1st Div., Gen. du Barail; 1st Brig., Gen. Margueritte; 2nd Brig., Gen. de Lajaille; 16 squadrons, Chasseurs d’Afrique, and 12 guns. [Three regiments reached Metz on the 10th of August, and the 4th at Mouzon on the Meuse.]
2nd Div., Gen. Viscomte de Bonnemains; 1st Brig., Gen. Girard; 2nd Brig., Gen. de Brauer; 16 squadrons, all Cuirassiers.
3rd Div., Gen. de Forton; 1st Brig., Gen. Prince Murat; 2nd Brig., Gen. de Gramont; 16 squadrons—(one brigade of Dragoons, the other Cuirassiers)—and 12 guns.
Artillery Reserve: Gen. Canu, 126 guns, 6 mitrailleuses, and 3 companies of Engineers.
STRENGTH OF ARMY.
| Battalions. | Squadrons. | Batteries. | Guns. | Mitrailleuses. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Guard | 24 | 24 | 12 | 60 | 12 |
| 1st Corps | 52 | 28 | 20 | 96 | 24 |
| 2nd Corps | 39 | 16 | 15 | 73 | 18 |
| 3rd Corps | 52 | 28 | 20 | 96 | 24 |
| 4th Corps | 39 | 16 | 15 | 72 | 18 |
| 5th Corps | 39 | 16 | 15 | 72 | 18 |
| 6th Corps | 49 | 24 | 20 | 114 | 6 |
| 7th Corps | 38 | 20 | 15 | 72 | 18 |
| Reserve Cav. | 48 | 6 | 30 | 6 | |
| Reserve Art. | 16 | 96 | |||
| ––– | ––– | ––– | ––– | ––– | |
| 332 | 220 | 154 | 780 | 144 |
It is not possible to do more than guess at the numerical strength of the French Corps, and consequently of the French Army; so great is the variation in the strength of battalions and squadrons. The infantry of the several Corps was continually augmented by the arrival of reserves, so that, the losses at Spicheren notwithstanding, the 2nd Corps was stronger by more than 2,000 men, five days after the battle, than it was on the morning of the 6th; Marshal Lebœuf told the Parliamentary Commission that, on the 1st of August, according to the “states” sent in to the head-quarters, the effective of the Army of the Rhine, including all the Corps in the field, was 243,171 men. But “the real effective,” he adds, “was greatly superior.” For by the 1st of August, no fewer than “278,882 men had been sent to the Army of the Rhine,” and subsequently, until the 14th, “numerous detachments.” It is plain that no precise information can be obtained, but it seems probable that the strength was always greater than that reported at the time. Similar uncertainty prevails respecting the effective strength of the “Army of Chalons.” The only authentic figures extant are those supplied by the German account of the capitulation, from which the original strength, increased by additions on the line of march, may be inferred.
III.
THE PROTOCOL OF CAPITULATION.
Between the undersigned, the Chief of the Staff of His Majesty the King of Prussia, commanding in chief the German Army, and the General, commanding in chief the French Army, each having received full powers from their Majesties, King William and the Emperor Napoleon, the following Convention has been concluded: