Criticism given by Plato on the three discourses — His theory of Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic.
The written discourse of Lysias (presented to us as one greatly admired at the time by his friends, Phædrus among them) is contrasted first with a pleading on the same subject (though not directed towards the attainment of the same end) by Sokrates (supposed to be improvised on the occasion); next with a second pleading of Sokrates directly opposed to the former, and intended as a recantation. These three discourses are criticised from the rhetorical point of view,[97] and are made the handle for introducing to us a theory of rhetoric. The second discourse of Sokrates, far from being Sokratic in tenor, is the most exuberant effusion of mingled philosophy, poetry, and mystic theology, that ever emanated from Plato.
[97] Plato, Phædrus, p. 235 A.
His theory postulates, in the Rhetor, knowledge already assured — it assumes that all the doubts have been already removed.
The theory of rhetoric too is far more Platonic than Sokratic. The peculiar vein of Sokrates is that of confessed ignorance, ardour in enquiry, and testing cross-examination of all who answer his questions. But in the Phædrus we find Plato (under the name of Sokrates) assuming, as the basis of his theory, that an expositor shall be found who knows what is really and truly just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable — distinct from, and independent of, the established beliefs on these subjects, traditional among his neighbours and fellow-citizens:[98] assuming (to express the same thing in other words) that all the doubts and difficulties, suggested by the Sokratic cross-examination, have been already considered, elucidated, and removed.
[98] Plato, Phædrus, pp. 259 E, 260 E, and 262 B.
The Expositor, with knowledge and logical process, teaches minds unoccupied and willing to learn.
The expositor, master of such perfect knowledge, must farther be master (so Plato tells us) of the arts of logical definition and division: that is, he must be able to gather up many separate fragmentary particulars into one general notion, clearly identified and embodied in a definition: and he must be farther able to subdivide such a general notion into its constituent specific notions, each marked by some distinct characteristic feature.[99] This is the only way to follow out truth in a manner clear and consistent with itself: and truth is equally honourable in matters small or great.[100]
[99] Plato, Phædrus, p. 266.
[100] Plato, Phædrus, p. 261 A.