The doctrine is briefly stated by the Platonist Nemesius, De Natur. Hominis, p. 223. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ Πλάτωνα τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι ψευδεῖς, αἱ δὲ ἀληθεῖς. Ψευδεῖς μέν, ὅσαι μετ’ αἰσθήσεως γίγνονται καὶ δόξης οὐκ ἀληθοῦς, καὶ λύπας ἔχουσι συμπεπλεγμένας· ἀληθεῖς δέ, ὅσαι τῆς ψυχῆς εἰσι μόνης αὐτῆς καθ’ ἑαυτὴν μετ’ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως, καθαραὶ καὶ ἀνεπίμικτοι λύπης, αἶς οὐδεμία μετάνοια παρακολουθεῖ ποτέ.
A brief but clear abstract of the argument will be found in Dr. Badham’s Preface to the Philêbus (pp. viii.-xi.). Compare also Stallbaum’s Prolegg. ch. v. p. 50, seq.
Distinction of true and false — not applicable to pleasures.
In this train of argument we find a good deal of just and instructive psychological remark: but nothing at all which proves the conclusion that there are or can be false pleasures or false pains. We have (as Sokrates shows) false remembrances of past pleasures and pains — false expectations, hopes, and fears of future: we have pleasures alloyed by accompanying pains, and pains qualified by accompanying pleasures: we have pleasures and pains dependent upon false beliefs: but false pleasures we neither have nor can have. The predicate is altogether inapplicable to the subject. It is applicable to the intellectual side of our nature, not to the emotional. A pleasure (or a pain) is what it seems, neither more nor less; its essence consists in being felt.[130] There are false beliefs, disbeliefs, judgments, opinions — but not false pleasures or pains. The pleasure of the dreamer or madman is not false, though it may be founded on illusory belief: the joy of a man informed that he has just been appointed to a lucrative and honourable post, the grief of a father on hearing that his son has been killed in battle, are neither of them false, though the news which both persons are made to believe may be totally false, and though the feelings will thus be of short duration. Plato observes that the state which he calls neutrality or indifference appears pleasurable when it follows pain, and painful when it results from an interruption of pleasure: here is a state which appears alternately to be both, though it is in reality neither: the pleasure or pain, therefore, whichever it be, he infers to be false[131] But there is no falsehood in the case: the state described is what it appears to be — pleasurable or painful: Plato describes it erroneously when he calls it the same state, or one of neutrality. Pleasure and Pain are both of them phenomena of present consciousness. They are what they seem: none of them can be properly called (as Plato calls them) “apparent pleasures which have no reality”.[132]
[130] This is what Aristotle means when he says:— τῆς ἡδονῆς δ’ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος … τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή (Eth. Nik. x. 3, 1174, b. 4).
[131] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 43-44; Republic, ix. p. 583.
I copy the following passage from Professor Bain’s work on “The Emotions and the Will,” the fullest and most philosophical account of the emotions that I know (pp. 615-616; 3rd ed., pp. 550 seq.):—
“It is a general law of the mental constitution, more or less recognised by inquirers into the human mind, that change of impression is essential to consciousness in every form.… There are notable examples to show, that one unvarying action upon the senses fails to give any perception whatever. Take the motion of the earth about its axis and through space, whereby we are whirled with immense velocity, but at a uniform pace, being utterly insensible of the circumstance.… It is the change from rest to motion that wakens our sensibility, and, conversely, from motion to rest. A uniform condition, as respects either state, is devoid of any quickening influence on the mind.… We have repeatedly seen pleasures depending for their existence on previous pains, and pains on pleasures experienced or conceived. Such are the contrasting states of Liberty and Restraint, Power and Impotence. Many pleasures owe their effect as such to mere cessation. For example, the pleasures of exercise do not need to be preceded by pain: it is enough that there has been a certain intermission, coupled with the nourishment of the exhausted parts. These are of course our best pleasures. By means of this class, we might have a life of enjoyment without pain: although, in fact, the other is more or less mixed up in every one’s experience. Exercise, Repose, the pleasures of the different Senses and Emotions, might be made to alternate, so as to give a constant succession of pleasure: each being sufficiently dormant during the exercise of the others, to reanimate the consciousness when its turn comes. It also happens that some of those modes of delight are increased, by being preceded by a certain amount of a painful opposite. Thus, confinement adds to the pleasure of exercise, and protracted exertion to that of repose. Fasting increases the enjoyment of meals; and being much chilled prepares us for a higher zest in the accession of warmth. It is not necessary, however, in those cases, that the privation should amount to positive pain, in order to the existence of the pleasure. The enjoyment of food may be experienced, although the previous hunger may not be in any way painful: at all events, with no more pain than the certainty of the coming meal can effectually appease. There is still another class of our delights depending entirely upon previous suffering, as in the sudden cessation of acute pains, or the sudden relief from great depression. Here the rebound from one nervous condition to another is a stimulant of positive pleasure: constituting a small, but altogether inadequate, compensation for the prior misery. The pleasurable sensation of good health presupposes the opposite experience in a still larger measure. Uninterrupted health, though an instrumentality for working out many enjoyments, of itself gives no sensation.”
It appears to me that this passage of Mr. Bain’s work discriminates and sets out what there is of truth in Plato’s doctrine about the pure and painless pleasures. In his first volume (The Senses and the Intellect) Mr. Bain has laid down and explained the great fundamental fact of the system, that it includes spontaneous sources of activity; which, after repose and nourishment, require to be exerted, and afford a certain pleasure in the course of being exerted. There is no antecedent pain to be relieved: but privation (which is only a grade and variety of pain, and sometimes considerable pain) is felt if the exertion be hindered. This doctrine of spontaneous activity, employed by Mr. Bain successfully to explain a large variety of mental phenomena, is an important and valuable extension of that which Aristotle lays down in the Ethics, that pleasure is an accessory or adjunct of ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος (ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως Eth. N. vii. 13, 1153, a. 15), without any view to obtain any separate extraneous pleasure or to relieve any separate extraneous pain (καθ’ αὑτὰς δ’ εἰσὶν αἱρεταί, ἀφ’ ὦν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, E. N. x. 6, 1176, b. 6).
[132] Plato, Philêbus, p. 51 A. πρὸς τὸ τινὰς ἡδονὰς εἶναι δοκούσας, οὔσας δ’ οὐδαμῶς, &c. τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλ’ οὐκ ὄν, p. 42 C, which last sentence is better explained (I think) in the note of Dr. Badham than in that of Mr. Poste.