In answer to the question put by Sokrates — What is Knowledge or Cognition? Theætêtus at first replies — That there are many and diverse cognitions:— of geometry, of arithmetic, of arts and trades, such as shoemaking, joinery, &c. Sokrates points out (as in the Menon, Hippias Major, and other dialogues) that such an answer involves a misconception of the question: which was general, and required a general answer, setting forth the characteristic common to all cognitions. No one can know what cognition is in shoemaking or any particular case — unless he first knows what is cognition generally.[3] Specimens of suitable answers to general questions are then given (or of definition of a general term), in the case of clay — and of numbers square and oblong.[4] I have already observed more than once how important an object it was with Plato to impress upon his readers an exact and adequate conception of the meaning of general terms, and the proper way of defining them. For this purpose he brings into contrast the misconceptions likely to arise in the minds of persons not accustomed to dialectic.
[3] Plato, Theætêt. p. 147 A.
Οὐδ’ ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνίησιν, ὁ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδιός; Οὐ γάρ.
[4] Plato, Theætêt. p. 148. Oblong (προμήκεις) numbers are such as can be produced only from two unequal factors. The explanation of this difficult passage, requiring us to keep in mind the geometrical conception of numbers usual among the Greek mathematicians, will be found clearly given in Mr. Campbell’s edition of this dialogue, pp. 20-22.
Preliminary conversation before the second answer is given. Sokrates describes his own peculiar efficacy — mental obstetric — He cannot teach, but he can evolve knowledge out of pregnant minds.
Theætêtus, before he attempts a second answer, complains how much the subject had embarrassed him. Impressed with what he had heard about the interrogatories of Sokrates, he had tried to solve this problem: but he had not been able to satisfy himself with any attempted solution — nor yet to relinquish the search altogether. “You are in distress, Theætêtus” (observes Sokrates), “because you are not empty, but pregnant.[5] You have that within you, of which you need to be relieved; and you cannot be relieved without obstetric aid. It is my peculiar gift from the Gods to afford such aid, and to stimulate the parturition of pregnant minds which cannot of themselves bring forth what is within them.[6] I can produce no truth myself: but I can, by my art inherited from my mother the midwife Phænaretê, extract truth from others, and test the answers given by others: so as to determine whether such answers are true and valuable, or false and worthless. I can teach nothing: I only bring out what is already struggling in the minds of youth: and if there be nothing within them, my procedure is unavailing. My most important function is, to test the answers given, how far they are true or false. But most people, not comprehending my drift, complain of me as a most eccentric person, who only makes others sceptical. They reproach me, and that truly enough, with always asking questions, and never saying any thing of my own: because I have nothing to say worth hearing.[7] The young companions who frequent my society, often suffer long-continued pains of parturition night and day, before they can be delivered of what is within them. Some, though apparently stupid when they first come to me, make great progress, if my divine coadjutor is favourable to them: others again become tired of me, and go away too soon, so that the little good which I have done them becomes effaced. Occasionally, some of these impatient companions wish to return to me afterwards — but my divine sign forbids me to receive them: where such obstacle does not intervene, they begin again to make progress.”[8]
[5] Plato, Theætêt. p. 148 E. ὠδίνεις, διὰ τὸ μὴ κενὸς ἀλλ’ ἐγκύμων εἶναι.
[6] Plato, Theætêt. p. 149 A, p. 150 A.
[7] Plato, Theætêt. p. 149 A. οἱ δέ, ἄτε οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι, καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν. 150 B-C μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ’ ἕνι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασανίζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ, πότερον εἴδωλον ἢ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἡ διανοία, ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές· ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις· ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, &c.
[8] Plato, Theætêt. pp. 150 E, 151 A. ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει ξυνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾷ· καὶ πάλιν οὗτοι ἐπιδιδόασιν.