Near the middle of April, 1863, the regiment marched down to Aquia Landing, where it remained in camp for two weeks.
General Hooker was now in command of the grand Army of the Potomac, having relieved Burnside after that general's unsuccessful attack on Fredericksburg. Hooker resolved to make an attempt to drive the rebel army from the vicinity of the Rappahannock. Burnside's failure had demonstrated the impracticability of crossing the river at Fredericksburg; for no army was safe for a moment with a strong army behind three lines of well-constructed earthworks in its front, and a wide and deep river in its rear. He therefore chose a flank movement by the way of Banks and United States fords, thus striking the left flank of the enemy near Chancellorsville Court-house, and avoiding their strong fortifications in the rear of Fredericksburg.
The Seventh Regiment arrived in the vicinity of Chancellorsville on the afternoon of the 30th of April, and encamped for the night a little southeast of the latter place, and near the Fredericksburg plankroad.
Early on Friday morning it was ordered forward, and took position in the second line of battle, in an open wood-lot, facing south. Late in the afternoon it was ordered back; and it finally took position directly south of the famous brick house, called the Chancellorsville Place, where headquarters were established and maintained during most of the action.
Just before dark the rebels came up in great numbers, in an attack on Knapp's Battery, which was stationed on the left. The Seventh was ordered to its support, but the attack was repelled before the regiment became warmly engaged. It remained in support of this battery during the night and in the forenoon of the following day. About noon of the 2d of May, the regiment was ordered forward to support a line of skirmishers; but this line, refusing to advance, was passed by the regiment, when it took the advance, and most handsomely drove the enemy back for some distance, holding the ground for several hours, when it was ordered to retire. It did so without confusion, taking a new position in rear of a piece of woods, where it remained until ordered into the intrenchments.
During this advance, the right wing was hotly engaged, and lost heavily; the left wing suffering slightly. It remained during the night in its old position near the brick house, in the second line of battle.
On the 3d, the regiment advanced to what is known as "the old rifle-pit," which it occupied while the other troops were falling back across a cleared field south of the Fredericksburg plankroad. Here it was exposed to a galling fire from the advancing rebel column; but it stood firm. When the balance of the troops of the brigade were in proper position, it formed under the protection of a battery, and slowly moved off the field, exposed to a terrible fire of both musketry and artillery, taking up its position in rear of the brigade. The brigade, however, was soon driven back, and passed to the rear of the regiment, exposing it to a severe fire. Soon the order came for a general advance, when the brigade, with a loud shout, dashed at the foe, led by the Seventh. The rebels were pushed back for a considerable distance; but no support coming up, the brigade was compelled to fall back to the south of the brick house, where it halted, and laid down in the road; but about eleven o'clock at night the shelling became so continuous and heavy that it was forced still further back, and finally resulting in its withdrawal to the vicinity of United States Ford. That night the regiment occupied a rifle-pit about half a mile from the river. At four o'clock in the afternoon of the 5th, it was relieved by the Fifth Ohio; and taking a circuitous route, arrived in a ravine on the left of the column, and near the river, and was soon after employed in the intrenchments.
Early in the morning of the 6th, the regiment crossed the river on a pontoon at United States Ford, and in the afternoon of the 7th arrived at its old camp at Aquia Landing.
In this battle the regiment was actively engaged but a small portion of the time. The loss was not severe, when taking into account the magnitude of the engagement, and its duration.
Why the army recrossed the river has not been fully explained. The immediate battle was not a defeat; at least it has not been considered as such. However, the two columns of Sedgwick and Hooker failed to unite, which fact may have had an influence in determining the retreat. The attacks of the enemy had been repulsed at all points, while Sedgwick had carried a portion of their fortifications in rear of Fredericksburg. The retreat alone turned a prospective victory into a humiliating defeat. The grand army failed to accomplish the purpose of its advance, and was compelled to hasten its march across the river in retreat, over which it had, but a week before, advanced in triumph. It can be said by way of apology only, that while at Chancellorsville the army maintained its reputation for bravery and endurance, the enemy manifestly looked upon it as a fruitless victory to him.