[Footnote 1: Tract in Joh. Ev., vi. 25.]

The socialist commentators of St. Augustine have strained this, and similar passages, to mean that because property rests on human, and not on divine, right, therefore it should not exist at all. It is, of course true that what human right has created human right can repeal; and it is therefore quite fair to argue that all the citizens of a community might agree to live a life of communism. That is simply an argument to prove that there is nothing immoral in communism, and does not prove in the very slightest degree that there is anything immoral in property. On the contrary, so long as 'the emperors and kings of the world' ordain that private property shall continue, it would be, according to St. Augustine, immoral for any individual to maintain that such ordinances were wrongful.

The correct meaning of the patristic distinction between natural and positive law with regard to property is excellently summarised in Dr. Carlyle's essay on Property in Mediæval Theology:[1] 'What do the expressions of the Fathers mean? At first sight they might seem to be an assertion of communism, or denunciation of private property as a thing which is sinful or unlawful. But this is not what the Fathers mean. There can be little doubt that we find the sources of these words in such a phrase as that of Cicero—"Sunt autem privata nulla natura"[2]—and in the Stoic tradition which is represented in one of Seneca's letters, when he describes the primitive life in which men lived together in peace and happiness, when there was no system of coercive government and no private property, and says that man passed out of this primitive condition as their first innocence disappeared, as they became avaricious and dissatisfied with the common enjoyment of the good things of the world, and desired to hold them as their private possession.[3] Here we have the quasi-philosophical theory, from which the patristic conception is derived. When men were innocent there was no need for private property, or the other great conventional institutions of society, but as this innocence passed away, they found themselves compelled to organise society and to devise institutions which should regulate the ownership and use of the good things which men had once held in common. The institution of property thus represents the fall of man from his primitive innocence, through greed and avarice, which refused to recognise the common ownership of things, and also the method by which the blind greed of human nature might be controlled and regulated. It is this ambiguous origin of the institution which explains how the Fathers could hold that private property was not natural, that it grew out of men's vicious and sinful desires, and at the same time that it was a legitimate institution.'

Janet takes the same view of the patristic utterances on this subject:[4] 'What do the Fathers say? It is that in Jesus Christ there is no mine and thine. Nothing is more true, without doubt; in the divine order, in the order of absolute charity, where men are wholly wrapt up in God, distinction and inequality of goods would be impossible. But the Fathers saw clearly that such a state of things was not realisable here below. What did they do? They established property on human law, positive law, imperial law. Communism is either a Utopia or a barbarism; a Utopia if one imagine it founded on universal devotion; a barbarism if one imposes it by force.'[5]

[Footnote 1: Property, Its Duties and Rights (London, 1913).]

[Footnote 2: De Off., i. 7.]

[Footnote 3: Seneca, Ep., xiv. 2.]

[Footnote 4: Histoire de la Science politique, vol. i. p. 330.]

[Footnote 5: See also Jarrett, Mediæval Socialism.]

It must not be concluded that the evidence of the approbation by the Fathers of private property is purely negative or solely derived from the interpretation of possibly ambiguous texts. On the contrary, the lawfulness of property is emphatically asserted on more than one occasion. 'To possess riches,' says Hilary of Poictiers,[1] 'is not wrongful, but rather the manner in which possession is used…. It is a crime to possess wrongfully rather than simply to possess.' 'Who does not understand,' asks St. Augustine,[2] 'that it is not sinful to possess riches, but to love and place hope in them, and to prefer them to truth or justice?' Again, 'Why do you reproach us by saying that men renewed in baptism ought no longer to beget children or to possess fields and houses and money? Paul allows it.'[3] According to Ambrose,[4] 'Riches themselves are not wrongful. Indeed, "redemptio animae* viri divitiae* ejus," because he who gives to the poor saves his soul. There is therefore a place for goodness in these material riches. You are as steersmen in a great sea. He who steers his ship well, quickly crosses the waves, and comes to port; but he who does not know how to control his ship is sunk by his own weight. Wherefore it is written, "Possessio divitum civitas firmissima."' A Council in A.D. 415 condemned the proposition held by Pelagius that 'the rich cannot be saved unless they renounced their goods.'[5]