St. Petersburg, 12th May, 1859.
I have become convinced, by the experience of the eight years of my official life in Frankfurt, that the settlement by the Diet, made in those days, forms a pressing, and, in critical times, a vitally dangerous fetter for Prussia, without giving, in return, such equivalents, enjoyed by Austria, under an unequally large mass of free self-action. The two greater Powers do not attain an equal measurement from the Princes and Governments of the smaller States; the construction of the object and the law of the Diet is modified according to the requirements of Austrian policy. I need not, considering your knowledge, enter upon more circumstantial arguments respecting the history of the policy of the Diet since 1850, and hence confine myself by naming the paragraphs concerning the restoration of the Diet, the question of the German Navy, Customs disputes, the laws respecting commerce, the press, and the Constitution, the Diet fortresses of Rastatt and Mainz, and the questions of Neuenburg and the East. We have always found ourselves face to face with the same compact majority, with the same demand for concessions from Prussia. In the Eastern question, the power of Austria has ever proved so superior to ours, that even the identity of the wishes and aspirations of the Diet governments, with the efforts of Prussia, have presented for her an ever-receding obstacle. With scarcely any exception, our associates in the Diet have given us to understand, or have even openly declared, that they were unable to maintain the Diet with us, should Austria pursue her own course; although it is unquestionable that federal law and real German interests were side by side with our peace policy; this, at least, was then the opinion of almost all the Princes. Would the latter have ever brought their own interests and wishes as a sacrifice to the wants, or even the safety, of Prussia? Certainly not: for their attachment to Austria is founded on outbalancing false interests, which prescribe to both a coalition against Prussia, a repression of all further development of the influence and power of Prussia, as a foundation for their common policy. A development of federal relations, under Austrian leadership, is the natural end of the policy of the German Princes and their Ministers; according to their opinions, this can only be accomplished at the expense of Prussia, and is necessarily directed against Prussia, so long as Prussia will not confine herself to the useful problem of providing for her equally entitled associates in the Diet an assurance against the preponderance of Austria, and is willing to bear the disproportion of her duties towards her rights in the Diet, being resigned to the wishes of the majority with untiring complacency. This tendency of the policy of the Central States will reappear with the constancy of the magnetic needle after every evanescent variation, because it represents no arbitrary product of individual events or persons, but is, in fact, a natural and necessary result of federal relations for the smaller States. There are no existing means by which we can maintain the actual federal treaties in an intimate manner.
Since our associates in the Diet, some years ago, began, under the guidance of Austria, to bring to light, from the hitherto neglected arsenal of the constitution of the Diet, the principles that would give prominence to their system—since it has been endeavored, in a partial way, to stifle the policy of Prussia by propositions which could only possess one signification in the sense of their proposers, in so far as they apply to the unanimity of Prussia and Austria—we have been obliged to endure the stress of the situation that the Diet and its whole historical development has forced upon us. We could say to ourselves, that in peaceful and orderly times we could weaken the evil in its results by skillful treatment, but we should be powerless to effect a cure; it is only too natural that in dangerous times, such as the present, the other side, in possession of all the advantages of the Diet settlement, should willingly confess that much has taken place of an improper nature, but should at the same time declare, in the “general interests,” that the present juncture is highly inapplicable for the discussion of past matters and “internal” disputes. But such an opportunity, if we do not make use of it at once, may not so speedily recur; and in the future we shall be forced to our normal resignation, which allows of no changes in the condition of things in orderly times.
His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has taken up a position commanding the unqualified approval of all those who are entitled to form any judgment of Prussian politics, and who thence have not allowed themselves to be disturbed by party feeling. Some of our associates in the Diet seek to blind us, by thoughtless and fanatical efforts, as to this attitude. If the statesmen of Bamberg are so frivolously ready to follow the first war outcry of an uncritical and mutable public opinion, if it does not take place probably quite without a comforting after-thought of the easiness with which a small state can change its colors in case of need; but if, in order to send a power like Prussia under fire, they desire to make use of the treaties of the Diet; if it be supposed that we shall substitute property and blood for political wisdom, and the thirst for action on the part of governments, to whom our defense is absolutely necessary for their existence; if these States think they are to dictate the guiding impulse, and regard theories concerning the rights of the Diet as means to such an end, then with such recognition all Prussian political autonomy would be over; then, in my opinion, it would be time for us to remember that the guides, who imagine we should follow them, serve other interests than those of Prussia, and that they understand the interests of Germany they talk so much about as non-identical with the interests of Prussia, if we decline to accede to their desires.
Perhaps I am going too far when I express it as my opinion, that we should seize every justifiable opportunity, presented by our associates in the Diet, to arrive at the revision of our mutual relations, necessary to Prussia, by which she can exist in defined relations to the smaller German States. I think we should willingly take up the gauntlet, and regard it as no misfortune, but as real progress, a crisis leading to improvement, if a majority at Frankfurt should decide upon such a vote, which we could look upon as a transgression of competency, an arbitrary change in the object of the confederation, a violation of its treaties. The more unmistakable this violation the better. We shall not easily find conditions of such a favorable nature in Austria, France, and Russia, by which we can alter our own position towards Germany for the better. Our allies are on the high road towards giving us perfectly justifiable motives for such a course, without our stimulating their insolence. Even the Kreuzzeitung, as I see by the number of last Sunday, is becoming somewhat startled at the thought that a Frankfurt majority could immediately dispose of the Prussian army. Not in this newspaper alone have I hitherto perceived with sorrow how Austria has established an autocracy over the German press by the skillfully laid net of her influence, and how well she knows to use the weapon. Without this, so-called public opinion could scarcely have risen to this height; I designate it so-called, for the real mass of the population is never inclined for war, unless the demonstrable suffering of real oppression has aroused it. To such a pitch has it risen, that even under the cloak of general German opinion, any Prussian newspaper can hardly declare itself in favor of Prussian patriotism. General Twiddle-twaddle plays a great part in this, nor must we omit the Zwanzigers (cash) that never fail Austria for this aim. Most newspaper correspondents write for their bread and cheese, most newspapers look to their incomes, and an experienced reader may easily see, by our newspapers and others, whether they have received, or speedily anticipate, or wish by threatening pantomime to force, a subsidy from Austria.
I think we should produce an admirable revulsion in public opinion if we were to sound the chords of independent Prussian policy in the press, in opposition to the exaggerations of our German allies. Perhaps things may happen at Frankfurt which may give us full reason to do so.
Under these circumstances the wisdom of our military precautions might be extended in other directions, and impart significance to our attitude; then Prussian self-respect would speak perhaps with a more conclusive tone than the Diet. I should only then care to see the word “German” in place of “Prussian” inscribed upon our standard, when we should have become more intimately and effectually bound up with our German fellow-countrymen than we have hitherto been; the word loses its charm in proximity to the ideas of the Diet.
I fear that your Excellency will interrupt me in this epistolary digression into the field of my former activity, with the cry, “Ne sutor ultra crepidam;” nor was it my intention to hold an official oration; I desired only to present the testimony of an experienced person against the Diet. I see in our position in the Diet, a defect of Prussia, which we shall have sooner or later to heal, ferro et igni, unless we adopt in time, and at a proper season of the year, measures for a cure. Were the Confederation abolished this very day, without substituting something in its place, I believe that this negative acquisition would soon form better and more natural relations between Prussia and her German neighbors, than have hitherto existed.
Bismarck.