At this point of the exposition, the Platonic Timæus breaks off the thread, and takes up a new commencement. Thus far (he says) we have proceeded in explaining the part of Reason or Intelligence in the fabrication of the Kosmos. We must now explain the part of Necessity: for the genesis of the Kosmos results from co-operation of the two. By necessity (as has been said before) Plato means random, indeterminate, chaotic, pre-existent, spontaneity of movement or force: spontaneity (ἡ πλανωμένη αἰτία) upon which Reason works by persuasion up to a certain point, prevailing upon it to submit to some degree of fixity and regularity.[63] Timæus had described the body of the Kosmos as being constructed by the Demiurgus out of the four elements; thus assuming fire, air, earth, water, as pre-existent. But he now corrects himself, and tells us that such assumption is unwarranted. We must (he remarks) give a better and fuller explanation of the Kosmos. No one of these four elements is either primordial, or permanently distinct and definite in itself.
[63] Plato, Timæus, p. 48 A.
The only primordial reality is, an indeterminate, all-recipient fundamentum: having no form or determination of its own, but capable of receiving any form or determination from without.
Forms or Ideas and Materia Prima — Forms of the Elements — Place, or Receptivity.
In the second explanation now given by Plato of the Kosmos and its genesis, he assumes this invisible fundamentum (which he had not assumed before) as “the mother or nurse of all generation”. He assumes, besides, the eternal Forms or Ideas, to act upon it and to bestow determination or quality. These forms fulfil the office of father: the offspring of the two is — the generated, concrete, visible, objects,[64] imitations of the Forms or Ideas, begotten out of this mother. How the Ideas act upon the Materia Prima, Plato cannot well explain: but each Form stamps an imitation or copy of itself upon portions of the common Fundamentum.[65]
[64] Plato, Timæus, p. 51 A. τὴν τοῦ γεγονότος ὁρατοῦ καὶ πάντως αἰσθητοῦ μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχήν.
[65] Plato, Timæus, pp. 50-51. 50 C: τυπωθέντα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τρόπον τινὰ δύσφραστον καὶ θαυμαστόν. 51 A: ἀνόρατον εἶδός τι, καὶ ἄμορφον, πανδεχές, μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατά πῃ τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ δυσαλωτότατον.
But do there really exist any such Forms or Ideas — as Fire per se, the Generic Fire — Water per se, the Generic Water, invisible and intangible?[66] Or is this mere unfounded speech? Does there exist nothing really anywhere, beyond the visible objects which we see and touch?[67]
[66] Plato, Timæus, p. 51 C.
[67] Ueberweg, in a learned Dissertation, Ueber die Platonische Weltseele (pp. 52-53), seeks to establish a greater distinction between the Phædrus, Phædon, and Timæus, in respect to the way in which Plato affirms the separate substantiality of Ideas, than the language of the dialogues warrants. He contends that the separate substantiality of the Platonic Ideas is more peremptorily affirmed in the Timæus than in the Phædrus. But this will not be found borne out if we look at Phædrus, p. 247, where the affirmation is quite as peremptory as that in the Timæus; correlating too, as it does in the Timæus, with Νοῦς as the contemplating subject. Indeed the point may be said to be affirmed more positively in the Phædrus, because the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος is assigned to the Ideas, while in the Timæus all τόπος or local existence is denied to them (p. 52 B-C). Sensible objects are presented in the Phædrus as faint resemblances of the archetypal Ideas (p. 250 C), just as they are in the Timæus: on the other hand, τὸ μεταλαμβάνειν τοῦ νοητοῦ occurs in the Timæus (p. 51 A), equivalent to τὸ μετέχειν, which Ueberweg states to be discontinued.