[71] Plato, Philêbus, p. 58 B. Οὐ τοῦτ’ ἔγωγε ἐζήτουν πω, τίς τέχνη ἢ τίς ἐπιστήμη πασῶν διαφέρει τῷ μεγίστη καὶ ἀρίστη καὶ πλεῖστα ὠφελοῦσα ἡμᾶς. ἀλλὰ τίς ποτε τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τἀκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐπισκοπεῖ, κἂν ᾖ σμικρὰ καὶ σμικρὰ ὀνίνασα. Τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὃ νῦν δὴ ζητοῦμεν.
[72] Plato, Philêbus, p. 58 D. ἀλλ’ εἴ τις πέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἐρᾷν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάντα ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν, ταύτην εἴπωμεν, &c.
As far as straining after truth is concerned (says Protarchus), Dialectic and the kindred sciences have an incontestable superiority.
Most men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal manifestations of the Kosmos. They neglect the unchangeable essences, respecting which alone pure truth can be obtained.
You must see (rejoins Sokrates) that Rhetoric, and most other arts or sciences, employ all their study, and seek all their standard, in opinions alone: while of those who study Nature, the greater number confine their investigations to this Kosmos, to its generation and its phenomenal operations — its manifestations past, present, and future.[73] Now all these manifestations are in perpetual flux, admitting of no true or certain cognition. Pure truth, corresponding to those highest mental endowments, Reason and Intelligence — can be found only in essences, eternal and unchangeable, or in matters most akin to them.[74]
[73] Plato, Philêbus, p. 59. εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἡγεῖταί τις ζητεῖν, οἶσθ’ ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ὅπῃ τε γέγονε καὶ ὅπῃ πάσχει τι καὶ ὅπῃ ποιεῖ, ταῦτα ζητεῖ διὰ βίου;
[74] Plato, Philêbus, p. 59.
Application. Neither Intelligence nor Pleasure separately, is the Good, but a mixture of the two — Intelligence being the most important. How are they to be mixed?
We have now (continues Sokrates) examined pleasure separately and intelligence separately. We have agreed that neither of them, apart and by itself, comes up to the conception of Good; the attribute of which is, to be all sufficient, and to give plenary satisfaction, so that any animal possessing it desires nothing besides.[75] We must therefore seek Good in a certain mixture or combination of the two — Pleasure and Intelligence: and we must determine, what sort of combination of these two contains the Good we seek. Now, to mix all pleasures, with all cognitions, at once and indiscriminately, will hardly be safe. We will first mix the truest and purest pleasures (those which include pleasure in its purest form), with the truest or purest cognitions (those which deal altogether with eternal and unchangeable essence, not with fluctuating particulars). Will such a combination suffice to constitute Good, or an all-sufficient and all-satisfactory existence? Or do we want anything more besides?[76] Suppose a man cognizant of the Form or Idea of Justice, and of all other essential Ideas: and able to render account of his cognition, in proper words: Will this be sufficient?[77] Suppose him to be cognizant of the divine Ideas of Circle, Sphere, and other figures; and to employ them in architecture, not knowing anything of human circles and figures as they exist in practical life?[78]
[75] Plato, Philêbus, p. 60 C. τὴν τἀγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷδε τῶν ἄλλων … ᾧ παρείη τοῦτ’ ἀεὶ τῶν ζώων διὰ τέλους πάντως καὶ πάντῃ, μηδενὸς ἑτέρου ποτὲ ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελεώτατον ἔχειν.