The law of the sea

by George L. Canfield; J. Y. Brinton; George W. Dalzell

Nor can the general owner be estopped from showing the real character of the transaction, by the fact that the libellants advanced money on the faith of the bills of lading; because this change in the libellants' condition was not induced by the act of the claimant, or of any one acting within the scope of an authority which the claimant had conferred. Even if the master had been appointed by the claimant, a willful fraud committed by him on a third person, by signing false bills of lading, would not be within his agency. If the signer of a bill of lading, was not the master of the vessel, no one would suppose the vessel bound; and the reason is, because the bill is signed by one not in privity with the owner. But the same reason applies to a signature made by a master out of the course of his employment. The taker assumes the risk, not only of the genuineness of the signature, and of the fact that the signer was master of the vessel, but also the apparent authority of the master to issue the bill of lading. We say the apparent authority, because any secret instruction by the owner, inconsistent with the authority with which the master appears to be clothed, would not affect third persons. But the master of a vessel has no more than apparent unlimited authority to sign bills of lading, than he has to sign bills of sale of the ship. He has an apparent authority, if the ship be a general one, to sign bills of lading for cargo actually shipped; and he has also authority to sign a bill of sale of a ship, when, in case of disaster, his power of sale arises. But the authority, in each case, arises out of, and depends upon a particular state of facts. It is not an unlimited authority in the one case more than in the other; and his act, in either case, does not bind the owner, even in favor of an innocent purchaser, if the facts upon which his power depended did not exist; and it is incumbent upon those who are about to change their conditions, upon the faith of his authority to ascertain the existence of all the facts upon which his authority depends.

*****

On these grounds, we are of the opinion that, upon the facts as they appear from the evidence in the record, the maritime law gives no lien upon the schooner that the claimant is not estopped from alleging and proving those facts.

It should be noted that the mere record title does not conclusively establish ownership. That title may be only security for the real owner out of control. The real facts may be shown when necessary (Davidson v. Baldwin, 79 Fed. 95).

11. Managing Owner.—

The shore business of a ship is usually attended to by an agent or representative called the "managing owner," "ship's husband," "shore-captain," "port-captain," "managing-agent," or "manager." Different expressions prevail in different localities but they all mean substantially the same thing—an agent of the owners charged with keeping the ship in good repair and finding business for her. He has authority to direct all proper repairs, equipment and outfit, to hire the officers and crew, to make contracts for freight, to collect and disburse the earnings. He should see that the ship is seaworthy and supplied with all necessary and proper papers. He has no implied authority to borrow money, nor surrender a lien for freight, nor to insure; he cannot bind the owners to the expenses of a lawsuit without their special consent. It is doubtful whether he can, in any event, pledge the credit of the owners beyond their interest in the ship and it is probable that they are entitled to the statutory limitation of liability against all his contracts or torts in which they do not personally participate. If, however, the ship is owned by a corporation, it is not advisable that any of the directors or officers should also be the managing owner, as his "privity or knowledge" may thereby attach to the corporation.

In Woodall v. Dempsey, 100 Fed. 653, the Court found the facts to be as follows:

The suit is for $3,513, a balance due for repairs. The work was done at Baltimore costing $16,000. The home port of the vessel was Philadelphia, the owners being Patrick Dempsey and Henry Hess, who reside here; the former having four-fifths, the latter one. Dempsey, managing owner, ordered and superintended the repairs. Mr. Woodall sought the work for his company, and came to Philadelphia to obtain it. At that time it was supposed $5,500 would cover the cost. The vessel was subsequently taken to the libellants' place at Baltimore and the work commenced in pursuance of arrangements made here. It was afterwards found that much more must be done than had originally been contemplated, and a much larger bill incurred. On the completion of the work, notes (of Dempsey) were given for the $3,513 unpaid, and the vessel was delivered to the owners.

Woodall brought an action in personam against Dempsey and Hess for the $3,513. It appeared that plaintiff dealt with Dempsey alone and there was no evidence to show that he took any action or made any expenditure on the credit of Hess. The Court said:

In my opinion the case turns on the power of Dempsey, considered merely as managing-owner, to bind Hess by the contract for repairs. Upon this subject the decision in Spedden v. Koenig, 24 C. C. A. 189, 78 Fed. 504, relied on by the respondents, seems to be much in point. The syllabus of the case states correctly the rule applied by the court: