Again, here in the Leges, the Athenian puts it to his two companions, Whether the unjust man, assuming him to possess every imaginable endowment and advantage in life, will not live, nevertheless, both dishonourably and miserably? They admit that he will live dishonourably: they deny that he will live miserably.[88] The Athenian replies by reasserting emphatically his own opinion, without any attempt to prove it. Now in the Gorgias, the same issue is raised between Sokrates and Polus: Sokrates refutes his opponent by a dialectic argument, showing that if the first of the two doctrines (the living dishonourably — αἰσχρῶς) be granted, the second (the living miserably — κακῶς) cannot be consistently denied.[89] The dialectic of Sokrates is indeed more ingenious than conclusive: but still it is dialectic — and thus stands contrasted with the oracular emphasis which is substituted for it in Leges.
[88] Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 A.
[89] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 474 C, 478 E.
Doctrine in Leges about Pleasure and Good — approximates more nearly to the Protagoras than to Gorgias and Philêbus.
Farthermore, the distinction between Pleasure and Good, in the language of the Athenian speaker in the Leges, approximates more nearly to the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras, than to his doctrine in the Gorgias, Philêbus, and Republic. The Athenian proclaims that he is dealing with men, and not with Gods, and that he must therefore recognise the nature of man, with its fundamental characteristics: that no man will willingly do anything from which he does not anticipate more pleasure than pain: that every man desires the maximum of pleasure and the minimum of pain, and desires nothing else: that there neither is nor can be any Good, apart from Pleasure or superior to Pleasure: that to insist upon a man being just, if you believe that he will obtain more pleasure or less pain from an unjust mode of life, is absurd and inconsistent: that the doctrine which declares the life of pleasure and the life of justice to lead in two distinct paths, is a heresy deserving not only censure but punishment.[90] Plato here enunciates, as distinctly as Epikurus did after him, that Pleasures and Pains must be regulated (here regulated by the lawgiver), so that each man may attain the maximum of the former with the minimum of the latter: and that Good, apart from maximum of pleasure or minimum of pain accruing to the agent himself,[91] cannot be made consistent with the nature or aspirations of man.
[90] Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 662 C-D-E, 663 B.
In v. pp. 732 E to 734, the Athenian speaker delivers τὰ ἀνθρώπινα of the general preface or proëm to his Laws, after having previously delivered τὰ θεῖα (v. pp. 727-732).
Τὰ θεῖα. These are precepts respecting piety to the Gods, and behaviour to parents, strangers, suppliants; and respecting the duty of rendering due honour, first to the mind, next to the body — of maintaining both the one and the other in a sound and honourable condition. Repeated exhortation is given to obey the enactments whereby the lawgiver regulates pleasures and pains: the precepts are also enforced by insisting on the suffering which will accrue to the agent if they be neglected. We also read (what is said also in Gorgias) that the δίκη κακουργίας μεγίστη is τὸ ὁμοιοῦσθαι κακοῖς ἀνδράσιν (p. 728 B).
Τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, which follow τὰ θεῖα, indicate the essential conditions of human character which limit and determine the application of such precepts to man. To love pleasure — to hate pain — are the paramount and indefeasible attributes of man; but they admit of being regulated, and they ought to be regulated by wisdom — the μετρητικὴ τέχνη — insisted on by Sokrates in the Protagoras (p. 356 E). Compare Legg. i. p. 636 E, ii. p. 653 A.
[91] It is among the tests of a well-disciplined army (according to Xenophon, Cyropæd. i. 6, 26) ὁπότε τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς ἥδιον εἴη τοῦ ἀπειθεῖν.