This, too, at once suggests the moral question, Is it right? There is no necessity, for our present purpose, to moot that question. We have, over and over again, challenged investigation; but the case is too clear to admit of discussion. Again, although we humbly submit that the moral bearing of philosophical questions must always be a legitimate subject of inquiry, yet it is inexpedient to introduce that question where it is not required. The questions whether the progress of physiology has been accelerated by experiments on living animals, or whether the treatment of diseases has been improved by that mode of inquiry, or whether it has tended to mislead people into erroneous and mischievous views, are all things that admit of proof entirely independent of moral considerations. Now we should be sorry to appear to undervalue that which we most highly prize, or to represent that to be irrelevant which is, in all subjects, the great consideration; but it is wise to take the ground chosen by those who argue in support of a fallacy; not that which they would ignore, or regard as disputable.
As we have already observed, we think it demonstrable that experiments on living animals, involving cruelty, have been entirely unproductive, whilst they have tended to mislead more than any other mode of investigation whatever. Many years since, we corrected some very extraordinary mis-statements in regard to the experiments of Orfila, Sir Charles Bell, and others, which could only be accounted for by a want of attention to the works from which they were selected; for it is curious to observe that (though different in kind) the most conclusive evidence of the erroneous value attributed to the experiments is furnished by the distinguished authors themselves.
Orfila wished to know what would be the effect of various poisons on the animal economy. He therefore set to work as follows:—He opened the gullet of a living animal, put in the poison, and then tied the tube; and this to ascertain how the stomach dealt with substances of this kind taken into that organ. Now there have been, unfortunately, too many instances afforded, by accidents and by suicides, of these very things in the human subject; presenting us with a series of facts, deplorable enough, it is true, but which, regarded merely as grounds of philosophical inquiry, are comparatively free from objection; whilst the experiments made by Orfila on his tortured animals are obviously loaded with all the elements of fallacy. It is surely not necessary to urge, as one of these, so serious a preliminary as placing a ligature on the gullet. We say nothing of the horrible cries that Orfila describes these animals as uttering; but surely, if the object had been to interfere with and obscure the processes of nature by every conceivable ingenuity, one could not have imagined any conditions better calculated for this purpose.
Sir Charles Bell was a physiologist who distinguished himself by a really important discovery; and it has been cited as an example of the successful application of the mode of inquiry in question. This is entirely an error. Whoever will read his book, will at once perceive the truth of that which he himself judiciously observes; namely, that physiology is much more a science of observation than experiment. As to the influence of experiments on animals, in his own discoveries, we have the best possible authority for denying it; viz. Sir Charles Bell himself. He states very clearly the object with which he was reluctantly induced to make some experiments. They had, in fact, nothing to do with his discovery. They were made in reluctant concession to the slowly-paced perceptions of others.
This he had the manliness to acknowledge, and the benevolence to regret. In short, examine what series of such experiments we may, we always find them either wholly unproductive, or, if they appear to prove anything of value, it is always something that is much more logically deducible from sources altogether unobjectionable. But if this be so, is there no mischief in unproductive modes of inquiry? Again—putting aside the brutalizing tendency of such practices as part of the moral question—Is life so long? Is Science so easy? Is Physiology, and especially the deplorably halt condition of Medical Science, in such a state that we can afford to waste time in vicious modes of inquiry? We think not. Is there nothing mischievous in our endeavour to obtain by the evidence of sense (the eye) that insight into nature which Lord Bacon has so emphatically warned us is the office of higher—in fact, of our intellectual—perceptions? If we are not allowed to indulge in feelings of disgust and abhorrence at all that is revolting to common sense, and our best and kindliest sentiments, can we read, without distrust, of experiments which so disgust by their nature that we know not how to describe them; or which are so revolting, from their cruelty, that the mind recoils from the contemplation of them? Is it possible to read many of the experiments of Spallanzani[24], without feeling the same disgust that Abernethy used to express in regard to them; or to read of opening animals alive, dividing them with instruments, breaking their bones, or running red-hot wires into their cavities, without feeling (if, indeed, any thing better is to be regarded as merely "mawkish sentimentality") that at least valuable time has been wasted in pursuits which have been brutalizing and unproductive?
In a review of a Biography of Sir Astley Cooper, in the "Quarterly," an experiment there described was characterized by the writer as "Hellish." We have no desire whatever to use unnecessarily strong terms; nor do we think that the one above mentioned was too strong for the case to which it referred; but we think that this extremely fallacious mode of investigation will be most quickly abandoned, by meeting fairly and in a mild and moderate spirit any allegations in its favour. Dr. Hull, of Norwich, and several other eminent persons, have expressed their dissent from this mode of inquiry.
Sir Isaac Newton considered cruelty to animals a violation of Christian charity[25].
For our part, we have several times stated our willingness to discuss any class of experiments which may be selected; for, although we may not express ourselves so well as a late writer in the "Quarterly," yet to our minds heaven and hell do not present an idea of greater contrast than that afforded by the notion—that laws which govern the whole animal kingdom, and which present, at every moment, accumulating evidences of goodness and mercy, should be auspiciously sought, much less have their nature and relations developed, by torture of those very objects for whom such benevolent provisions have been designed. We have paid some attention to this subject; and it is very curious to remark, that observations or experiments, when they cease to be cruel, become instructive.
Indeed, if we reflect for a moment, we shall see that it must be so. If we desire to know the actual nature of any living being, it must be as if we were ourselves unseen—that is, that the animal may be in a perfectly undisturbed condition. The moment we lose this, elements of interference immediately arise and fog our reasoning; and the more refined the inquiry, the more the avoidance of disturbance becomes essential: in fact, the utmost success in obtaining the conditions philosophically necessary, depends on maintaining as nearly as possible the natural condition—that is, the comfort of the animal; so that the conditions necessary on philosophical grounds, and those which we regard as still more important after all, coincide.
In every path of life, there are unpleasant duties; and it might have happened that the functions of animals could only have been investigated by the means we would repudiate: but the simple truth is, that it is demonstrably otherwise.