CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY.
“UT SCIAT REGNARE.”

Bismarck’s Policy.—Its Gradual Growth and Political Character.—Contrast with Lucchesini.—Bismarck’s Open Honesty.—Vassal and Liege.—Liberalism a Danger.—Democracy a Danger.—The Relative Positions of Prussia and Austria in the Federation.—Gerlach’s Ideal Conservatism.

Bismarck has now to be politically tested, and amidst all the strange eventualities in the remarkable history of Prussia, we perceive, first as a counsellor, then as an actor, and finally as a guide, that the one man emerges, a man ever the same, yet ever appearing to change. Otto von Bismarck is best to be compared to a tree, which continues the same, although gaining in height and strength by growth; whose lofty top, with its wide-spreading leaves, alters its appearance at each new spring, to a greater or lesser degree; it remains the same, even if the wind bends the trunk, despite its toughest power of resistance, slightly aside; an imperfect twig may be broken off by the storm, or a heavy rain-fall may bare one of the deep roots, and abandon the growing power a prize to the effects of the breeze and the sun.

The altered appearance which Bismarck at different times has presented, has blinded many eyes; many thought he had grown into another man, as he presented himself ever stronger, mightier, and of greater stature! Of course, he has long since become too great, too strong, and too mighty for his opponents, and some have found, in a manner not so entirely agreeable, the influence of the wide-spreading tree with its potent shadow.

There have certainly been alterations in the man, but none of them inconsistent with the growth of the tree. The simile may not be accurate, but it indicates the truth. Bismarck has himself pointed out the changes which he has undergone very much better by the modest sentence, “I have learnt something!” Perhaps he did not always learn the best, but he has learnt more than many who now turn maliciously from him, because they could not keep step with him; some others, also, because they would not.

We owe to Guizot the expression of the same thought, so moderately phrased by Bismarck, in the pointed French remark, “L’homme absurde seul ne change pas!” The word, however, is somewhat suspicious in the mouth of the French statesman, for its utterance is pro domo, as an excuse for various political apostasies.

Now, in Bismarck there is no trace of apostasy throughout his political life, and perhaps in no statesman can an enduring political principle be more easily discovered, and followed into detail—if we only adhere to facts, and do not allow ourselves to be diverted by absurd misinterpretations of his words, the diatribes of political opposition, or the hollow declamation of foolish party babblers.

This is the more easy, as Bismarck is precisely the opposite of one of his predecessors in the Foreign Office of Prussia. The cunning of the Marquis of Lucchesini,[34] a predecessor of Bismarck, had become so well known, so proverbial, that none of his negotiations ever led to any thing, because whoever was representing the other side always commenced with the conviction that Lucchesini would, in the end, outwit him. A certain degree of confidence, however inconsiderable, is necessary on both sides, if political arrangements are to end in results. Bismarck, on the other hand, is a thoroughly honest politician—honest to such a degree that his political adversary is sometimes puzzled, and suspects some snare in his very openness. Bismarck is a thoroughly honest man, who scorns every intentional deception on the part of his opponents.

We are well aware that this assertion will be met in many circles with scornful contradiction; but it is nevertheless true, and we will demonstrate the proposition. But they also err, who may perhaps believe that we are of opinion that we have, in this, said something flattering to the Minister-President; we merely acknowledge that this honesty has been implanted in the nature of Bismarck by the Almighty, that it could not but develop itself and become a sustaining principle; but such acknowledgment does not constitute flattery.