[Alexandrian Museum] founded as a copy of the Platonic and Aristotelic μουσεῖα at Athens, i. [277];
date of foundation, [280];
Demetrius Phalereus chief agent in its establishment, [ib.];
its contents, [275];
rapid accumulation of books, [ib.];
under charge of Aristophanes, [273];
contained Plato’s works before time of Aristophanes, [274];
editions of Plato issued, [295];
its authority followed by ancient critics, [297], [299].
Alkibiadês, when young, frequented Sokrates’ society, ii. [21];
attachment of Sokrates to, iii. [8];
fitness as ideal in Alkibiadês I. and II., ii. [22];
see [Alkibiadês I. and II.] and [Symposion.]
[Alkibiadês] I. and II., different critical opinions, ii. [17];
date, i. [306], [308-11], ii. [22];
authenticity, i. [306-7], [309-10], ii. [2 n.], [17];
prolixity, [26];
circumstances and interlocutors, [1];
fitness of historical Alkibiadês for ideal, [22];
no bearing on the historical Alkibiadês, [20 n.];
the Platonic picture an ideal, [22];
illustrates Sokratico-Platonic method in negative and positive aspect, [7];
actual and anticipated effects of dialectic, [11];
analogy with Xenophontic dialogues, [21], [29];
Alkibiadês as Athenian adviser, [2];
advises on war and peace, his standard the just and unjust, [3];
whence knowledge of it, [4];
from the multitude, their judgment worthless, [5];
the expedient and inexpedient substituted, [6];
the just identified with the good, honourable, expedient, [7];
ignorance of Athenian statesmen, eulogy of Spartan and Persian kings, [8];
Alkibiadês must become good — for what end and how, [8-10];
confesses his ignorance, [10];
will never leave Sokrates, [12];
Delphian maxim — the mind the self, [11];
self-knowledge, from looking into other minds is temperance, [11];
situation in Second, [12];
danger of prayer for mischievous gifts — most men unwise, [ ib.];
instances of injurious gifts — mischiefs of ignorance, [14];
depend on the subject-matter, [ ib.];
few wise public counsellors, why called wise, [15];
special accomplishments often hurtful, if no knowledge of the good, [16];
Sokrates on prayer and sacrifice, [ ib.];
Sokrates’ purpose, to humble presumptuous youths, [21];
his mission against false persuasion of knowledge, [24];
his positive solutions illusory, [ 26-7];
opinion embraces all varieties of knowledge save of the good, [30];
the good, how known — unsolved, [31].
[Allegorical] interpretation of poets, ii. [285];
see [Mythe].
[Ἀλυπία], the Good, iii. [338 n.];
not identical with pleasure, [353], [377];
and pleasure included in Hedonists’ end, [ib.];
is a negative condition intermediate between pleasure and pain, iv. [86].
[Amabile primum], ii. [181], [191];
approximates to Idea of Good, [192];
the Good, [194];
compared with Aristotle’s prima amicitia, [ib.]