Surgical Experiences in South Africa, 1899-1900 / Being Mainly a Clinical Study of the Nature and Effects of Injuries Produced by Bullets of Small Calibre

by George Henry Makins

The battles included, those of the first Kimberley Relief Force, were fought under fair average conditions as to the nature of the ground. In the first two the defending enemy occupied heights, in the two following the ground advanced over by our men was comparatively even; thus at Modder River there was only a gradual slope upwards, and at Magersfontein the advanced trenches of the Boers were only slightly above the level of the ground over which the advance was made. At the same time, at the latter battle a great number of the Boers engaged were on the sides of the hill well above the advanced trenches. In no case were the Boers in such a position as to have to fire upwards, to them a considerable advantage. It must also be noted that throughout the Boers were able to rest their rifles; hence the fire should have been at any rate of an average degree of accuracy. In the advances of our own men, anthills and stones were practically the only cover to be obtained, and little or no help was given by variations in the general surface. All these points seem to favour a large proportional number of hits on the part of the riflemen. I very much regret that I am unable to say what was the proportional number of shell wounds among the men hit, but I can say with some confidence that among the wounded it was not as great as ten per cent. I should be inclined to place it as low as five per cent. Again, I cannot fix the proportionate occurrence of wounds from bullets of large calibre such as the Martini-Henry, but this was certainly not large. I think if ten per cent. is deducted to represent the number of hits from either of these forms of projectile, that we may fairly assume the remaining 90 per cent. of the wounds to have been produced by bullets of small calibre. The numbers of the opposing forces were probably fairly even.

Taking all these circumstances together, and bearing in mind that our army was always in the position of having to make frontal attacks on men well protected in strong positions, I think it must be allowed that a fair idea should be possible of the effectiveness of the modern weapons. Only one circumstance, one inseparable from any fighting with the Boers, seems to affect the numbers in an important manner. This consists in the fact that the Boer rarely fights to the bitter end, hence the greater proportion of his hits are obtained at long distances.

TABLE I

	Number of troops engaged	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total	Percentage of killed and wounded to number of men engaged
Belmont:
Officers	297	3	23	0	26	8.75
Non.-com. officers and men	8,396	55	206	4	265	3.15
Total	8,693	58	229	4	291	3.34
Graspan:
Officers	326	3	7	0	10	3.06
Non.-com. officers and men	8,213	18	163	7	188	2.29
Total	8,539	21	170	7	198	2.31
Modder River:
Officers	335	3	19	0	22	6.56
Non.-com. officers and men	9,856	67	377	18	462	4.68
Total	10,191	70	396	18	484	4.74
Magersfontein:
Officers	379	18	48	2	68	17.94
Non.-com. officers and men	11,068	148	669	101	918	8.29
Total[1]	11,447	166	717	103	986	8.43

Table I. gives the number of men engaged, and also that of the killed and wounded at each of four battles. Table III. shows for comparison the relative number of killed and wounded in some former campaigns while older forms of weapon were in use.

With regard to the numbers in Tables I. and II. it should be at once said that they are only to be regarded as approximate, since they do not exactly tally with those officially reported in the 'Times' at a later date. Sources of error may, however, have crept into both, and as there is little difference in the gross numbers, I have preferred to retain the series compiled by Major Burtchaell, R.A.M.C., as Table II. contains interesting information as to the proportionate number of men who died during the first 48 hours, after being wounded.

TABLE II

Showing Proportion of Mortality amongst Men Hit, (a) on the Field, (b) during the First Forty-eight Hours

						Percentage mortality
	Number of troops engaged	Total number of men hit	Killed	Died within forty-eight hours	Total	To men hit	To force employed
Belmont:
Officers	297	26	3	3	6	23	2.02
Non.-com. officers and men	8,396	265	55	8	63	23.77	0.75
Total	8,693	291	58	11	69	23.71	0.79
Graspan:
Officers	326	10	3	1	4	40[2]	1.22
Non.-com. officers and men	8,213	188	18	3	21	11.17	0.25
Total	8,539	198	21	4	25	12.62	0.29
Modder River:
Officers	335	22	3	1	4	18.18	1.19
Non.-com. officers and men	9,856	462	67	9	76	16.45	0.77
Total	10,191	484	70	10	80	16.53	0.78
Magersfontein:
Officers	379	68	18	4	22	32.35	5.80
Non.-com. officers and men	11,068	918	148	20	168	18.30	1.51
Total	11,447	986	166	24	190	19.26	1.66