[34] Plato, Theætêt. p. 156 E. ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὄψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ ὁρᾷ δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο οὔ τι ὄψις ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρῶν, τὸ δὲ ξυγγεννῆσαν τὸ χρῶμα λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὖ ἀλλὰ λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὁτιοῦν ξυνέβη χρῆμα χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι.
Plato’s conception of the act of vision was — That fire darted forth from the eyes of the percipient and came into confluence or coalescence with fire approaching from the perceived object (Plato, Timæus, pp. 45 C, 67 C).
Agent and Patient — No absolute Ens.
Accordingly, nothing can be affirmed to exist separately and by itself. All existences, come only as twin and correlative manifestations of this double agency. In fact neither of these agencies can be conceived independently and apart from the other: each of them is a nullity without the other.[35] If either of them be varied, the result also will vary proportionally: each may be in its turn agent or patient, according to the different partners with which it comes into confluence.[36] It is therefore improper to say — Such or such a thing exists. Existence absolute, perpetual, and unchangeable is nowhere to be found: and all phrases which imply it are incorrect, though we are driven to use them by habit and for want of knowing better. All that is real is, the perpetual series of changeful and transient conjunctions; each Object, with a certain Subject, — each Subject, with a certain Object.[37] This is true not merely of individual objects, but also of those complex aggregates rationally apprehended which receive generic names, man, animal, stone, &c.[38] You must not therefore say that any thing is, absolutely and perpetually, good, honourable, hot, white, hard, great — but only that it is so felt or esteemed by certain subjects more or less numerous.[39]
[35] Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 A. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὖ τι ἐπὶ ἑνὸς νοῆσαι, ὥς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως. Οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστί τι, πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι ξυνέλθῃ — οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι, &c.
[36] Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 A. τό τέ τινι ξυνελθὸν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλῳ αὖ προσπεσὸν πάσχον ἀνεφάνη.
[37] Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 A. οὐδὲν εἶναι ἓν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό, ἀλλά τινι ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ’ εἶναι παντάχοθεν ἐξαιρετέον, &c.
[38] Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 B. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἄνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῶόν τε καὶ εἶδος.
In this passage I follow Heindorf’s explanation which seems dictated by the last word εἶδος. Yet I am not sure that Plato does really mean here the generic aggregates. He had before talked about sights, sounds, hot, cold, hard, &c., the separate sensations. He may perhaps here mean simply individual things as aggregates or ἀθροίσματα — a man, a stone, &c.
[39] Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 E.