[53] Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 E. ὡς εἰ βουλήθειμεν ὁτουοῦν εἶδους τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, οἷον τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ σκληρότατα ἀποβλέποντες οὕτως ἂν μᾶλλον συννοήσαιμεν ἢ πρὸς τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητι; Answer: πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθει.
[54] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 45-46.
[55] Plato, Philêbus, p. 47 A.
[56] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 49-50 D. Plato here introduces, at some length, an analysis of the mixed sentiment of pleasure and pain with which we regard scenic representations, tragedy and comedy — especially the latter. The explanation which he gives of the sentiment of the ludicrous is curious, and is intended to elucidate an obscure psychological phenomenon (ὅσῳ σκοτεινότερόν ἐστι, p. 48 B). But his explanation is not clear, and the sense which he gives to the word φθόνος is a forced one. He states truly that the natural object (at least one among the objects) which a man laughs at, is the intellectual and moral infirmities of persons with whom he is in friendly intercourse, when such persons are not placed in a situation of power, so as to make their defects or displeasure pregnant with dangerous consequences. The laugher is amused with exaggerated self-estimation or foolish vanity displayed by friends, δοξοσοφία, δοξοκαλία &c. (49 E). But how the laugher can be said to experience a mixture of pain and pleasure here, or how he can be said to feel φθόνος, I do not clearly see. At least φθόνος is here used in the very unusual sense (to use Stallbaum’s words, note p. 48 B, page 278) of “injusta lætitia de malis eorum, quibus bene cupere debemus”: a sense altogether contrary to that which the word bears in Xen. Memor. iii. 9, 8; which Stallbaum himself cites, as if the definition of φθόνος were the same in both.
The intense pleasures belong to a state of sickness; but there is more pleasure, on the whole, enjoyed in a state of health.
Recollect (observes Sokrates) that the question here is not whether more pleasure is enjoyed, on the whole, in a state of health than in a state of sickness — by violent rather than by sober men. The question is, about the intense modes of pleasure. Respecting these, I have endeavoured to show that they belong to a distempered, rather than to a healthy, state both of state of body and mind:— and that they cannot be enjoyed pure, without a countervailing or preponderant accompaniment of pain.[57] This is equally true, whether they be pleasures of body alone, of mind alone, or of body and mind together. They are false and delusive pleasures: in fact, they are pleasures only in seeming, but not in truth and reality. To-morrow I will give you fuller proofs on the subject.[58]
[57] Plato, Philêbus, p. 45 C-E. μή με ἡγῇ διανοούμενον ἐρωτᾷν σε, εἰ πλείω χαίρουσιν οἱ σφόδρα νοσοῦντες τῶν ὑγιαινόντων, ἀλλ’ οἴου μέγεθός με ζητεῖν ἡδονῆς, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ποῦ ποτὲ γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε, &c.
[58] Plato, Philêbus, p. 50 E. τούτων γὰρ ἁπάντων αὕριον ἐθελήσω σοι λόγον δοῦναι, &c.
Sokrates acknowledges some pleasures to be true. Pleasures of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, smells, &c. Pleasures of acquiring knowledge.
Thus far (continues Sokrates) I have set forth the case on behalf of the pleasure-haters. Though I deny their full doctrine, — that there is no pleasure except cessation from pain — I nevertheless agree with them and cite them as witnesses on my behalf, to the extent of affirming that a large proportion of our so-called pleasures, and those precisely the most intense, are false and unreal: being poisoned and drenched in accompaniments of pain.[59] But there are some pleasures, true, genuine, and untainted. Such are those produced by beautiful colours and figures — by many odours — by various sounds: none of which are preceded by any painful want requiring to be satisfied. The sensation when it comes is therefore one of pure and unmixed pleasure. The figures here meant are the perfect triangle, cube, circle, &c.: the colours and sounds are such as are clear and simple. All these are beautiful and pleasurable absolutely and in themselves — not simply in relation to (or relatively to) some special antecedent condition. Smells too, though less divine than the others, are in common with them unalloyed by accompanying pain.[60] To these must be added the pleasure of acquiring knowledge, which supposes neither any painful want before it, nor any subsequent pain even if the knowledge acquired be lost. This too is one of the unmixed or pure pleasures; though it is not attainable by most men, but only by a select few.[61]