The Seventh Regiment: A Record

by George L. Wood

A dispatch being sent to Charleston, on the following day a provision-train met them twelve miles from the latter place. In due time the command arrived at Charleston, weary and foot-sore from their long and toilsome march.

CHAPTER V.
Reflections on the Skirmish at Cross Lanes. — Battle of Carnifex Ferry.

The occasion for the affair at Cross Lanes was brought about by a series of blunders. The first blunder was committed by the officer who ordered all the forces, with the exception of the Seventh Ohio, from a position which enabled them to guard the ferries of the Gauley. If it was deemed important to hold these ferries at all, it was certainly advisable to retain a sufficient force to guard against surprise and capture. But then, what would be considered a sufficient force? To settle the question, it is necessary to take into account the size of the army occupying the country, as well as the size of that of the enemy. Neither army was large, and both were much scattered, scarcely more than a brigade occupying one position. A regiment, therefore, may perhaps be considered a sufficient force for an outpost.

The army in Western Virginia was at no time sufficiently large to accomplish any thing, under the best generalship, beyond simply holding the country, and preventing invasion; and it was only for the want of a moderately sized army that the rebel general failed to drive back our forces. But the rebel authorities had no men to spare for the purpose of winning barren victories; so the armies of Western Virginia were left to watch each other, with an occasional skirmish.

At the time the affair at Cross Lanes took place, our army occupied a front of many miles, as did also the rebel army. It was quite impossible to collect, in case of emergency, more than about six thousand men. But, however it may be as to the first point, it is clear, secondly, that the commanding officer at Cross Lanes committed an error in not making a personal inspection of the grounds, adjacent to the camp, immediately on his arrival. It is always considered highly important that those in command should know precisely the ground their commands are expected to defend, and not to trust to chance or a battle to develop favorable points of defence or attack. By reason of this want of knowledge, rumors as to the presence of the enemy in force created uneasiness and alarm, which was entirely natural, although without cause. While in this state of feeling, the commanding officer sent dispatches to Generals Rosecrans and Cox, which created the impression that their author was not to be trusted to hold these ferries. Those generals attributed this alarm to a want of personal courage, they being well informed as to the strength of the position at Cross Lanes. It was not, however, a want of courage, but simply a failure on his part to understand the real strength of the position, by reason of not having visited it in person.

When the order to withdraw came, Colonel Tyler regretted it as much as any one; for he had that day examined the position, and knew that he could hold it against any force the enemy could bring to the attack. But this knowledge was obtained too late: lying on his table was a positive order to withdraw. Reason said hold the position; military law, which was higher in authority, said abandon it; so the place was evacuated. The third and irremediable error was committed in not returning to Cross Lanes when ordered. If that had been done, the consequences resulting from the withdrawal would have been entirely checked. The order to return was given on Wednesday, with the expectation that it would be acted upon as soon as Thursday morning; but it was not until the Saturday noon following that the command started. There was no reason for this delay. The regiment had marched but eighteen miles in as many days, and could, without any injustice being done it, have returned the day the order was given. Even had the command moved as late as Friday, with dispatch, it would not have been too late, as it seems to be well settled that Floyd did not cross over any considerable body of troops until Saturday.

In the way of criticism on this affair, it has been said that, had a spirited dash been made on the enemy on Saturday evening, the rebels could have been driven across the river. I think this claim subject to many doubts. In my opinion a reconnoissance should have been made that night, instead of falling back to Panther Mountain. This would have resulted in the discovery of their position and force, and thus given the command an opportunity to take advantage of the night to withdraw. Had this been done, the ferry might possibly have been reached.

The result of these blunders was the fighting of two engagements, with a heavy Federal loss, while the enemy suffered less. One of these, Carnifex Ferry, has been dignified with the name of battle, while the other is considered but an affair.

After the repulse of the Seventh, Floyd intrenched himself on the bank of the river, near the ferry. About two weeks later, "Rosecrans came down with his legions," comprising about four thousand men. Approaching the vicinity of the ferry, he threw forward General Benham's brigade, with no design of bringing on an engagement, however; but the line unwittingly advanced to within a short distance of the enemy's works, when a sheet of flame shot along their entire line. The unequal contest lasted five hours, when the Union forces withdrew, hungry and supperless, with a loss of fourteen killed, and one hundred and four wounded. The loss of the enemy was about twenty wounded.