CHAPTER XXXVI.
REPUBLIC — REMARKS ON ITS MAIN THESIS.
Summary of the preceding chapter.
The preceding Chapter has described, in concise abstract, that splendid monument of Plato’s genius, which passes under the name of the Πολιτεία or Republic. It is undoubtedly the grandest of all his compositions; including in itself all his different points of excellence. In the first Book, we have a subtle specimen of negative Dialectic, — of the Sokratic cross-examination or Elenchus. In the second Book, we find two examples of continuous or Ciceronian pleading (like that ascribed to Protagoras in the dialogue called by his name), which are surpassed by nothing in ancient literature, for acuteness and ability in the statement of a case. Next, we are introduced to Plato’s most sublime effort of constructive ingenuity, in putting together both the individual man and the collective City: together with more information (imperfect as it is even here) about his Dialectic or Philosophy, than any other dialogue furnishes. The ninth Book exhibits his attempts to make good his own thesis against the case set forth in his own antecedent counter-pleadings. The last Book concludes with a highly poetical mythe, embodying a Νεκυία shaped after his own fancy, — and the outline of cosmical agencies afterwards developed, though with many differences, in the Timæus. The brilliancy of the Republic will appear all the more conspicuous, when we come to compare it with Plato’s two posterior compositions: with the Pythagorean mysticism and theology of the Timæus — or with the severe and dictatorial solemnity of the Treatise De Legibus.
Title of the Republic, of ancient date, but only a partial indication of its contents.
The title borne by this dialogue — the Republic or Polity — whether affixed by Plato himself or not, dates at least from his immediate disciples, Aristotle among them.[1] This title hardly presents a clear idea either of its proclaimed purpose or of its total contents.
[1] See Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Staat, p. 63 seq.; Stallbaum, Proleg. p. lviii. seq.
The larger portion of the treatise is doubtless employed in expounding the generation of a commonwealth generally: from whence the author passes insensibly to the delineation of a Model-Commonwealth — enumerating the conditions of aptitude for its governors and guardian-soldiers, estimating the obstacles which prevent it from appearing in the full type of goodness — and pointing out the steps whereby, even if fully realised, it is likely to be brought to perversion and degeneracy. Nevertheless the avowed purpose of the treatise is, not to depict the ideal of a commonwealth, but to solve the questions, What is Justice? What is Injustice? Does Justice, in itself and by its own intrinsic working, make the just man happy, apart from all consequences, even though he is not known to be just, and is even treated as unjust, either by Gods or men? Does Injustice, under the like hypothesis, (i.e. leaving out all consideration of consequences either from Gods or from men), make the unjust man miserable? The reasonings respecting the best polity, are means to this end — intermediate steps to the settlement of this problem. We must recollect that Plato insists strongly on the parallelism between the individual and the state: he talks of “the polity” or Republic in each man’s mind, as of that in the entire city.[2]
[2] Plato, Repub. ix. p. 591 E. ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ πολιτείαν. x. p. 608 B: περὶ τῆς ἐν αὑτῷ πολιτείας δεδιότι, &c.