At the present time, the simplest eyes can see that the rivalry of Prussia and Austria was now first coming into public sight, ere it was possible to think of any reconstruction of Germany. Austria had declined all the propositions of Prussia, which aimed essentially at a peaceable separation of Austria from the German Federation, and led to a federal union of the newly constructed union, under the leadership of Prussia, with Austria, but had replied with the Reform Act, containing within itself a nullification of Prussia. Austria, and the Central States allied with her, had given Prussia the alternatives of unconditional submission, immediate nullification, or the exclusion of herself from the new Federation.
Prussia, with quiet dignity, perfected this act of self-exclusion; and, lo! matters did not go on, and the Viennese Reform Act was a blank.
In his report to the King’s Majesty of the 15th of September, 1863, and in the Royal reply to the members of the Princes’ Congress on the 22d of the same month, Bismarck promulgated a series of “preliminary conditions” as to the part Prussia might take in further negotiations.
He demanded—1. The “veto of Prussia and Austria at least upon every federal war not undertaken in resistance of an attack upon federal territory;” 2. The “entire equality of Prussia with Austria in the presidency and government of federal concerns;” and 3. “A national representation, not to consist of delegates, but of directly chosen representatives, in the ratio of the populations of single States, the powers of which, in resolution, should, in any case, be more extensive than those in the project for the Frankfurt Reform Act.” As a plea for this condition he especially insisted, in his report to the King, that “the interests and requirements of the Prussian people were essentially and indissolubly identical with those of the German people, wherever this element attained its true construction and value; Prussia never need fear to be drawn into any policy adverse to her own interests.” Besides these three points, he also maintained that the “German sovereigns” were bound either “to learn the opinion of the nation itself by the means of chosen representatives, or to adduce the constitutional sanction of the Diets of each individual State.”
But that Bismarck had fully understood the final and actual ends of the Austro-Central policy, may be seen from the following sentence of his report to the King’s Majesty:—
“In the entirely remarkable attitude observed by Austria in this transaction, it is impossible to avoid the impression that apparently the Imperial Austrian Cabinet from the commencement contemplated, not the co-operation of Prussia in the common enterprise, but the realization of a separate federation as an end, already visible in the first propositions of the 3d of August, in case that Prussia would not join in the Austrian plans.”
There can be no doubt that Bismarck, by his firm attitude towards the Congress of Princes and the Austro-Central policy, has not only saved the future of Prussia, but also that of Germany. At that time people were so confused and dazzled that it was not at all seen. The small fights in the Chamber had robbed people of any understanding of the great things there accomplished. Bismarck was plainly of opinion that war was imminent, as may be clearly read from the report on which he founded the dissolution of the Electoral Chamber of the Diet. It is here said:—“On the basis of the German Federal Constitution attempts have come to light, the unmistakable object of which is to set down such a power of the Prussian State in Germany and in Europe, which forms a well-earned heritage of the glorious history of our fathers, and which the Prussian people has not at any time resolved to allow to be alienated from it. Under these circumstances, it will be a necessity for his Majesty’s subjects at the same time to give expression to the fact, at the forthcoming elections, that no political difference of opinion is so deeply rooted in our country that, in the face of an attempt to bring down the independence and dignity of Prussia, the unity of the nation and its unalterable fidelity to the governing house can be shaken.”
Perhaps they in the camp of Austria and its allies reckoned on—decidedly they believed in—war; and war certainly came at the time, but in a remarkable way, not between Prussia and Austria, but, to the inexpressible surprise of the world, Prussia and Austria, hand-in-hand as allies, took the field against Denmark.
It is utterly impossible clearly to state how Bismarck succeeded in inducing Austria to enter upon this war, how he managed to get their old rival to draw the sword for Prussia’s interest, in exact contradiction to her entire previous policy. It is quite true to say that the energetic initiative of Bismarck carried away Austria with him, but the matter does not grow at all clearer for that. It is also not inexact, most certainly, to affirm that Austrian diplomacy might assert that she was obliged to join, in order to watch over Prussia and bridle her; but it was by no means false when the Viennese exclaimed, “That Bismarck drags us by the halter!” when Austria went into Holstein, to Schleswig, to Jütland, in the interest of Prussia and Germany. No doubt the magic of Austria’s burning desire to retrieve the Imperial army’s lost prestige, after the misfortune of 1859, contributed to this political wonder—the desire of hanging fresh laurels on the black and yellow standard. Such a crown the warriors of Austria honestly won there in the North. Perhaps the circumstance that the Emperor of Austria always felt a friendly feeling towards Bismarck personally, had additional influence; and there might be a not altogether groundless feeling in existence that the conservative policy of Bismarck was not unlikely in some way to exert a favorable influence in Austria. It is said that on one occasion the Emperor Francis Joseph involuntarily exclaimed, when Bismarck was severely blamed in his presence, “Ah! if I but had him!”
If, however, Bismarck thus led Austria to the North as the ally of Prussia, and thus prevented interferences from other quarters, he also created new difficulties for himself in the sequence of events, which were to assume far higher proportions than they usually assumed. He knew very well that, after the victory over Denmark, the old quarrel with Austria would break out again—must break out again; nor could he have omitted to see that a victorious war, carried on in conjunction with Austria, could not fail mightily to increase all kinds of sympathies possessed by Austria in the army, and in conservative Prussia. The deep abhorrence against any rupture with Austria which Bismarck had to combat in his own camp, emerged still more into light after the war in a more animated way, and rendered his position more difficult from day to day. All the traditions of glorious alliance of the great period of the War of Freedom had become revivified in the hut as in the palace, and they possessed real power; for it is an unquestionable fact that Austria would be the best ally for Prussia from that moment when it determines to allow Prussia to take her proper position in Germany without malice or envy. It was the destiny of Germany that Austria could not resolve to give Prussia what was Prussia’s right; Bismarck’s great political task, however, was to compel the surrender from Austria of that which is the meed of Prussia and Germany.