Before starting from the hill over Flavigny for Pont à Mousson on the afternoon of the 17th, General von Moltke had issued an order to Prince Frederick Charles and Von Steinmetz, indicating the operations which were to begin the next morning. Their purport was that while the 7th Corps stood fast, and the 8th leant towards the right of the Second Army, the Corps composing it should move forward, left in front, facing north. It was a general direction, intended to place the troops in such an array as would enable them to strike and stop the French, if they still sought to reach Chalons by the northern roads, or by a right wheel bring the whole German force to bear upon the enemy if he were found in position before Metz. By six o’clock on the morning of the 18th, King William and his staff were once more on the height near Flavigny, soon after which time the whole Army was in movement, and a sputter of musketry had begun on the extreme right between Frossard’s foreposts and those of the 7th Corps in the woods. The 8th had come up near to Rezonville; the 9th was moving between that village and St. Marcel; the Guard was passing Mars la Tour; and the 12th was on the road to Jarny. Behind, in second line, were the 10th and 3rd, the 5th and 6th divisions of cavalry being attached to the latter Corps respectively; while the 2nd Corps, which had bivouacked at Pont à Mousson, had started on another forced march, in order, should there be a battle, to enter the field before dark. The morning wore away, and, except on the right where his left was visible and his skirmishers active, no evidence of the enemy’s presence could be found. The Saxon cavalry division, scouting northward and westward, lighted only on stragglers and patrols; the horsemen and staff officers out in front of the other Corps watching as well as they could the movements of the French, sent in divergent statements, leaving it doubtful where their main body was, and what it was doing or intended to do. Great uncertainty, in short, prevailed until after ten o’clock, and even then General von Moltke and the staff were under the impression that the French right was near Montigny la Grange; but, believing that the adversary would fight, an order went forth at 10.30 a.m., which finally brought the German Armies into line facing eastward. Meantime Prince Frederick Charles had, by degrees, also arrived at the conclusion that the French would accept battle, and, at half-past ten, he likewise instructed General von Manstein to move towards La Folie and begin an attack with his artillery, provided the enemy’s right was not beyond Amanvillers. Immediately afterwards, while Von Moltke still believed that the flank he wished to turn was at the last-named village, the Prince acquired certain information, from a Hessian cavalry patrol, that the French right rested on St. Privat la Montagne. By such slow degrees was the long-sought flank discovered. Orders were then given directing the 12th and the Guard to wheel to the right and move on St. Marie aux Chênes and Habonville; but before they could come into line, Manstein’s guns were heard, and Von Moltke became apprehensive lest the exciting sounds of conflict would carry away the impetuous Steinmetz, lest the First Army, always so eager for battle, might strike in prematurely and injure a combination which depended so much upon a simultaneous onset. Accordingly, the rein upon that General was tightened, and he was told that he might use artillery, yet not do more with his infantry than attract the notice of the enemy and keep his attention on the strain. But so thoroughly were the chiefs of the German Corps imbued with the same principles of conduct, that the Prince Royal of Saxony and Prince Augustus of Würtemberg had already, in anticipation, prepared to play the part which was to be assigned them. Having learned, from their own scouting parties, where the French right stood, and having heard the guns at Vernéville, they had both wheeled their divisions to the eastward, and pushed out their advance Guards. Thus they were ready to march at the moment when the order arrived; in fact, the order was in course of execution before it reached the officers to whom it had been addressed. Meantime, acting on the first instructions from the Prince, drawn up when he believed the right rested on Amanvillers, General von Manstein, a little before noon, had begun
The Battle of Gravelotte.
At this moment, it should be noted, the French camps on the right centre and right did not know that an enemy was within a long mile of their bivouacs. The usual patrols had been sent out and had returned—even scouts selected by the local officials for their knowledge of the country—to report that they had not seen anybody. Marshal Canrobert, in his evidence on the Bazaine court-martial, expressly testifies to the fact, and adds that the first intimation he received came from the boom of hostile guns on his left front. The troops of Ladmirault’s Corps, encamped on both sides of Amanvillers, were peacefully engaged in cooking their noontide meal, when General von Manstein, who seems to have been endowed with some of the impetuosity of his namesake, who figured in the wars of Frederick II., riding ahead of his corps, caught sight of the quiescent camp. The temptation could not be withstood. From the hills near Vernéville he could not see the troops at St. Privat, but he had been informed by the Hessian Cavalry that the French were there. He had been formally enjoined to attack if the enemy’s right was near La Folie; it was much to the north of that farm; yet Manstein, unable to neglect the opportunity of startling a negligent camp by an outburst of fire, sent the solitary battery which had accompanied him into instant action from a rising ground east of Vernéville. The first shot was fired at a quarter to twelve, and its successors roused the French line from St. Privat to the centre, for Frossard and Lebœuf seemed to have been on the alert. General von Blumenthal, with the leading infantry battalions, was at that time moving on the farm of Chantrenne, and he was stopped by the lively musketry salute which greeted his men. Manstein, seeing that his guns were too distant from their living targets, now ordered the battery forward, and it was soon joined, first by the divisional then by the corps artillery; the whole finally forming a long line of fifty-four pieces, each battery having, as it dashed up, wheeled to the right and opened fire. The movement was a grave error, for the long rounded hill on which the batteries stood faced south-east, offered no shelter except on its low right shoulder, and the guns were exposed to a fire from the front, the flank, and even from the left rear. Two batteries were slewed round to the left, but that did not remedy the original mistake. There were no infantry at hand to keep down the fire of the French foot, which, lurking in the hollows, sent a hail of bullets among the guns. Committed to this false position, the superb German artillerymen did their utmost to make it good; but no heroism could avail against its cruel disadvantages. General Blumenthal, indeed, had carried the Chantrenne farm, but the enemy, at the first shot, had thrown a garrison into another homestead named Champenois, whence the chassepots smote the front of the batteries. The Hessians, also, had developed a powerful attack through the Bois de la Cusse towards the railway embankment and Amanvillers, thus taking off some of the severe pressure from the devoted gunners. But the French infantry crept nigher and nigher; under the rush of shells, shrapnel, and bullets, officers, men, and horses fell fast and faster. By concentrating their aim the Germans crushed one or silenced another battery; by using shell they sometimes scattered oncoming infantry; still the penalty of haste and a wrong direction had to be paid. The left battery, disabled, was caught in the tempest and borne down by a rush of French foot. Two pieces were dragged away by hardy men and wounded horses; two were left on the field; and two were captured. Yet this astonishing artillery, though horribly shattered, continued to hold its ground. It was saved, at a later moment, from a persevering attack on its vulnerable flank by the steady onset of an infantry battalion, which lost nearly half its strength in succouring the guns. Then, for the position was really untenable, all the batteries, except three on the right, where there was a little shelter, at length drew reluctantly, in succession, out of the shambles and went rearward to refit. It was half-past two; they had been more than two hours in the jaws of death, and had lost no fewer than 210 officers and men and 370 horses. So audaciously, if sometimes unwisely, was this grand arm employed in battle that no one need be astonished to learn how Canrobert, who loved a picturesque phrase, called his dreaded and admired opponents, “tirailleurs d’artillerie.”
Prince Frederick Charles at the Front.
Manstein, who was to have attacked the French right, had dashed somewhat impetuously against the right centre, and for some two hours his Corps sustained the brunt of the engagement, for the Guards and the Saxons were still on the march, the first heading for Vernéville and Habonville, the second on St. Marie aux Chênes, into which Canrobert had hurried three battalions. North of the artillery, whose bloody adventure has been described, the Hessian division, under Prince Louis, posted astride of the railway embankment, which, running from Amanvillers to Habonville, cut the line of troops at right angles, held the copses of the Bois de la Cusse, and, supported by thirty guns, formed the backbone of the German attack in that exposed quarter. Further south, the other half of the 9th Corps, the 18th Division, had its reserves near Vernéville, with troops established in Chantrenne and L’Envie; but they could make no way, because the French were solidly planted in Champenois, in the Bois de Genivaux, in a spinney projecting to the westward of La Folie, in that farm and on the higher ground above. About half-past two the contest in the centre had become defensive on the part of the 9th Corps, and the energies of the leaders and the troops alike were taxed to retain the ground already occupied and extricate the artillery. Prince Frederick Charles, on learning just before noon, from the cavalry reports, where the French right actually stood, became anxious when he heard at St. Marcel the uproar of a hot artillery engagement, and he rode off at once towards the sound and smoke which rose in clouds above the woods. On reaching Habonville he was able to survey the conflict, and also discern, in outline, the enemy’s position at St. Privat. The great head-quarters were still imperfectly informed, yet they wished to restrain precipitate action and prevent a home-thrusting central attack until strong bodies could be launched against the French right. The Prince, however, saw that the combat could not be broken off, and he set himself to make all secure by placing a brigade of the Guard, as a reserve, to assist the 9th Corps, which was all that Manstein requested, and by ordering up four batteries from the 3rd Corps, the infantry masses of which were not far from Vernéville. Prince Augustus of Würtemberg had preceded the Guard Corps, and as soon as General Pape, commanding the 1st infantry division, arrived with the advanced guard it was arranged that his four batteries should go into action to the south-west of Habonville, that is on the left of the much-tried Hessians, and cover the march of the Guard towards St. Marie. The spot first selected for the guns was found defective, and the batteries, at a gallop, took up new ground further to the left, to the south-west of St. Ail. Thereupon, that village was occupied by the Guard; Prince Augustus sent for the corps artillery, and soon nine batteries were arrayed between the two villages, on a diagonal line pointing to the north-west, that is, so disposed as to bring to bear a heavy fire on St. Privat, a succour which gave further relief to the gunners of the 9th Corps. For not only Canrobert’s cannon, but his infantry, lurking in the shallow valleys along the front, now directed their shells and bullets upon the Guard batteries. Although the French did not attempt any heavy stroke, they were active and enterprising, and kept their swarms of skirmishers within a thousand yards of the guns, but, as the official historian remarks, over and over again, beyond the range of the needle-gun. Before three o’clock the Guard Corps was up, and the 12th, or rather half of it, had approached near St. Marie. Such was the condition of the battle on that side; and it is now necessary to describe the daring operations of the First Army, on the German right wing.
Steinmetz Attacks the French Left.
It will be remembered that the 7th and 8th Corps, commanded by Von Steinmetz, upon whom it was necessary to keep a tight hand, had been brought up to the south and west of Gravelotte, the left of the 8th touching Manstein’s right. The 7th provided the outposts which lined the fringe and salient of the Bois de Vaux, and these troops were engaged in an intermittent and bickering contest with the French infantry thrown out upon that flank. The 1st Division of Cavalry, from the right bank, crossing the Moselle at Borny, rode up about noon as a support, and General von Fransecky, preceding the 2nd Corps, assured the King, whom he found near Flavigny, that one division would arrive in time to form a reserve for the First Army. Von Steinmetz, on a height near Gravelotte, nervously observed the French, sent in repeated information that they were moving off, and evidently desired to adopt the tactics which he had applied on two previous occasions. He was ordered to be still, and when the guns spoke at Vernéville, Von Moltke, knowing their effect upon the veteran warrior, intimated afresh that he must stand expectant yet awhile. Permission was given, as already mentioned, to use his guns; but when the despatch was handed to Steinmetz he had already opened fire with the batteries of the 7th Corps, arrayed to the south, and of the 8th to the north of Gravelotte; and the infantry had been moved eastward to the edge of the region just clear of the French fire. The troops in the Bois de Vaux were reinforced, the mill of the Mance and the gully itself were occupied, and an ample force was posted above the ravine to protect the line of guns.
The expectant attitude, always distasteful to Von Steinmetz, was not, and in the nature of things could not be long maintained by the First Army. The generals on the spot knew more accurately what had occurred in the centre than the Great Staff when the order to look on was written. General von Goeben, knowing how deeply Manstein had committed the 9th Corps, felt bound to attack in order that he might detain and provide employment for the French left. From a point near Gravelotte he could see the masses of troops held in reserve by Lebœuf and Frossard, and, with the ready assent of his immediate chief he pushed forth columns from both his divisions. On the south of the high road the soldiers disappeared in the deep gully of the Mance, their path marked by puffs of smoke as they drove back the French skirmishers, and reappeared climbing the opposite slope leading to the huge quarries below Point du Jour; but here, struck and repelled by the defenders, they vanished again into the depths, where they held on to the gravel pits in the bottom. Nearer the high road, one battalion wedged itself in to the quarries close to St. Hubert; while beyond the highway, the Germans dashed through the wood, established themselves on its eastern border above and about the farmstead, and stormed the stone parapets set up by the French foreposts at the confluence of the two streamlets which form the Mance. Farther they could not go, because Lebœuf’s men stiffly held the eastern patch of woodland, while the open ground towards the Moscow farm was swept by musketry fire from the deep banks in the cross-roads, from the shelter trenches above, and from the loopholed buildings of the farm. But the attack on the Bois de Genivaux aided the men of the 9th Corps, who, from Chantrenne, had entered its northern border, and compelled the defenders of the lines in front of Moscow to turn upon the new assailants. Then the companies which had gathered about St. Hubert became engaged in a destructive contest, for the walls were high and well garnished, and the northern point of attack was more or less commanded by the higher ground towards Moscow. On the south front, however, there proved to be more chances of success.
Relying, perhaps, on Frossard’s infantry and guns, the discharges from which commanded the high road, the garrison had forgotten to barricade the gates, doors, and windows; and when the place had been cannonaded by the southern line of guns, the assailants, who had suffered great loss with unflinching hardihood, came on with an irresistible rush, and carried the farm by storm. The feat was accomplished about three o’clock; and the work done gave a solid support to the German right wing. At this time, the German guns, so well fought, having taken more forward positions, had mastered the French artillery, which sank into comparative silence. There were seventy-eight pieces in action on the south of the high road, and fifty-four on the north, and their superiority is admitted and recorded by Frossard himself, who saw his batteries idle or withdrawn, his reserves smitten, and its defenders literally burnt out of the farm buildings at Point du Jour. Yet the French left was not shaken, it was hardly touched, by a vehement attack which had given the Germans a better defensive position, indeed, but still one only on the verge of Frossard’s stronghold, and affording no facilities for a rush against the fortified lines occupied by the 3rd French Corps, in the thickets of Genivaux and on the brow of the bare hills.