Of the garrison of 5653 no less than 2312 were on the sick list, when, on the 26th, came the great crisis of the defence of Quebec:
"On the night of the 26th April, a man of the French army who, with some others had been cast away in a boat that night, came down the river on a piece of ice, and being taken up next morning at the Town, gave the General information that the chevalier de Levi [Lévis] was within twenty miles of us, with an army of about twelve thousand men, made up of regulars, Canadians and savages.
"27th April, 1760.—The Governor marched out, with the Grenadiers and Piquets of the garrison, to support the Light Infantry which had taken post some days before near Cap Rouge. By the time he got out, the vanguard of the French army appeared; upon which, he thought it adviseable to withdraw the Light Infantry, and all the other outposts, and retire to Town; and for that purpose he sent orders to the 28th, 47th and 58th and Colonel Fraser's Regiment to march out to St. Foy and cover his retreat; the 35th Regiment, 2nd Battalion Royal Americans having been detached in the morning to prevent the enemy, in case they attempted to land at Sillery or any other place near the Town. The retreat was accordingly effected without any loss, tho' the enemy were so nigh as to skirmish with our rear till we got within half a league of the Ramparts.
"On the 28th April, 1760, about eight o'clock in the morning, the whole Garrison, exclusive of the Guards, was drawn up on the parade, and about nine o'clock we marched out of Town with twenty pieces of Field Artillery, that is, two to each Regiment. The men were likewise ordered to carry a pick axe or spade each. When we had marched a little way out of Town, we saw the advanced parties of the Enemy nigh the woods, about half a league distant from us. When we were about three-quarters of a mile out of Town, the General ordered the whole to draw up in line of Battle, two deep, and take up as much room as possible. Soon thereafter, he ordered the men to throw down the intrenching tools, and the whole Army to advance slowly, dressing by the right, having drawn up the 35th Regiment and 3rd Battalion Royal Americans in our rear as a corps of reserve, with one hundred men (in a redoubt which was begun by us a few days preceding) to cover our retreat in case of necessity. In this order, we advanced, about one hundred paces, when the canonading began on our side, and we observed the French advanced parties retiring, and their main body forming in order of Battle at the edge of the wood, about three hundred paces distant we continued canonading and advancing for some minutes. The enemy, on their side, played against the left of our army, where our Regiment happened to be, with two pieces of cannon and killed and wounded us some men. The affair begun now to turn serious, when the General ordered the Light Infantry, who were posted on the right of our army, to attack five companies of French Grenadiers who they obliged to retire, but they being supported by a large column of the enemy, the Light Infantry were in their turn obliged to give way, which they doing along the front of our line on the right (as I am told) hindered our men on the right from firing for some minutes which gave the enemy full time to form. On the left, matters were in a worse situation. The company of Volunteers of the garrison, commanded by Captain Donald McDonald of our Regiment, and Captain Hazen's company of Rangers who covered the left flank of our army having been almost entirely destroyed, were obliged to give way; by this means the left of the 28th Regiment was exposed, and this obliged them to give ground after an obstinate resistance; Colonel Fraser's Regiment was next them to the right, and being in danger of being surrounded, and at the same time extremely galled by a fire from the Bushes in front and flank, were under a necessity of falling back instantly, when Colonel Fraser who commanded the Left Brigade consisting of the 28th, 47th and his own Regiment, sent orders to the 47th to retire; they were drawn up with a small rising ground in their front, which till then covered them pretty much from the enemy's fire, but as most of the Regiment to the right, as well as the two Regiments to the left of them, had by this time retired, it was absolutely necessary for the 47th to quit that ground, otherwise they must inevitably have been surrounded in a few minutes. Most of the Regiments attempted to carry off their artillery, but the ground was so bad with wreaths of snow in the hollows, that they were obliged to abandon them, after nailing them up, as well as the intrenching tools. Every Regiment made the best of their way to Town, but retired however in such a manner that the enemy did not think proper to pursue very briskly, otherwise they must have killed or made prisoners many more than they did. Our loss was about three hundred killed, and about seven hundred wounded, and a few Officers and men made prisoners. We had about three thousand in the field, one-third of whom had that very day, come voluntarily out of the Hospitals; of these, about five hundred were employed in dragging the cannon, and five hundred more in reserve, so that we could have no more than two thousand in the line of battle, whereas the enemy must have had at least four times as many, beside a large body in reserve, and notwithstanding their great superiority we suffered very little in the retreat; some Regiments attempted to rally, but it was impossible to form in any sort of order with the whole, till we got within the walls.
"Our Regiment had about four hundred men in the field near one half of whom had that day come out of the Hospital, out of their own accord. We had about sixty killed and forty wounded, and of thirty-nine officers, Captain Donald McDonald who commanded the volunteer company of the army, and Lieutenant Cosmo Gordon who commanded the Light Infantry company of our Regiment, were both killed in the field; Lieutenant Hector McDonald and Ensign Malcolm Fraser died of their wounds, all very much regretted by every one who knew them. We had twenty-three more Officers wounded; of this number was Colonel [Simon] Fraser, who commanded the left wing of the army, and it was with great pleasure we observed his behaviour during the action, when he gave his orders with great coolness and deliberation. He was touched at two different times; the first took him in the right breast but having his cartouche box slung, it luckily struck against the star of it and did not penetrate tho', otherways, must infallibly have done his business. The second, he got in the retreat, but striking against the cue of his hair, he received no other damage than a stiffness in his neck for some days. [Fraser then adds this tribute to Lord Lovat's son:] Here I cannot help observing that if any unlucky accident had befallen our Colonel, not only his Regiment must have suffered an irreparable loss, but I think I can, without any partiality say, it would be a loss to his Country. His behaviour this winter in particular to his Regiment has been such, as to make him not only esteemed by them, but by the Garrison in general. Captain Alexander Fraser of our Regiment, was wounded in the right temple, and thought very dangerous, the rest are mostly flesh wounds. I received a musket ball in the right groin, which was thought dangerous for three or four days, as the ball was supposed to be lodged, but whether it has wrought out in walking into Town, or did not penetrate far enough at first to lodge, or is still in, I cannot say, but in twenty days I was entirely cured, and the wound which was at first but small was entirely closed up.
"When we marched out, we thought the General did not intend to give the French battle; and as he ordered the Army to carry out intrenching tools, we thought he meant to throw up works on the rising ground, before the Town, if the Enemy should not choose to attack him that day; but, it seems he changed his mind on seeing their situation, which gave him all the advantage he could desire with such an inferior Army and where, if the Enemy ventured to attack him, he could use his Artillery, on which was his chief dependence, to the best purpose: having a rising ground, whereon he might form his Army and plant his Cannon, so as to play on the Enemy as they advanced for about four hundred or five hundred yards, with round shot, and when they came within a proper distance the grape shot must have cut them to pieces. However, it seems he observed the enemy, some formed at the edge of the wood, some forming, and the rest marching from St. Foy. The bait was too tempting, and his passion for glory getting the better of his reason he ordered the Army to march and attack the enemy, as he thought, before they could form, in a situation the most desired by them and ought to be avoided by us, as the Canadians and Savages could be used against us to the greatest advantage in their beloved (if I may say element) woods. It would give me great pleasure to relate something more to the advantage of this gentleman who is, in many respects, possessed of several virtues, and particularly all the military ones, except prudence, and entirely free of all mercenary principles; but, as his conduct on this occasion is universally condemned by all those who are not immediately dependent on him, truth obliges me to state matters as I believe, they really stood; more especially as it is not said he advised with any of those who had a right to be consulted before such a step should be taken. Nay, it is said: that the preceding night, at a meeting with the different Commandants of the Corps, he declared his intention of fortifying himself on the heights and not to attack the Enemy, unless he should be forced to it, which we were persuaded of by his orders to carry out intrenching tools. We had very little chance of beating an Army four times our number [an exaggeration: they were not twice as numerous] in a situation where we could scarce act; and if the Enemy had made a proper use of their advantage, the consequences must have proved fatal to us, as they might have got betwixt us and the Town, cut off our retreat, and by that means ruined us to all intents." [It will hardly be denied that the young officer is rather severe upon his future friend and patron, General Murray.]
"Our situation became now extremely critical: we were beat in the field, by an army greatly superior in numbers, and obliged to rely on what defence we could make within the walls of Quebec, which were hitherto reckoned of very little consequence against a superior army.
"The French that very night after the Battle opened trenches within six hundred yards of the walls, and went on next, 29th April, with their works pretty briskly. For the first two days after the battle there was very little done by us; and on the 1st of May, the largest of our block houses (small square redoubts of Logs musquet proof) was blown up by accident, and Captain Cameron of our Regiment and a subaltern of the 48th with several men, dangerously burnt and bruised. On the 3rd day after the battle, the General set about to strengthen or (I may say) fortify the Town, and the men worked with the greatest alacrity. In a few days there were about one hundred additional guns mounted, with which our people kept an incessant fire on the enemy, and retarded their works very much.
"On the 9th May, the Leostaff Frigate, Captain Dean, arrived from England, and brought us news from thence, and informed us that there was a squadron in the River, which might be expected every tide to our assistance. This added greatly to the spirits of the Garrison, and our works were carried on briskly. The General seemed resolved from the first to defend the place to the last. This, nobody doubted, and every one seemed to forget their late misfortune, and to place entire confidence in the General's conduct, which all must acknowledge very resolute, when reduced almost to an extremity.