[97] Plato, Timæus, p. 68 E.
[98] See my remarks on the [Politikus], in the last chapter: also Protagoras, p. 320 seq.
Compare Plato, Kriton, p. 48 A. ὁ ἐπαΐων περὶ τω δικαίων, ὁ εἷς.
In the Menon also the same question is broached as in the Protagoras, whether virtue is teachable or not? and how any virtue can exist, when there are no special teachers, and no special learners of virtue? Here we have, though differently handled, the same antithesis between the ethical sentiment which grows and propagates itself unconsciously, without special initiative — and that which is deliberately prescribed and imparted by the wise individual: common sense versus professional specialty.
[99] See the conditions of the ὀρθὴ πολιτεία, and its gradual depravation and degeneracy into the state of actual governments, in Republic, v. init. p. 449 B, vii. 544 A-B.
Comparison of Kratylus, Theætêtus, and Sophistês, in treatment of the question respecting Non-Ens, and the possibility of false propositions.
One more remark, in reference to the general spirit and reciprocal bearing of Plato’s dialogues. In three comparison distinct dialogues — Kratylus, Theætêtus, Sophistês — one and the same question is introduced into the discussion: a question keenly debated among the contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle. How is a false proposition possible? Many held that a false proposition and a false name were impossible: that you could not speak the thing that is not, or Non-Ens (τὸ μὴ ὄν): that such a proposition would be an empty sound, without meaning or signification: that speech may be significant or insignificant, but could not be false, except in the sense of being unmeaning.[100]
[100] Plato, Kratyl. p. 429.
Ammonius, Scholia εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας of Aristotle (Schol. Brandis, p. 60, a. 10).
Τινές φασι μηδὲν εἶναι τῶν πρός τι φύσει, ἀλλὰ ἀνάπλασμα εἶναι ταῦτα τῆς ἡμετέρας διανοίας, λέγοντες ὅτι οὕτως οὐκ ἐστὶ φύσει τὰ πρός τι ἀλλὰ θέσει … Τινὲς δέ, ἐκ διαμέτρου τούτοις ἔχοντες, πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρός τι ἔλεγον. Ὧν εἶς ἦν Πρωταγόρας ὁ σοφιστής· … διὸ καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τινὰ ψευδῆ λέγειν· ἕκαστος γὰρ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ καὶ δοκοῦν ἀποφαίνεται περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐκ ἐχόντων ὡρισμένην φύσιν ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς σχέσει τὸ εἶναι ἐχόντων.