Highways and Highway Transportation

by George R. Chatburn

About this time Great Britain became involved in the Crimean War while in the United States the slavery question divided the country. Some hot-headed southerners wished forcibly to annex Nicaragua and filibusters actually joined in some of the “revolutions” which are almost always in progress in Central American States with the idea of extending slave territory.[55] Through one of these a man by the name of Walker had made himself head of Nicaragua and for two years remained a dictator. His rule was marked by severity and a series of acts that won him the enmity of the Central American States and also that of the Accessory Transit Company, whose charter and steamers he confiscated. He had secured the presidency and opened the state to slavery; he had also been able to get recognition at Washington. But another revolution broke out and he was driven out in 1857.

The action of Walker had destroyed American influence in Central America. In the United States opinion was divided. Slavery enthusiasts openly advocated control of any transit route across the isthmus and that “no power on earth should be suffered to impede.”[56] This and numerous other troubles which followed, off and on intermittently, delayed and prevented canal construction.

French Participation.

—After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 by the French an organization of French scientists made a careful study of the various routes across the Isthmus and decided the one at Panama to be the most feasible. As a result, in 1875, De Lesseps, the engineer of the Suez Canal, began a careful survey of that route and in 1878, Lucien Bonaparte Wyse, of the French Navy, secured from the United States of Colombia (which had succeeded New Granada) a concession giving a company to be organized by him exclusive right to construct a canal and railroad across the Isthmus of Panama. Neutrality was to be maintained and troops transported only by permission of Colombia. In return for this privilege and certain grants of land Colombia was to receive 5 per cent of the gross tolls collected. The concession was for ninety-nine years and the canal was to be opened within eighteen years. While it was claimed this concession did not conflict with the treaty of 1846 between New Granada and the United States, nevertheless it provided that the latter might share in its advantages. The concession was transferred to De Lesseps, who arranged for an International Congress of Geographical Sciences, which assembled in Paris, May 15, 1879. The United States was one of the twenty-five nations there represented. Fourteen projects involving seven different routes were discussed and included all that were considered feasible.

Without going into detailed description some of these routes may be mentioned. The Tehauntepec route was 148 miles long and required 120 locks, would take about twelve days to pass a vessel through, and was in the region of earthquakes. The Nicaraguan Route was favored by many—it was 180 miles long, needed 17 locks, but it required an actual construction of only 60 miles as existing rivers and lakes could be utilized. A route from the Chiriqui Gulf to the Gulf Dulce, another from the Gulf of Darien by way of the Atrato and Napipi Rivers, and another into the San Miguel Bay, were discarded for various reasons. The choice centered upon the route from Colon to Panama by way of the Culebra pass and the Chagres River. This route, the shortest of all, was only 45 miles in length, but there were several disadvantages. The Chagres River must be diverted by a large dam or carried for miles in an aqueduct.

A company (Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interoceanique) was organized and popular subscriptions invited. It was claimed that further than granting the charter the French Government had nothing to do with the canal. Stock could be owned by people of all nations, but the United States did not take kindly to the measure, although no formal action to prevent the construction of the canal was taken. Several promotion schemes were advanced by private individuals to head off the French and Congress was petitioned for aid. Captain Eads, who by jetties had deepened the mouth of the Mississippi River, and an engineer of note, suggested a ship railway across the isthmus of Tehauntepec. A “Marine Canal Company of Nicaragua” wanted Congress to guarantee its capital stock; another Nicaraguan company had Ex-President Grant as a sponsor.[57] The surveys made by the United States of the Panama and of the Atrato-Napipi routes in 1875, were printed by order of Congress. In 1880 the House asked the president for the report of surveys made in 1872 and submitted in 1875 which had not yet become public; this report recommended the Nicaraguan route.

From time to time indignation was manifested in the United States against allowing a foreign country to gain a foothold even though by a neutral company on the American continent. The Monroe Doctrine was brought out; the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was presented; the reports of Congressional Commissions were referred to as arguments against the De Lesseps Canal. Various other complications entered, one of which was a possible conflict of authority if in case of a revolution on the Isthmus it were necessary to send troops by the United States to maintain the neutrality of the railroad and by France troops to maintain the neutrality of the canal.

Sweeping aside these questions De Lesseps made preparation to construct the canal, and landed a force of seventy engineers, superintendents and workmen on the Isthmus of Panama in 1881. De Lesseps planned a tide-water canal which would require a cut of 285 feet in the Culebra pass. Difficulties encountered from slides in this cut and other reasons made it advisable afterwards to change the plans. De Lesseps purchased much machinery in Europe and America at large expense; bought the Panama railroad for $17,000,000, because the line of the Canal crossed it frequently and it could be utilized for transporting materials, and began the operation of opening up the cut at various points along its course. The engineers estimated the cost at 843,000,000 francs; this, De Lesseps cut to 600,000,000 francs, and set the opening ceremonies for 1888.

During the Garfield administration Secretary of State Blaine held out for a strong American policy and informed Colombia, which was charged with making arrangements whereby certain European powers might assume joint guarantee over the canal, that “any movement in the sense of supplementing the guarantee contained (in the treaty of 1846) would necessarily be regarded by this government as an uncalled for intrusion into a field where the local and general interest of the United States of America should be considered before those of any other power save those of Colombia alone.”[58] England claimed to be a new world power equally interested with the United States in maintaining the neutrality of the canal. Blaine proposed amending the Clayton-Bulwer treaty so that the United States could fortify the canal, also to annul that part extending it to any other practical routes so that the United States might be free to build a canal at Panama or elsewhere as it chose. Garfield’s death and Blaine’s retirement from the cabinet ended for the time being policies regarding South and Central Americas that would either have brought the United States in trouble with England or secured to her complete control of the canal and also, perhaps, much of South American trade. A treaty with Nicaragua allowing the construction of a canal wholly under American control, the United States guaranteeing the integrity of the territory of Nicaragua, which was undoubtedly a violation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and prepared by Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State under Arthur, for the purpose of testing that treaty, was withdrawn by President Cleveland who was inaugurated before its confirmation.

There was a growing feeling that the De Lesseps company would never finish the canal. The company had spent $10,000,000 more than the estimate of 600,000,000 francs ($120,000,000), and had not paid the $17,000,000 promised for the Panama railway. In fact it was bankrupt. While a large amount of excavation had been done, it was small compared with what was necessary. A magnificent plant with much costly machinery was going to decay.