[4] Plat. Rep. iv. p. 432 B. τὸ δὲ δὴ λοιπὸν εἶδος, δι’ ὃ ἂν ἔτι ἀρετῆς μετέχοι πόλις, τί ποτ’ ἂν εἴη; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη.
Compare p. 444 D, where he defines Ἀρετή — Ἀρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑγίεια τέ τις ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς· κακία δὲ, νόσος τε καὶ αἶσχος καὶ ἀσθένεια.
[5] Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, 4-5. σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, &c.
Compare the discussion of σωφροσύνη, iv. 5, 9-11, where Sokrates enforces the practice of it on the ground that it ensured to a man both more pleasures and greater pleasures, of which he would deprive himself if he were foolish enough to be intemperate.
[6] Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Staat, pp. 25-26. “Dieser Tadel trifft höchstens die Aufstellung jener vier zusammengehörigen Tugenden; welche Platon offenbar genug nur mit richtigem praktischen Sinne aus Ehrfurcht für das Bestehende aufgenommen hat: wie sie denn schon auf dieselbe Weise aus dem gemeinen Gebrauch in die Lehrweise des Sokrates übergegangen sind.”
[7] Plato, Repub. iv. p. 433 A. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν. Compare iii. p. 406 E.
[8] See Charmidês, pp. 161-162. Heindorf observes in his note on this passage:— “A sophistis ergo vulgata hæc σωφροσύνης definitio: ad justitiam quoque ab iisdem ut videtur, translata. Republ. iv. p. 433 (the passage cited in note preceding). Quo pertinent illa Ciceronis, De Officiis, i. 9, 2. Item ad prudentiam, Aristot. Eth. Nicom. vi. 8, Philosopho vero hoc tribuit Sokrates, Gorgias, p. 526).”
The definition given in the Charmidês appears plainly ascribed to Kritias as its author (p. 162 D). The affirmation that it was “a sophistis vulgata,” and afterwards transferred by these same to Justice, is made without any authority produced; and is expressed in the language usual with the Platonic commentators, who treat the Sophists as a philosophical sect or school.
From whomsoever Plato may have derived this ethical classification — Virtue as a whole, distributed into four varieties — 1. Prudence or Knowledge — 2. Courage or Energy — 3. Temperance — 4. Justice — we find it here placed in the foreground of his doctrine, respecting both the collective Commonwealth and the individual man.[9] He professes to understand and explain what they are — to reason upon them all with confidence — and to apply them to very important conclusions.
[9] In some of the Platonic Dialogues these four varieties are not understood as exhausting the sum total of Virtue: ἡ ὁσιότης is included also; see Lachês, p. 199 D, Protagoras, p. 329 D, Euthyphron, pp. 5-6. Plato does not advert to τὸ ὅσιον in the Republic as a separate constituent, seemingly because on matters of piety he enjoins direct reference to Apollo and the Delphian oracle (Rep. iv. p. 427 B).