An enclosed ground may be “used for purposes of betting” if betting men are allowed to enter and bet indiscriminately with those resorting thereto. |Eastwood v. Miller.| Thus in Eastwood v. Miller[[373]] an officer went to the borough park ground at Dewsbury, which was (it was admitted) in the occupation of the defendant. A pigeon-shooting match was about to take place. There were two bookmakers on the ground shouting out 20 to 2 on the match. Two persons went up to one of the bookmakers and made a bet, receiving tickets in exchange. Defendant was within hearing of the bookmakers, but did not take any part or say anything. After the pigeon-shooting match a foot-race took place at which bets were made as before on the pigeon-shooting.

It was objected that there was no evidence that the grounds were kept or used for the purposes of betting, as only one bet was proved to have been made. But the Court held that there was sufficient evidence to justify the magistrates in coming to the conclusion that the premises were used for betting as well as pigeon-shooting, and that the two objects were combined. Defendant knew that persons going there would bet upon the matches, and they were allowed to bet there.

Haigh v. Sheffield

In Haigh v. Town Council of Sheffield[[374]] defendant occupied a house, and an enclosed piece of ground adjoining, used for cricket, foot-races, &c. Within the grounds, but outside the space reserved for the runners, and amongst the spectators, some fifteen or twenty persons, being clearly professional betters (George Trickett being one of them), stood on chairs and stools in different spots, with books in their hands, calling out the odds on the different runners and betting with different persons. Numerous bets were made by the visitors to the grounds, such persons each depositing one shilling and receiving a ticket. It was admitted that the defendant knew what was going on, and took no steps to prevent it. Upon the question whether defendant could be convicted of keeping or using the place for the purpose of betting, Blackburn, J., said: “The appellant keeps the grounds for both purposes (foot-racing and betting); and it is immaterial which purpose is ancillary to the other. Then it was said the place was not shown to have been ‘habitually’ used for betting: the word does not occur in the statutes; but I think, if it were necessary to show it, there was ample evidence from which the conclusion might be drawn, that it was habitually used; and, moreover, I am of opinion, though the magistrate would not probably have found that the place was ‘used’ for betting if only one instance of betting had been proved, still, if the occupier of the place, knowing that betting was going on in this way, though only once, allowed it to be carried on, he would be guilty of permitting the place to be used for betting within the statute.”

To the same effect is Foote v. Buttler,[[375]] where the landlord of an inn was proved only to have made occasional bets with other people, the Court held that there was sufficient evidence in which the magistrates might find, as a fact, that it was used as a betting house.

On the other hand, in Whitehurst v. Fincher,[[376]] the defendant was proved on some few occasions to have gone to the bar of a public house, and to have made bets with persons there[[376]]; but it did not appear that he was a professional bookmaker. The Court held that the mere making of bets was not “user” within the Act, as it did not appear that he made a business of betting with persons who resorted there.

Person using.

(b.) As to who is included in the term “person using the same,” the question was raised in Oldham v. Ramsden,[[377]] as to whether it did not mean “using as owner or occupier.” Coleridge, C.J., rather suggested that that was so. The same view seems to have been argued in the case of Snow v. Hill,[[378]] and if correct would have the effect of limiting the application of the Act to persons who use a place by virtue of a tenancy or legal right. It is, however, submitted, that the wording of the statute precludes such a construction, which would reduce the words “person using the same” to mere surplusage[[379]]. It is significant that the words are omitted from the offence of “permitting, &c.,” and also from section 4, of which further mention will be made hereafter. But while it would seem to be clear that “the person using the same” may be a person who is a mere trespasser, it is equally clear that he must be a person who is using it for the illegal businesses specified: the “persons resorting thereto” for the purpose of betting are not within the Act, as was pointed out by A. L. Smith, J., in Snow v. Hill,[[380]] see, too, Jenks v. Turpin,[[381]] where the same learned judge put a like construction on somewhat similar words in the Gaming House Act, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 38, s. 4.

Manager.

(3.) The next person whom the statute makes liable is the manager or person assisting in the conduct of the illegal business.