I am not inclined to blame any one for this unfortunate occurrence, though it may occur to the mind of the reader that good generalship would require that the commandant of a body of troops, in the heart of an enemy's country, should know whether or not the cavalry of that enemy was hanging on his flank and rear. And then, again, it may be urged with truth that the command was almost entirely without cavalry, though it was furnished with one company, as well as one of Snake Hunters, as they were called. The legitimate business in the army of the latter was scouting. They had no other duty to perform.
But however these facts may be, yet true it is that a regiment of the enemy's regular cavalry was not only hanging on the flank of our column, but occupied our rear—thus severing our communications, and cutting off our supplies.
On the 15th day of August we again moved forward, after first sending a company down to Hugh's Ferry. We proceeded through a densely wooded country, abounding in laurel and pau-pau, arriving at Cross Lanes, two and a half miles from Carnifex Ferry, on the Gauley River, in time to prepare our camp before night.
Soon after our arrival Captain Schutte, of Company K, was on picket duty at Carnifex Ferry. During the day the captain, for some unknown reason, conceived the idea of a scout across the river. Selecting fourteen of his men, he crossed over to the opposite bank, and, taking the main road, immediately pushed into the country. The march was made, apparently, without any apprehension of the presence of an enemy; at least, no steps appear to have been taken to prevent a surprise. All went well, however, until the party had made a distance of several miles, when, the first intimation they had of danger, they were fired upon by a party of cavalry, concealed in an adjacent thicket, and all but four of the party killed or wounded—Captain Schutte being wounded mortally. The survivors conveyed him to an old building, and, at his own request, left him. He expired soon after, and was buried on the spot by the rebels. The four men fled towards the river, and, being pursued, took to the woods. One, being separated from his companions, was pursued to the bank of the river, and was only saved by throwing himself into the stream from the projecting rocks. He concealed his body under water, keeping sufficient of his face above to sustain life. He could plainly distinguish the conversation of the rebels, and knew by it that they were in search of him. Here he remained during the day, and at night dragged himself upon the rocks. The next morning, tired and hungry, he floated himself down stream by clinging to the almost perpendicular rocks, until, arriving opposite a house, he was hailed by a woman, to whom he made known his condition. She immediately unfastened a canoe, and, paddling directly across the river to where he was lying, half famished in the water, helped him over its sides, and conveyed him to the other shore. Before they landed, however, the rebels discovered them, and gave the order to "halt." It not being obeyed, they fired, the bullets sinking harmlessly into the water. In a moment the two were lost to view in the pau-pau, which lined the river bank. The woman guided the soldier to her home, where she cared for him during a short illness, which succeeded his escape. When he was sufficiently recovered to join his command, he found the regiment had abandoned Cross Lanes, which had been occupied by the rebel forces. He returned to his former retreat, where he was concealed until the day of the disaster to the Seventh, when, taking advantage of the confusion into which the rebel forces were thrown during the affair, he escaped towards Gauley Bridge, which place he reached in safety the following day.
CHAPTER IV.
The skirmish at Cross Lanes. — Gallant conduct and final escape of the Seventh Regiment.
The occupation of Cross Lanes was considered by the authorities of the gravest importance. It was contiguous to three fords on the Gauley River, which, when possessed by the Federal forces, was a perfect protection to the left of the army occupying Gauley Bridge. Carnifex Ferry was immediately south two and one-half miles. There was a road leading from the vicinity of Gauley Bridge, on the south bank of the Gauley River, which unites with the Sunday road, crossing the river at this ferry. This road afforded the enemy a means of gaining the left of our forces, at Gauley Bridge. The occupation of Cross Lanes, therefore, by the enemy, would sever the communication between our forces at the above point, and the main army under Rosecrans, occupying the country from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, along Cheat Mountain.
Carnifex Ferry, was a point easily defended against a much superior force. Indeed, it had so many natural defences, that it elicited exclamations of surprise from men accustomed to the selection of places for defence. The current of the river was rapid, while the abrupt rocks on its banks afforded secure hiding places for a considerable body of troops. It was quite impossible to bring artillery to bear in such a manner on the position as to interfere materially with troops concealed there. It seems to be the opinion of most persons familiar with the place, that it would be quite impossible to dislodge a body of troops properly posted on the north bank of the river at this ferry, provided a stubborn resistance was made.
It was for the purpose of preventing the crossing of the enemy at this point that the force of Colonel Tyler was ordered to Cross Lanes. By keeping pickets well on the line of the river, to watch any advance of the enemy, the regiment was entirely safe at its camp, from which it was comparatively easy to re-enforce any portion of the line. But for some reason, the commanding officer failed to visit the ferry in person, until the afternoon of the day on which a peremptory order was received to report with his command at Gauley Bridge. Hitherto he had been entirely unable to give correct information, as to the probability of his being able to hold the ferry. He was ordered to abandon the position, because his dispatches were such, that they created an uneasiness in the minds of Generals Rosecrans and Cox, as to the propriety of trusting him to hold so important a position. Here was the fatal mistake. A lesser error had already been made, in withdrawing all the forces from Tyler, other than the Seventh. Had these forces remained, the position would probably not have been abandoned, as all would have felt secure. When the order to withdraw was received, the commanding officer regretted it as much as any one. But the mischief was already done; the order was imperative. On that evening, Monday, the regiment left Cross Lanes at 11 o'clock P.M., and the next day, by noon, was at Twenty Mile Creek, some eight miles from Gauley Bridge.
On the Wednesday morning following, Colonel Tyler reported in person to General Cox. In the mean time, the general having become satisfied that Colonel Tyler could be trusted to hold Cross Lanes, and being confident that the contemplated attack of the enemy on Gauley Bridge had been abandoned, ordered him to return as soon as the troops were rested, expecting him to start back, at least the next morning. But Tyler did not move. On Friday afternoon, General Cox, on learning that he had not moved, was much excited, and said to an officer present—