Alexander's Moral Order and Progress, bk. iii. ch. i. Section 10.
Martineau's Types of Ethical Theory, vol. ii. bk. i. ch. i. Section 2.
Mackenzie's Manual of Ethics, ch. v. Section 13 & ch. vii. Section 2.
Janet's Theory of Morals, ch. iii.
Dewey's Outlines of Ethics, Section lxvii.
Spencer's Principles of Ethics, pt. i. ch. 3.
III
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
I
In the preceding chapters I have examined only those features of goodness which are common alike to persons and to things. Goodness was there seen to be the expression of function in the construction of an organism. That is, when we ask if any being, object, or quality is good, we are really inquiring how organic it is, how much it contributes of riches or solidity to some whole or other. There must, then, be as many varieties of goodness as there are modes of constructing organisms. A special set of functions will produce one kind of organism, a different set another; and each of these will express a peculiar variety of goodness. If, then, into the construction of a person conditions enter which are not found in the making of things, these conditions will render personal goodness to some extent unlike the goodness of everything else.