Obviously, therefore, we are here in the presence of a great distinction, and one which needs itself to be in some way connoted. It is, indeed, but a special exhibition of the one great distinction which I have carried through the whole course of this work—namely, that between ideation as receptual and conceptual. But it is none the less important to designate this special exhibition of it by means of well-defined terms; and I can only express surprise that such should not already have been done by logicians. The terms which I shall use are the following.
By a connotative name I will understand the connotative extension of a denotative name, whether such extension be great or small, and, therefore, whether it be extended receptually or conceptually. But for the exclusively conceptual extension of a name I will reserve the convenient term denomination. This term, like those previously defined, was introduced by the schoolmen, and by them was used as synonymous with connotation. But it is evident that they (and all subsequent writers) only had before their minds the case of conceptual connotation, and hence they felt no need of the distinction which for present purposes it is obviously imperative to draw. Now, I do not think that any two more appropriate words could be found whereby to express this distinction than are these words connotation and denomination, if for the purposes of my own subsequent analysis I am allowed to define them in accordance with their etymology. For, when so defined, a connotative sign will mean a classificatory sign, whether conferred receptually or conceptually; while a denominative sign will mean a connotative sign which has been conferred as such with a truly conceptual intention—i.e. with an introspective appreciation of its function as all that logicians understand by a name.
I will now sum up these sundry definitions.
By an indicative sign I will understand a significant tone or gesture intentionally expressive of a mental state; but yet not in any sense of the word denominative.
By a denotative sign I will understand the receptual marking of particular objects, qualities, actions, &c.
By a connotative sign I will understand the classificatory attribution of qualities to objects named by the sign, whether such attribution be due to receptual or to conceptual operations of the mind.
By a denominative sign I will understand a connotative sign consciously bestowed as such, or with a full conceptual appreciation of its office and purpose as a name.
By a predicative sign I will mean a proposition, or the conceptual apposition of two denominative terms, expressive of the speaker’s intention to connote something of the one by means of the other.