There is, then, a vast distinction between any theory of heredity which postulates the material of heredity as highly stable and largely continuous, and Weismann’s theory, which postulates this material as absolutely stable and perpetually continuous. But we must next take notice that Weismann himself has not kept this distinction in view with the constancy which we should have expected from so forcible a thinker. On the contrary, although in the construction of his theory of evolution he never fails to press the postulates of absolute stability and perpetual continuity to their logical conclusions in the various doctrines above enumerated (pp. 57-58), when engaged on his more special theory of heredity he every now and then appears to lose sight of the distinction. Indeed, he occasionally makes such large concessions with regard to both these postulates, that, were they to be entertained, the occupation of his critics would be gone: his theory of heredity would become converted into Galton’s, while his theory of evolution would vanish altogether. It is therefore necessary to quote some of these concessions, if only to justify ourselves in subsequently ignoring them. I will give one instance of each; but it is necessary to preface the illustrations with a few words to mark emphatically three very distinct cases of congenital variation—leaving aside for the present the question whether or not they all occur in fact, as they are held to do by one or other of the theories of heredity.
1. The case where impoverished nutrition of the body has the effect of simply starving its germinal material. This is not a case where either the continuity or the stability of such material is affected. Its full efficiency as “formative material” may indeed be thus deteriorated to any extent, so that the progeny may be to any extent puny or malformed; but this will not necessarily cause any such re-shuffling of its “molecules” as will thereafter result in a permanent phylogenetic change. At most it will affect only the immediate offspring of poorly nourished parents; and natural selection will always be ready to eliminate such inefficient individuals. This case I will always hereafter call the case of nutritive congenital changes.
2. The case where germinal material is influenced by causes which do effect a re-shuffling of its “molecules,” so that a permanent phylogenetic change does result. Observe, in this case, it does not signify whether the causes arise from external conditions of life, from any action of the soma on its own germinal material, or from so-called “spontaneous” changes on the part of such material itself. But the one cause which has not been concerned in producing an hereditary modification of this class is the mixture of “germ-plasms” in an act of sexual union. In hereafter speaking of this case I will follow Weismann’s terminology, and call congenital changes thus produced specialized congenital changes.
3. Lastly, we have the case of the Lamarckian factors. This precisely resembles case 2, save that the congenital changes produced are still more “specialized.” For while in the preceding case the re-shuffling before mentioned may have produced a congenital change of any kind, in the present case the congenital change produced must be of one particular kind—viz., a reproduction by heredity of the very same modification which occurred in the parents. “The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge.” This would be an extreme example of “use-inheritance,” and so of case 3. But if the fathers had eaten sour grapes, and the children, instead of having their teeth set on edge, were to be born with a wryneck or a squint, then we should have a good example of case 2. In order, then, to mark the important distinction between these two cases, I will hereafter call the highly specialized changes due to the Lamarckian factors—supposing such changes to be possible—representative congenital changes.
These several distinctions being understood, I will proceed to furnish the two quotations from Weismann, which are respectively illustrative of his concessions touching his two fundamental postulates, as previously explained.
We may fairly attribute to the adult organism influences which determine the phyletic development of its descendants. For the germ-cells are contained in the organism, and the external influences which affect them are intimately connected with the state of the organism in which they lie hid. If it be well nourished, the germ-cells will have abundant nutriment; and, conversely, if it be weak and sickly, the germ-cells will be arrested in their growth. It is even possible that the effects of these influences may be more specialized; that is to say, they may act only upon certain parts of the germ-cells. But this is indeed very different from believing that the changes of the organism which result from external stimuli can be transmitted to the germ-cells, and will re-develop in the next generation at the same time as that at which they arose in the parent, and in the same part of the organism[18].
It will be perceived that Weismann himself here very clearly draws all the distinctions between cases 1, 2, and 3, as above explained. Therefore it becomes the more remarkable that he should not have perceived how radically inconsistent it is in him thus to entertain as “possible” congenital variations belonging to the case 2. For, as we have now so fully seen, the theory of germ-plasm (as distinguished from that of stirp) cannot entertain the possibility of an hereditary and specialized change of any kind as thus produced by external conditions of life: should such a possibility be entertained, there must obviously be an end to the absolute stability of germ-plasm, and a consequent collapse of Weismann’s theory of evolution. Either germ-plasm is absolutely stable, or else it is but highly stable. If it is absolutely stable, individual variations of an hereditary kind can occur only as results of sexual admixtures of germ-plasm, and Weismann’s theory of evolution is established. But if germ-plasm is not absolutely stable (no matter in how high a degree it may be so) hereditary individual variations may be produced by other causes, and Weismann’s theory of evolution collapses. Therefore, if we are to examine his theory of evolution, we can do so only by ignoring such a passage as the one just quoted, which surrenders the postulate of the absolute stability of germ-plasm.
Again, if we are to examine Weismann’s theory of heredity, we must similarly ignore such a passage as the following, where he represents that he is similarly prepared to surrender his still more fundamental postulate of the perpetual continuity of germ-plasm.
After remarking that some of his own experiments on the climatic varieties of certain butterflies raise such difficulties against his whole theory of heredity that even now “he cannot explain the facts otherwise than by supposing the passive acquisition of characters produced by the direct influence of climate,” he goes on to remark more generally—“We cannot exclude the possibility of such a transmission occasionally occurring, for, even if the greater part of the effects must be attributed to natural selection, there might be a smaller part in certain cases which depends on this exceptional factor[19]”—i.e., the Lamarckian factor!
Now, it must be particularly noted that in this passage Weismann is speaking, not as in the previous passage, of specialized congenital characters, but of representative congenital characters. In other words, he here entertains the possibility which in the passage previously quoted he very properly rejects—namely, “that changes of the organism which result from external stimuli can be transmitted to the germ-cells, and will re-develop in the next generation at the same time as that at which they arose in the parent, and in the same part of the organism.” But it is evident that if the theory of germ-plasm is undermined by the concession made in the passage thus previously quoted, in the passage last quoted a match is put to the fuse. It does not signify whether the particular case of the butterflies in question will ever admit of any other explanation more in accordance with the theory of germ-plasm: the point is that in no case can this theory entertain the possibility of causes other than admixtures of germ-plasm in sexual unions producing hereditary changes, (A) of any kind, (B) still less of a specialized kind, and (C) least of all of a representative kind. For the distinguishing essence of this theory is, that germ-plasm must always have moved, so to speak, in a closed orbit of its own: its “sphere” must have been perpetually distinct from those of whatever other “plasms” there may be in the constellations of living things. So that, in such passages as those just quoted, Weismann is not only destroying the very foundations of his general theory of evolution, but at the same time he is identifying his more special theory of heredity with those which had been already published by his predecessors, and more particularly by Galton. Now, it is not Galton’s theory that we are considering; and therefore we must hereafter ignore those fundamental admissions, whereby Weismann every now and again appears ready to relinquish all that is most distinctive of, or original in, his own elaborate system of theories.