Imperial Federation: The Problem of National Unity

by George R. Parkin

The Australasian colonies aspire, and reasonably aspire, to dominance in the Pacific. That manifestly depends on having at command the naval power which can be best secured by co-operation with the Empire. The creation of substantial interests in the heart of the Pacific, such as would be involved in the construction of cable, postal and commercial routes, linking Australia and New Zealand with Canada in one direction, with the West Indies and Great Britain in another (when the Panama route is open), interests which the whole Empire would be concerned in securing, would do more than anything else to give effect to Australian aspirations.

However threatening or annoying the presence of Germany and France in the Southern Seas might be to an independent Australia before she had arisen to a position of great naval strength, I cannot but think that every German and French station in the Pacific, so long as the Empire remains one, is a guarantee of peace. So overwhelming would be the advantage {212} in naval and coaling bases, and in reserves of fighting force, enjoyed by a united British people in those seas, that any European nation could not but expect that a declaration of war against the British Empire would be followed by an immediate attempt on our part to sweep the enemy from the few ports which he might hold in the Pacific; and it cannot be doubted that such an attempt would be made with every probability of success.

There are those who think that Australian Federation will not make for British unity, but will instead prove the prelude to Australian Independence. I believe that this is an entirely mistaken view. But were it true; did the choice for Australians lie between Federation with the Empire and Federation among the colonies themselves, I unhesitatingly say that the true course would be to accept the latter. Until Australia can act and speak as a unit, she is incapable of deciding wisely and conclusively upon her own destiny; she is not in a position to take her right place and exert her due influence in a federation of nations. A number of colonies grouped as are those of Australia, which failed to see the advantage of a common political life, or were unwilling to make the sacrifices necessary to secure it, would remain in a state of political unrest and incomplete development which would render them a weakness rather than a strength in a great national combination. Much as I believe in the advantages which would come to Australia, to the other colonies, to Great Britain and {213} to the world at large from British unity, I yet am convinced that it would be better that Australia should be isolated from the Empire than that she should be divided within her own boundaries. This opinion is entertained, I feel sure, by ninety-nine out of every hundred advocates of a United Empire.

In Canada, however, confederation has not had the effect of weakening attachment to the Empire. By giving the people a larger political judgment it has made them weigh more seriously the responsibilities of national existence and made them value more highly connection with a powerful state.

Meanwhile the contest going on in Australia is the best of all preparations for the acceptance of the wider idea of national unity, since it leads to the accurate definition of principles, and a careful balancing of the gain and loss involved in large organization.

Canadian experience leads us to think that Australian Federation would lend itself to national union in another way. In Canada before 1867, the date of Confederation, the Colonial Office was continually appearing as a factor in provincial politics. Whatever trouble arose, Downing Street was to blame, and party passion vented all its bitterness upon this official representative of England's policy. It is safe to say that Confederation eliminated the Colonial Office as an active, or at any rate, an irritating factor from Canadian party politics. It was found that by far the larger number of those questions which gave rise {214} to friction with the Colonial Office were transferred to the domain of the Dominion government; that the difficulties were such as were necessarily incident to the management of a large state; that Canadians had to fight out among themselves disputes once fought out with an English minister. It is a striking fact that since Canada attained to a united voice on public questions, since confederation imposed upon her the necessity of dealing with internal difficulties and forming a large judgment on common affairs, not only has no serious difficulty arisen with the Colonial Office, but the deliberately expressed opinion of the Canadian Government has, as a rule, given a general direction to British policy in dealing with external matters which concerned Canada.

In one or two of the Australian colonies the Colonial Office is still heard of occasionally as it was in Canada thirty or forty years ago; the Colonial Secretary of the day is a frequent subject of political lampoon; denunciation of his policy is a part of the stock-in-trade of the party politician. To say that this denunciation is affected rather than real is not enough; it is at times a very real irritant between English and Australian feeling. The federation of Australia will, in my opinion, remove this irritant as federation did in Canada, and by eliminating petty differences enable people to take larger views and have fewer suspicions in national affairs. If the Federal Government of Australia reserve the right, as Canada has done, to appoint the governors of provinces, there will {215} be no opportunity for disputes such as that which arose with Queensland a few years ago. If the right be not reserved, a colony will have little room to complain about the manner of its exercise by the Colonial office.

I have pointed out the interest which it seems to me the Australian colonies have in all matters which affect the rule of the Empire in the East, and especially in the question whether Britain or Russia is in India. Military authorities, on the other hand, are agreed, and the fact is, indeed, manifest to any observer, that in the event of a great struggle for the possession of India, the advantage for the Empire as a whole would be immeasurable in having behind India the colonies of Australia and New Zealand, as a base of supply and support, even if they did not send a man into the field. The suggested creation of a great national arsenal in one of the southern colonies as a safe source of rapid supply of war material in case of any temporary break in the connection of India and the colonies with the United Kingdom is a proposal which recommends itself to the common sense of British people, who will have more at stake in the next great war than any nation ever risked before. In the single matter of equipping cavalry the colonies might well turn the scale in an Eastern war. Already both New Zealand and Australia export horses in considerable numbers to India, and indeed already furnish the bulk of the remounts for our Indian cavalry. The surplus stock {216} to be drawn upon is becoming great enough to stand almost any drain, and with the attention now given in the colonies to horse breeding quality is constantly improving. The command of men which the nation has in India, and of horses in Australia, would counterbalance anything that Russia can draw from the steppes of Tartary.

In the matter of food supplies, too, the colonies might play an important part. Army contracts for tinned meats are now filled by the great meat preserving factories, and the capacity of the vast pastures of Queensland and the farms of New Zealand to furnish food of this kind is practically unlimited. There remains to be noticed one all-important fact. The original acquisition of India, as the highest authorities now admit, depended upon Britain's easy access to its coasts by sea. With the Australian colonies and South Africa under the national flag that access could be easily maintained in the face of all comers. The permanence of the British position in India may be considered as resting very largely on this issue.

Whether in a critical contest for the possession of India Australia would contribute men, as well as supplies, may be left to conjecture. But looking at all that would be at stake for the colonies of the South, the failure to respond to a real call of need against Russia would indicate some falling off in that 'saving common sense' which has hitherto inclined British people to challenge enemies on the furthest {217} frontier rather than await them at their own doors. An Australian opinion has already been given upon this subject. A contingent of Australian troops sent to the Soudan may be put to the credit of impulsive national enthusiasm; a contingent one day on the frontier of Afghanistan might well be the outcome of deliberate and far-sighted Australian policy.