [Views of Plato on mensuration. Objects measured against each other. Objects compared with a common standard. In each Art, the purpose to be attained is the standard ] | ib. |
| [Purposein the Sophistês and Politikus is — To attain dialectic aptitude. This is the standard of comparison whereby to judge whether the means employed are suitable ] | [261] |
| [Plato’sdefence of the Politikus against critics. Necessity that the critic shall declare explicitly what his standard of comparison is ] | [262] |
| [Comparison of Politikus with Protagoras, Phædon, Philêbus, &c. ] | ib. |
| [Definitionof the statesman, or Governor. Scientific competence. Sokratic point of departure. Procedure of Plato in subdividing ] | [263] |
| [King during the Saturnian period, was of a breed superior to the people — not so any longer ] | [264] |
| [Distinctionof causes Principal and Causes Auxiliary. The King is the only Principal Cause, but his auxiliaries pretend to be principal also ] | [266] |
| [Plato does not admit the received classification of government. It does not touch the point upon which all true distinction ought to be founded — Scientific or Unscientific ] | [267] |
| [Unscientificgovernments are counterfeits. Government by any numerous body must be counterfeit. Government by the one scientific man is the true government ] | [268] |
| [Fixed laws, limiting the scientific Governor, are mischievous, as they would be for the physician and the steersman. Absurdity of determining medical practice by laws, and presuming every one to know it ] | [269] |
| [Governmentby fixed laws is better than lawless government by unscientific men, but worse than lawless government by scientific men. It is a second-best ] | ib. |
| [Comparisonof unscientific governments. The one despot is the worse. Democracy is the least bad, because it is least of a government ] | [270] |
| [The true governor distinguished from the General, the Rhetor, &c. They are all properly his subordinates and auxiliaries ] | [271] |
| [What the scientific Governor will do. He will aim at the formation of virtuous citizens. He will weave together the energetic virtues with the gentle virtues. Natural dissidence between them ] | [272] |
| [If a man sins by excess of the energetic element, he is to be killed or banished: if of the gentle, he is to be made a slave. The Governor must keep up in the minds of the citizens an unanimous standard of ethical orthodoxy ] | [272] |
| [Remarks — Sokratic Ideal — Title to govern mankind derived exclusively from scientific superiority in an individual person ] | [273] |
| [Different ways in which this ideal is worked out by Plato and Xenophon. The man of speculation and the man of action ] | ib. |
| [The theory in the Politikus is the contradiction to that theory which is assigned to Protagoras in the Protagoras ] | [274] |
| [Points of the Protagorean theory — rests upon common sentiment ] | [275] |
| [Counter-Theory in the Politikus. The exigencies of the Eleate in the Politikus go much farther than those of Protagoras ] | [276] |
| [The Eleate complains that under the Protagorean theory no adverse criticism is allowed. The dissenter is either condemned to silence or punished ] | ib. |
| [Intoleranceat Athens, not so great as elsewhere. Plato complains of the assumption of infallibility in existing societies, but exacts it severely in that which he himself constructs ] | [277] |
| [Theory of the Politikus — distinguished three gradations of polity. Gigantic individual force the worst ] | [278] |
| [Comparison of the Politikus with the Republic. Points of analogy and difference ] | [279] |
| [Comparisonof the Politikus with the Kratylus. Dictatorial, constructive, science or art, common to both: applied in the former to social administration — in the latter to the formation and modification of names ] | [281] |
| [Courageand Temperance are assumed in the Politikus. No notice taken of the doubts and difficulties raised in Lachês and Charmidês ] | [282] |
| [Purposeof the difficulties in Plato’s Dialogues of Search — To stimulate the intellect of the hearer. His exposition does not give solutions ] | [284] |
| |
| |
| |
| [CHAPTER XXXI. ] |
| KRATYLUS. |
| [Persons and subjects of the dialogue Kratylus — Sokrates has no formed opinion, but is only a Searcher with the others ] | [285] |
| [Argumentof Sokrates against Hermogenes — all proceedings of nature are conducted according to fixed laws — speaking and naming among the rest ] | [286] |
| [The name is a didactic instrument; fabricated by the law-giver upon the type of the Name-Form, and employed as well as appreciated, by the philosopher ] | [287] |
| [Names have an intrinsic aptitude for signifying one thing and not another ] | [289] |
| [Forms of Names, as well as Forms of things nameable — essence of the Nomen, to signify the Essence of its Nominatum ] | ib. |
| [Exclusive competence of a privileged lawgiver, to discern these essences, and to apportion names rightly ] | [290] |
| [Counter-Theory, which Sokrates here sets forth and impugns — the Protagorean doctrine — Homo Mensura ] | [291] |
| [Objection by Sokrates — That Protagoras puts all men on a level as to wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance ] | [292] |
| [Objection unfounded — What the Protagorean theory really affirms — Belief always relative to the believer’s mind ] | ib. |
| [Each man believes others to be wiser on various points than himself — Belief on authority — not inconsistent with the affirmation of Protagoras ] | [293] |
| [Analogyof physical processes (cutting and burning) appealed to by Sokrates — does not sustain his inference against Protagoras ] | [294] |
| [Reply of Protagoras to the Platonic objections ] | [295] |
| [Sentimentsof Belief and Disbelief, common to all men — Grounds of belief and disbelief, different with different men and different ages] | [295] |
| [Protagorasdid not affirm, that Belief depended upon the will or inclination of each individual but that it was relative to the circumstances of each individual mind ] | [297] |
| [Facts of sense — some are the same to all sentient subjects, others are different to different subjects. Grounds of unanimity ] | [298] |
| [Sokratesexemplifies his theory of the Absolute Name or the Name-Form. He attempts to show the inherent rectitude of many existing names. His etymological transitions ] | [299] |
| [These transitions appear violent to a modern reader. They did not appear so to readers of Plato until this century. Modern discovery, that they are intended as caricatures to deride the Sophists ] | [302] |
| [Dissent from this theory — No proof that the Sophists ever proposed etymologies ] | [304] |
| [Plato did not intend to propose mock-etymologies, or to deride any one. Protagoras could not be ridiculed here. Neither Hermogenes nor Kratylus understand the etymologies as caricature ] | [306] |
| [Plato intended his theory as serious, but his exemplifications as admissible guesses. He does not cite particular cases as proofs of a theory, but only as illustrating what he means ] | [308] |
| [Sokrates announces himself as Searcher. Other etymologists of ancient times admitted etymologies as rash as those of Plato ] | [310] |
| [Continuanceof the dialogue — Sokrates endeavours to explain how it is that the Names originally right have become so disguised and spoiled ] | [312] |
| [Letters, as well as things, must be distinguished with their essential properties, each must be adapted to each ] | [313] |
| [Essential significant aptitude consists in resemblance ] | ib. |
| [Sokrates assumes that the Name-giving Lawgiver was a believer in the Herakleitean theory ] | [314] |
| [But the Name-Giver may be mistaken or incompetent — the rectitude of the name depends upon his knowledge ] | [315] |
| [Changes and transpositions introduced in the name — hard to follow ] | [315] |
| [Sokrates qualifies and attenuates his original thesis ] | [316] |
| [Conversation of Sokrates with Kratylus; who upholds that original thesis without any qualification ] | ib. |
| [Sokrates goes still farther towards retracting it ] | [317] |
| [There are names better and worse — more like, or less like to the things named: Natural Names are the best, but they cannot always be had. Names may be significant by habit, though in an inferior way ] | [318] |
| [All names are not consistent with the theory of Herakleitus: some are opposed to it ] | [319] |
| [It is not true to say, That Things can only be known through their names ] | [320] |
| [Unchangeable Platonic Forms — opposed to the Herakleitean flux, which is true only respecting sensible particulars ] | ib. |
| [Herakleitean theory must not be assumed as certain. We must not put implicit faith in names ] | [321] |
| [Remarksupon the dialogue. Dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum and others, that it is intended to deride Protagoras and other Sophists ] | ib. |
| [Theory laid down by Sokrates à priori, in the first part — Great difficulty, and ingenuity necessary, to bring it into harmony with facts ] | [322] |
| [Oppositetendencies of Sokrates in the last half of the dialogue — he disconnects his theory of Naming from the Herakleitean doctrine ] | [324] |
| [Ideal of the best system of naming — the Name-Giver ought to be familiar with the Platonic Ideas or Essences, and apportion his names according to resemblances among them ] | [325] |
| [Comparisonof Plato’s views about naming with those upon social institutions. Artistic, systematic construction — contrasted with unpremeditated unsystematic growth ] | [327] |
| [Politikus compared with Kratylus ] | [328] |
| [Ideal of Plato — Postulate of the One Wise Man — Badness of all reality ] | [329] |
| [Comparisonof Kratylus, Theætêtus, and Sophistês, in treatment of the question respecting Non-Ens, and the possibility of false propositions ] | [331] |
| [Discrepancies and inconsistencies of Plato, in his manner of handling the same subject ] | [332] |
| [No common didactic purpose pervading the Dialogues — each is a distinct composition, working out its own peculiar argument ] | ib. |
| |
| |
| |
| [CHAPTER XXXII. ] |
| PHILEBUS. |
| [Character, Personages, and Subject of the Philêbus ] | [334] |
| [Protest against the Sokratic Elenchus, and the purely negative procedure ] | [335] |
| [Enquiry — What mental condition will ensure to all men a happy life? Good and Happiness — correlative and co-extensive. Philêbus declares for Pleasure, Sokrates for Intelligence ] | ib. |
| [Good — object of universal choice and attachment by men, animals, and plants — all-sufficient — satisfies all desires ] | ib. |
| [Pleasures are unlike to each other, and even opposite cognitions are so likewise ] | [336] |
| [Whether Pleasure, or Wisdom, corresponds to this description? Appeal to individual choice ] | [337] |
| [First Question submitted to Protarchus — Intense Pleasure, without any intelligence — He declines to accept it ] | [338] |
| [Second Question — Whether he will accept a life of Intelligence purely without any pleasure or pain? Answer — No ] | ib. |
| [It is agreed on both sides, That the Good must be a Tertium Quid. But Sokrates undertakes to show, That Intelligence is more cognate with it than Pleasure ] | [339] |
| [Difficultiesabout Unum et Multa. How can the One be Many? How can the Many be One? The difficulties are greatest about Generic Unity — how it is distributed among species and individuals ] | ib. |
| [Active disputes upon this question at the time ] | [340] |
| [Order of Nature — Coalescence of the Finite with the Infinite. The One — The Finite Many — The Infinite Many ] | ib. |
| [Mistake commonly made — To look only for the One, and the Infinite Many, without looking for the intermediate subdivisions ] | [341] |
| [Illustration from Speech and Music ] | [342] |
| [Plato’s explanation does not touch the difficulties which he had himself recognised as existing ] | [343] |
| [It is nevertheless instructive, in regard to logical division and classification ] | [344] |
| [At that time little thought had been bestowed upon classification as a logical process ] | ib. |
| [Classification — unconscious and conscious ] | [345] |
| [Plato’s doctrine about classification is not necessarily connected with his Theory of Ideas ] | ib. |
| [Quadruple distribution of Existences. 1. The Infinite. 2. The Finient 3. Product of the two former. 4. Combining Cause or Agency ] | [346] |
| [Pleasure and Pain belong to the first of these four Classes — Cognition or Intelligence belongs to the fourth ] | [347] |
| [In the combination, essential to Good, of Intelligence with Pleasure, Intelligence is the more important of the two constituents ] | ib. |
| [Intelligence is the regulating principle — Pleasure is the Indeterminate, requiring to be regulated ] | [348] |
| [Pleasureand Pain must be explained together — Pain arises from the disturbance of the fundamental harmony of the system — Pleasure from the restoration of it ] | ib. |
| [Pleasure presupposes Pain ] | [349] |
| [Derivative pleasures of memory and expectation belonging to mind alone. Here you may find pleasure without pain ] | ib. |
| [A life of Intelligence alone, without pain and without pleasure, is conceivable. Some may prefer it: at any rate it is second-best ] | ib. |
| [Desirebelongs to the mind, presupposes both a bodily want, and the memory of satisfaction previously had for it. The mind and body are here opposed. No true or pure pleasure therein ] | [350] |
| [Can pleasures be true or false? Sokrates maintains that they are so ] | [351] |
| [Reasonsgiven by Sokrates. Pleasures attached to true opinions, are true pleasures. The just man is favoured by the Gods, and will have true visions sent to him ] | ib. |
| [Protarchusdisputes this — He thinks that there are some pleasures bad, but none false — Sokrates does not admit this, but reserves the question ] | [352] |
| [No means of truly estimating pleasures and pains — False estimate habitual — These are the false pleasures ] | ib. |
| [Much of what is called pleasure is false. Gentle and gradual changes do not force themselves upon our notice either as pleasure or pain. Absence of pain not the same as pleasure ] | [353] |
| [Opinionof the pleasure-hating philosophers — That pleasure is no reality, but a mere juggle. There is no reality except pain, and the relief from pain ] | [354] |
| [Sokrates agrees with them in part, but not wholly ] | ib. |
| [Theoryof the pleasure-haters — We must learn what pleasure is by looking at the intense pleasures — These are connected with distempered body and mind ] | [355] |
| [The intense pleasures belong to a state of sickness; but there is more pleasure, on the whole, enjoyed in a state of health ] | [356] |
| [Sokratesacknowledges some pleasures to be true. Pleasures of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, smells, &c. Pleasures of acquiring knowledge ] | ib. |
| [Pure and moderate pleasures admit of measure and proportion ] | [357] |
| [Pleasureis generation, not substance or essence: it cannot therefore be an End, because all generation is only a means towards substance — Pleasure therefore cannot be the Good ] | ib. |
| [Other reasons why pleasure is not the Good ] | [358] |
| [Distinctionand classification of the varieties of Knowledge or Intelligence. Some are more true and exact than others, according as they admit more or less of measuring and computation ] | ib. |
| [Arithmetic and Geometry are twofold: As studied by the philosopher and teacher: As applied by the artisan ] | [359] |
| [Dialecticis the truest and purest of all Cognitions. Analogy between Cognition and Pleasure: in each, there are gradations of truth and purity ] | [360] |
| [Differencewith Gorgias, who claims superiority for Rhetoric. Sokrates admits that Rhetoric is superior in usefulness and celebrity: but he claims superiority for Dialectic, as satisfying the lover of truth ] | ib. |
| [Most men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal manifestations of the Kosmos. They neglect the unchangeable essences, respecting which alone pure truth can be obtained ] | [361] |
| [Application.Neither Intelligence nor Pleasure separately, is the Good, but a mixture of the two — Intelligence being the most important. How are they to be mixed? ] | ib. |
| [We must include all Cognitions — not merely the truest, but the others also. Life cannot be carried on without both ] | [362] |
| [But we must include no pleasures except the true, pure, and necessary. The others are not compatible with Cognition or Intelligence — especially the intense sexual pleasures ] | ib. |
| [What causes the excellence of this mixture? It is Measure, Proportion, Symmetry. To these Reason is more akin than Pleasure ] | [363] |
| [Quintuple gradation in the Constituents of the Good. 1. Measure. 2. Symmetry. 3. Intelligence. 4. Practical Arts and Right Opinions. 5. True and Pure Pleasures ] | [364] |
| [Remarks. Sokrates does not claim for Good the unity of an Idea, but a quasi-unity of analogy ] | [365] |
| [Discussionsof the time about Bonum. Extreme absolute view, maintained by Eukleides: extreme relative by the Xenophontic Sokrates. Plato here blends the two in part; an Eclectic doctrine ] | ib. |
| [Inconvenience of his method, blending Ontology with Ethics ] | [366] |
| [Comparison of Man to the Kosmos (which has reason, but no emotion) is unnecessary and confusing ] | [367] |
| [Plato borrows from the Pythagoreans, but enlarges their doctrine. Importance of his views in dwelling upon systematic classification ] | [368] |
| [Classification broadly enunciated, and strongly recommended — yet feebly applied — in this dialogue ] | [369] |
| [What is the Good? Discussed both in Philêbus and in Republic. Comparison ] | [370] |
| [Mistakeof talking about Bonum confidently, as if it were known, while it is subject of constant dispute. Plato himself wavers about it; gives different explanations, and sometimes professes ignorance, sometimes talks about it confidently ] | ib. |
| [Plato lays down tests by which Bonum may be determined: but the answer in the Philêbus does not satisfy those tests ] | [371] |
| [Inconsistency of Plato in his way of putting the question — The alternative which he tenders has no fair application ] | [372] |
| [Intelligenceand Pleasure cannot be fairly compared — Pleasure is an End, Intelligence a Means. Nothing can be compared with Pleasure, except some other End ] | [373] |
| [The Hedonists, while they laid down attainment of pleasure and diminution of pain, postulated Intelligence as the governing agency ] | [374] |
| [Pleasuresof Intelligence may be compared, and are compared by Plato, with other pleasures, and declared to be of more value. This is arguing upon the Hedonistic basis ] | [375] |
| [Marked antithesis in the Philêbus between pleasure and avoidance of pain ] | [377] |
| [The Hedonists did not recognise this distinction — They included both in their acknowledged End ] | ib. |
| [Arguments of Plato against the intense pleasures — The Hedonists enforced the same reasonable view ] | [378] |
| [Different points of view worked out by Plato in different dialogues — Gorgias, Protagoras, Philêbus — True and False Pleasures ] | [379] |
| [Opposition between the Gorgias and Philêbus, about Gorgias and Rhetoric ] | [380] |
| [Peculiarity of the Philêbus — Plato applies the same principle of classification — true and false — to Cognitions and Pleasures ] | [382] |
| [Distinction of true and false — not applicable to pleasures ] | ib. |
| [Plato acknowledges no truth and reality except in the Absolute — Pleasures which he admits to be true — and why ] | [385] |
| [Plato could not have defended this small list of Pleasures, upon his own admission, against his opponents — the Pleasure-haters, who disallowed pleasures altogether ] | [387] |
| [Sokrates in this dialogue differs little from these Pleasure-haters ] | [389] |
| [Forced conjunction of Kosmology and Ethics — defect of the Philêbus ] | [391] |
| [Directive sovereignty of Measure — how explained and applied in the Protagoras ] | ib. |
| [How explained in Philêbus — no statement to what items it is applied ] | [393] |
| [Classification of true and false — how Plato applies it to Cognitions ] | [394] |
| [Valuable principles of this classification — difference with other dialogues ] | [395] |
| [Close of the Philêbus — Graduated elements of Good ] | [397] |
| [Contrast between the Philêbus and the Phædrus, and Symposion, in respect to Pulchrum, and intense Emotions generally ] | [398] |
| |
| |
| |
| [CHAPTER XXXIII.] |
| MENEXENUS. |
| [Persons and situation of the dialogue ] | [401] |
| [Funeralharangue at Athens — Choice of a public orator — Sokrates declares the task of the public orator to be easy — Comic exaggeration of the effects of the harangue ] | [401] |
| [Sokratesprofesses to have learnt a funeral harangue from Aspasia, and to be competent to recite it himself. Menexenus entreats him to do so ] | [402] |
| [Harangue recited by Sokrates ] | [403] |
| [Compliments of Menexenus after Sokrates has finished, both to the harangue itself and to Aspasia ] | ib. |
| [Supposed period — shortly after the peace of Antalkidas ] | ib. |
| [Custom of Athens about funeral harangues. Many such harangues existed at Athens, composed by distinguished orators or logographers — Established type of the harangue ] | [404] |
| [Plato in this harangue conforms to the established type — Topics on which he insists ] | [405] |
| [Consolation and exhortation to surviving relatives ] | [407] |
| [Admiration felt for this harangue, both at the time and afterwards ] | [407] |
| [Probablemotives of Plato in composing it, shortly after he established himself at Athens as a teacher — His competition with Lysias — Desire for celebrity both as rhetor and as dialectician ] | ib. |
| [Menexenuscompared with the view of rhetoric presented in the Gorgias — Necessity for an orator to conform to established sentiments ] | [409] |
| [Colloquialportion of the Menexenus is probably intended as ridicule and sneer at Rhetoric — The harangue itself is serious, and intended as an evidence of Plato’s ability ] | [410] |
| [Anachronism of the Menexenus — Plato careless on this point ] | [411] |
| |
| |
| |
| [CHAPTER XXXIV. ] |
| KLEITOPHON. |
| [Persons and circumstances of Kleitophon ] | [413] |
| [Conversationof Sokrates with Kleitophon alone: he alludes to observations of an unfavourable character recently made by Kleitophon, who asks permission to explain ] | ib. |
| [Explanationgiven. Kleitophon expresses gratitude and admiration for the benefit which he has derived from long companionship with Sokrates ] | [414] |
| [The observations made by Sokrates have been most salutary and stimulating in awakening ardour for virtue. Arguments and analogies commonly used by Sokrates ] | ib. |
| [But Sokrates does not explain what virtue is, nor how it is to be attained. Kleitophon has had enough of stimulus, and now wants information how he is to act ] | [415] |
| [Questions addressed by Kleitophon with this view, both to the companions of Sokrates and to Sokrates himself ] | [416] |
| [Replies made by the friends of Sokrates unsatisfactory ] | ib. |
| [None of them could explain what the special work of justice or virtue was ] | [417] |
| [Kleitophonat length asked the question from Sokrates himself. But Sokrates did not answer clearly. Kleitophon believes that Sokrates knows, but will not tell ] | [417] |
| [Kleitophonis on the point of leaving Sokrates and going to Thrasymachus. But before leaving he addresses one last entreaty, that Sokrates will speak out clearly and explicitly ] | [418] |
| [Remarkson the Kleitophon. Why Thrasyllus placed it in the eighth Tetralogy immediately before the Republic, and along with Kritias, the other fragment ] | [419] |
| [Kleitophon is genuine, and perfectly in harmony with a just theory of Plato ] | [420] |
| [It could not have been published until after Plato’s death ] | ib. |
| [Reasonswhy the Kleitophon was never finished. It points out the defects of Sokrates, just as he himself confesses them in the Apology ] | [421] |
| [The same defects also confessed in many of the Platonic and Xenophontic dialogues ] | [422] |
| [Forcible,yet respectful, manner in which these defects are set forth in the Kleitophon. Impossible to answer them in such a way as to hold out against the negative Elenchus of a Sokratic pupil ] | [423] |
| [The Kleitophon represents a point of view which many objectors must have insisted on against Sokrates and Plato ] | [424] |
| [The Kleitophon was originally intended as a first book of the Republic, but was found too hard to answer. Reasons why the existing first book was substituted ] | ib. |