[211] Compare Problem II. Chap. IV.
[212] “Das Bewusstwerden ist nichts Anderes als ein weiter fortgeschrittenes Erinnern oder Neuwerden des von aussen aufgenommenen Wissens, ein innerliches Wissen dieses Wissens oder ein in sich reflectirtes Wissen.”—Jessen, Versuch einer Wissenschaftlichen Begründung der Psychologie, 1855, p. 477.
[213] In common language a stone or a tree is said to be unconscious; but this is an anthropomorphic extension of the term. In strictness we should no more speak of unconsciousness outside the sphere of Sentience than of darkness outside the sphere of Vision.
[214] The contraction may be effected in the eye out of the organism. See p. [229]. It is then no reflex.
[215] Glasgow Medical Journal, 1857, p. 451. See also further on, [note] to p. [426].
[216] Mayer, Die Elementarorganisation des Seelenorgans, p. 12, is the authority for the last statement.
[217] Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie, Bd. 31, p. 711.
[218] Aubert, Grundrüge der physiol. Optik, 1876, p. 633. “The accommodative movement of the eye is to be considered voluntary. It is true we contract the pupil without being conscious of the contraction of muscular fibres, but this holds good for every voluntary movement. When a person raises the tone of his voice he is not conscious that by muscular contraction he makes his chordæ vocales more tense; he attains his object without being aware of the means by which he does so. The same is applicable to accommodation for near objects and to the contraction of the pupil accompanying it. The fact that this last is only an associated movement does not deprive it of its voluntary character, for there is perhaps no single muscle which can contract entirely by itself.” Donders, On the Anomalies of Accommodation, 1864, p. 574. Professor Beer of Bonn has the rare power of contracting or dilating the pupils of his eye at will; here ideas act as motors. When he thinks of a very dark space the pupil dilates, when of a very bright spot the pupil contracts. (Noble, The Human Mind, 1858, p. 124.) I believe this to be only an exaggerated form of the normal tendency. In all of us the mechanism is so disposed that the feelings of dilatation are associated with feelings (and consequently ideas) of darkness; and by this association a reversal of the process obtains, so that the idea of darkness calls up the feeling it symbolizes.
[219] Spencer, Principles of Psychology, I. 499.
[220] Descartes expressly calls them sensitive machines. He refuses them Thought, but neither “la vie ou le sentiment.” He adds, “Mon opinion n’est pas que les bêtes voient comme nous lorsque nous sentons que nous voyons.”—Œuvres, IV. p. 339. This example is cited by him in proof of human automatism: “Que ce n’est point par l’entremise de notre âme que les yeux se ferment, puisque c’est contre notre volonté, laquelle est sa seule ou du moins sa principale action; mais c’est à cause que la machine de notre corps est tellement composée que le mouvement de cette main vers nos yeux excite un autre mouvement en notre cerveau qui conduit les esprits animaux dans les muscles qui font abaisser les paupières.” All indeed that we assign to Sensibility, he assigns to these hypothetical animal spirits, and thence he concludes, “Qu’il ne reste rien en nous que nous devions attribuer à notre âme sinon nos pensées.”—Les Passions de l’Âme, art. 13 and 17. Comp. Discours de la Méthode, partie iv.