“You would not be reasonable.”
“What would you say to me?”
“I should say, ‘Please, sir, let me learn the proposition first, and then I shall be able to admire it. I don’t know it yet!’”
“Very good!—Now again, suppose, when you tried to learn it, you were not able to do so, and therefore could see no beauty in it—should I blame you?”
“No, sir; I am sure you would not—because I should not be to blame, and it would not be fair; and you never do what is not fair!”
“I am glad you think so: I try to be fair.—That looks as if you believed in me, Davie!”
“Of course I do, sir!”
“Why?”
“Just because you are fair.”
“Suppose, Davie, I said to you, ‘Here is a very beautiful thing I should like you to learn,’ and you, after you had partly learned it, were to say, ‘I don’t see anything beautiful in this: I am afraid I never shall!’—would that be to believe in me?”