In reference to the Conservative programme, I fully subscribe to your observations. The negative construction prevailing throughout of the propositions should have been avoided from the first. A political party can never stand, much less conquer position and adherents, by a mere languid defensive policy. Every party professes to abhor the dirt of the German Republic, and the Opposition now forming give themselves honest trouble not to have it—that is, the dirt. A figure of speech so much wider than the requirements of the time, either means nothing, or conceals what people do not desire to say. I myself am in doubt whether the authors of the programme do not really stand at the pure Würzburg point of view. Among our best friends, we have so many doctrinaires who ask from Prussia an identical duty of protecting foreign princes and countries as she protects her own subjects. The system of the solidarity of the conservative interests of all countries, is a dangerous fiction as long as the fullest and most honest reciprocity does not exist between the rulers of all countries. Were Prussia to carry it out in isolation, it would become Quixotism, which would only weaken our King and his Government in the solution of the most important question, viz., that defense of Prussia confided to the Crown of Prussia by the Almighty, against injustice coming from within or without. We are gradually making the whole unhistorical, ungodly, and illegal sovereignty swindle of those German princes who use the Confederation as a pedestal whence to play at being European powers, into the nurse-child of the Conservative party of Prussia. Internally our Prussian Government is liberal; abroad it is legitimist. We respect foreign crown rights with greater constancy than we do our own, and become enthusiastic about those lesser sovereignties created by Napoleon and sanctioned by Metternich, to blindness against all the perils with which the independence of Prussia and Germany is threatened in the future, as long as the nonsense of the present Confederation endures, which is nothing more than a hothouse of dangerous and revolutionary efforts. I could have wished that, instead of vague expressions against the German Republic, it had been openly stated in the programme what we desire to see changed and restored in Germany, whether by justly directed efforts towards alterations in the constitution of the Confederation, such as definite associations like the Customs Union, and the Military Treaty of Coburg. We have the double task of giving evidence that the existing Confederation is not our ideal, but that we purpose to attempt the necessary alterations openly in a legal way, and that we do not intend to go beyond these in confirming security and prosperity. To us the necessity of a firmer consolidation of our defensive powers is as patent as that of daily bread; we require a new and plastic system of customs, and a number of institutions in common, to defend material interests against the evils resulting from the unnatural interior configuration of German frontiers. There should be no doubt as to the sincerity and earnestness with which we ask for these objects. Nor do I see, moreover, why we should recoil so prudishly from the idea of popular representation, whether in the Diet, or in any customs, or associative parliament. Surely we can not combat an institution as revolutionary which is legally established in every German State, and which we Conservatives even would not wish to see abolished, even in Prussia. In national matters we have hitherto regarded very moderate concessions as valuable. A thoroughly conservative national representation might be created, and yet receive the gratitude of the liberals.
I am interrupted by the sounds of packing. In case you still have an opportunity of conferring with our friends on the subject, I enclose you the sketch I read to you with the request, however, that it shall not become public, as I am unaware whether the King would like that this hasty memorandum of the conversation I had with His Majesty, and which I committed to writing at his command, should become known, as I hear several discussions have taken place about it.
Berlin, the 2d Oct., 1861.
In Koblenz and here I have been active for German politics, and in the present state of things not quite without results. I wrote about the 19th of last month from Stolpmünde to your residence here, and enclosed in my letter the draught of the short sketch I had presented to the King. I am to carry this matter into greater detail. If, therefore, the letter and enclosure, as I hope, has reached your hands, I beg of you to send it me to Reinfeld, that I may work it up more completely there. I am really home-sick for my household on the English Quay, with the tranquil view of the Neva ice. On the 13th, it will be necessary to meet at Königsberg.
Berlin, the 16th May, 1864.
I can understand your hesitation against the address, which, however, in my opinion, at the present time seizes the diplomatic position with useful pressure. I may certainly be mistaken in this, for the longer I act in political affairs the less is my confidence in human calculation; and if you feel an inward opposition to it, I speak the less of it, as I would rather be able to declare with a good conscience that the Government has not inspired the idea mirrored in it. The actual state of things, however, is such, that it appears very necessary to let loose all the dogs willing to give tongue (forgive this sporting simile) against Denmark at the conference; the general cry of the pack will effect a conviction on the part of alien Powers that the subjection of the Duchies to Denmark is an impossibility, and the latter will be obliged to consider projects which the Prussian Government can not present to them. Among alien Powers in this last category I class the Holsteiners themselves, together with the Augustenburg, and all the eternally ignoble down to Königsau. The Duchies have hitherto played the part of the birthday child in the German family, and have accustomed themselves to think that we are willing to bring every sacrifice to the altar of their particular interests, and are willing to risk the existence of Prussia for every individual German in the north of Schleswig. The address will especially counteract this frenzy; I do not fear that it will have so strong an effect as to bring us into any difficulty. If Prussian ambition were to rise to such a height among the nation, so that the Government, instead of stimulating, would have to moderate the feeling, I should not at all regret such a condition.
You will perceive from this how I comprehend the matter from a human point of view. As to the rest, my impression of gratitude for God’s assistance till now rises into a conviction that the Lord knows how to turn even our errors to our benefit. I daily observe this with salutary humility.
To clear up the situation I will conclude by saying that to me Prussian annexation is not the chief and necessary end, but probably the most agreeable result.